In general, Yara is in compliance with the Norwegian regulations relating to the organisation and procedures of the AGM.
Under ITEM 4.1, the board of directors seeks approval of the Company's remuneration guidelines. The proposed remuneration structure is not in line with ECGS' guidelines. Accordingly, ECGS recommends to vote OPPOSE.
Under ITEM 4.2, the board of directors seeks approval of a share-based incentive plan. In view of the low level of transparency, specifically regarding the performance conditions applicable to the incentive plan, ECGS recommends to vote OPPOSE.
Under ITEM 5, approval is sought for the Company's report on corporate governance. ECGS notes that Yara reports one deviation of the Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance which relates to the bundled election of the board of directors. Since ECGS considers it to be best practice for directors to be elected on an individual basis, it does not approve of the proposed deviation. Therefore, ECGS recommends to vote OPPOSE.
Under ITEM 6, the board of directors seeks approval of the auditor's remuneration. In view of the current term in office of the auditor, ECGS recommends to vote OPPOSE.
Finally, under ITEM 10, the nomination committee proposes to appoint 3 new members to the board of directors. As ECGS has concerns over the aggregate time commitments of no less than 2 of the 3 proposed new nominees, it recommends to vote OPPOSE.
Yara International is a holding company. Through its subsidiaries, Co. converts energy, natural minerals and nitrogen from the air into products for farmers and industrial customers. Co. provides mineral fertilizers, industrial products and environmental products and services to its customers. Its mineral fertilizer portfolio, sold as five main brands (YaraMila, YaraLiva, YaraVita, YaraBela, YaraVera) represents a range of crop nutrients. Its industrial portfolio contains a range of nitrogen chemicals as well as CO2 and dry ice. Its environmental product and services reduce NOx emissions, control unpleasant odor, prevent toxic gases, avoid corrosion and improve water quality.
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We expect Q1 EBITDA of USD468m, up 24% YOY but weaker than we previously expected due to soft European demand. However, urea prices are nearing the summer floor and Yara has confirmed that it will raise the improvement target at the next CMD. We reiterate BUY and our NOK480 target price but have lowered our underlying 2019–20e EBITDA by 2–5%.
Proxinvest Corporate Governance Rating ® helps investors integrate governance into their investment decision and identify governance risks and opportunities within their portfolio. Proxinvest Corporate Governance Rating ® Service rates European issuers through the analysis of four main themes : Ownership & Shareholder rights, Board & Committees, Audit & Process, Remuneration. Each theme is rated taking into account several comprehensive sub-categories. Our unique two-step process to achieve each rating includes a first step quantitative valuation and a second step qualitative filter...
Le renouvellement des mandats de Philippe Maubert, Christophe Maubert, Catherine Canovas, et Lionel Picolet sont soumis à l’approbation des actionnaires. Au regard du manque d’indépendance au conseil d’administration, Proxinvest s’opposera aux résolutions 5 à 8. La politique de rémunération pour 2019 présentée par la société dans le Rapport de Gouvernance d’entreprise est très insuffisante. L’absence de nombreuses informations ne permet pas à l’actionnaire d’estimer la rémunération attribuable aux dirigeants pour 2019. Ainsi, Proxinvest s’opposera à la résolution 9. Concernant la rémunératio...
GouvernanceLa société propose le renouvellement de 3 administrateurs et la nomination de 2 administrateurs indépendants. Parmi les renouvellements proposés figure celui de Julie Guerrand. Selon la politique de vote de Proxinvest, en cas de conseil ne comprenant pas une majorité de membres indépendants, Proxinvest soutient 1 représentant pour chacun des 3 principaux actionnaires. En l'occurrence, le représentant le plus légitime de H51, le premier actionnaire, est sa Présidente, Julie Guerrand. Nous soutenons donc son renouvellement, mais pas celui de M. Bauer. Concernant Mme Sénéquier, bien qu...
Le conseil n'est pas majoritairement composé de membres libres de conflits d'intérêts. Par conséquent, parmi les renouvellements proposés, seul le Président du conseil sera soutenu en raison de la séparation des fonctions avec la Direction Générale (résolutions 5 à 7). En ce qui concerne la rémunération 2018 du Directeur Général, l'absence de communication des taux de réalisation de chacun des critères financiers du bonus constitue un manque rédhibitoire pour Proxinvest. Par ailleurs, l'attribution d'actions gratuites est basée sur des critères non vérifiables et qui sont calculés sur une pér...
ITEM 10: Although the board does not comprise a majority of independent members, Julie Guerrand is the most legitimate representative of the main shareholder as she is its Chairman. Thus, we recommend approval. ITEMS 7 and 8: Axel Dumas’ additional remuneration is indexed to the Group’s revenue, but only in an upward direction. If the company underperforms, executive will not be impacted. This is not acceptable. Moreover, Emile Hermès SARL’s total remuneration reached €9.6 M in 2018, which widely exceeds the median CAC 40 executives and represents 458 times the French minimum wage (SMIC), wh...
The majority of the Board is not composed of independent members. Consequently, among the proposed renewals, only the Chairman of the Board will be supported due to the separation of functions with the Executive Management (resolutions 5 to 7). With regard to the 2018 remuneration of the CEO, the failure to communicate the achievement rates of each of the financial criteria related to the bonus constitutes a fundamental flaw for ECGS. In addition, the allocation of performance shares is based on criteria that cannot be verified and are calculated over a period of only two years, which is insu...
The Annual General Meeting will be held foreseeable on the second call on May 31st, 2019, at 12 p.m. The re-election of the Chairman is proposed in item 10. Mr. Antonio Brufau Niub has served on the Board since 1996 and has been Chairman for fifteen years. Prior to serving as Chairman, he served as CEO of the Company and Executive Chairman. There are concerns that his fixed fees of EUR 2.5 million per year imply that he continues to perform some executive functions. Furthermore, ECGS guidelines do not support the appointment of a former CEO as Chairman. This can undermine the Boardns supe...
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