Mr Lemoine, who chaired the Management Board for 9 years, left as of December 231st 2017. He was replaced by André François-Poncet.
Following his departure he received a severance amounting to €5,418,000, which is excessive.
Performance shares and stock options that were granted to him in 2017 were cancelled. However, the company did not prorate the non-yet vested performance shares and options that were granted to him previously.
Regarding the 2018 remuneration policy of the Management Board Member and Chairman, we appreciate that performance measurement period is now over 3 years for the performance shares. However, we regret that this improvement was not made for the options.
Finally, at the end of this 2018 AGM, the Chairman of the Board, François de Wendel will leave his position, as well as Ms Dominique Hériard-Dubreuil, Vice-Chairman. They will be replaced by Nicolas ver Hulst and Gervais Pellissier respectively.
Wendel is an investment company specializing in acquiring long-term holdings in industrial and services companies. Co.'s activities can be divided into six main divisions. Through Bureau Veritas, Co. provides conformity assessment services and certification. Through Stahl, Co. is engaged in high performance coatings and leather finishing products. Through Saint-Gobain, Co. manufactures, transforms and distributes construction materials. Through Legrand, Co. specializes in electrical and digital building infrastructures. Through Deutsch, Co. provides high-performance connectors. Through Materis, Co. provides specialty chemicals for construction.
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WENDEL (FR), a company active in the Business Support Services industry, now shows a lower overall rating. The independent financial analyst theScreener just confirmed the fundamental rating of 4 stars out of 4, as well as the stock market behaviour of the title as moderately risky. However, environmental deterioration penalises the general evaluation, which is downgraded to Neutral. As of the analysis date May 14, 2019, the closing price was EUR 120.30 and its expected value was estimated at EUR 117.79.
ITEMS 7 and 8: In the 2019 remuneration policies of the Members of the Management Board, the company proposes to increase the measurement period of the options performance condition up to 3 years, following ECGS past criticisms; we commend the Company for this change which is a significant improvement compared to the previous remuneration policy and justifies our support of Items 7 and 8. However, we urge the company to amend performance conditions of performance shares as vesting scales of 2 out of 3 performance conditions allow vesting in case of underperformance.
Rémunérations Pour la politique de rémunération 2019 de ses dirigeants, la société propose de porter à 3 ans la durée de mesure de la condition de performance des options, ce dont Proxinvest la félicite. Ce changement significatif positif est la raison pour laquelle Proxinvest soutient les résolutions 7 et 8. Nous encourageons toutefois la société à modifier les grilles d'acquisitions de 2 des critères de performance liés aux actions de performance puisque celles-ci permettent toujours l'acquisition en cas de performance inférieure à la médiane.
Item 3: Approve the Remuneration Report The structure is weighted more heavily towards short-term performance. One of the performance metrics for the LTI is the payment of sustainable dividends, which is not considered appropriate as executives can potentially influence the payout level. The LTI also includes relative TSR as a performance metric. Nevertheless, the quantum is not excessive and even maximum potential amounts are moderate. On balance, we recommend shareholders vote in favor. Item 4: Approve the Remuneration PolicyThe main concern with the Company's remuneration policy is that pa...
Item 2: Approve the Remuneration ReportThe remuneration structure is unsatisfactory. The main concern at the Company is that the potential maximum incentive pay including the bonus, matching shares on the deferred portion of the bonus and the LTI amounts to 1000% of base salary, which is considered grossly excessive. Actual incentive pay during the year was1.6 times the ECGS limit. Furthermore, variable remuneration is overly reliant on a single performance metric, benchmark profit before tax. A second performance criteria will be used in the coming year. We note that the Company has adjusted ...
Leadership changes Vittorio Colao was succeeded by Nick Read who was appointed Chief Executive Designate on 27 July 2018 and became Chief Executive on 1 October 2018. Margherita Della Valle joined the Board as Chief Financial Officer on 27 July 2018. Item 15: Advisory vote on the Remuneration ReportThe structure is unsatisfactory. The maximum bonus and total incentive pay exceed guidelines. The quantum for the year was excessive. Pay weighted more towards rewarding long-term performance, but there are overlapping performance conditions as free cash flow was used for both the STI and LTI. A b...
GOUVERNANCELa société n’est pas contrôlée ; pourtant, son conseil ne présente un taux d’indépendance que de 25% selon Proxinvest (33,33% selon la société). Cette situation est principalement due au pacte d’actionnaires conclu entre la société et ses 3 principaux actionnaires, BPIfrance, NSIG et CEA qui ont chacun 2 sièges au conseil (soit 17% du conseil chacun). Or, ils ne détiennent chacun que 11% du capital. Ils sont donc tous les 3 en surreprésentation. C’est cette surreprésentation et le manque d’indépendance du conseil qui explique que Proxinvest ne soutienne, pour chacun de ces 3 actionn...
RémunérationsAu titre de l’exercice 2018-2019, une rémunération exceptionnelle sous forme d’actions gratuites a été attribuée au Directeur Général. S’il est compréhensible que le conseil ait souhaité récompenser son DG pour avoir su gérer au mieux la crise du prix du liège, il semble cependant, très généreux de lui octroyer une rémunération exceptionnelle supérieure à son bonus (111% du bonus annuel précisément). De plus, cette rémunération exceptionnelle représente 35% de son fixe, alors que la politique approuvée par les actionnaires lors de la précédente assemblée générale prévoyait un plaf...
Résolution 7 : la société propose la mise en place d’une clause de non-concurrence, d’une durée identique à celle proposée en 2018 dans le cadre de l’opération avec Siemens (clause qui n’a pas pu être mise en place suite à l’échec de l’opération), mais d’un montant moindre (18 mois contre 24 mois précédemment). Proxinvest apprécie vivement la baisse du montant. Cependant, il excède toujours notre plafond de 12 mois de rémunération fixe + variable annuel ; aussi, nous ne soutenons pas cet engagement. Résolution 9 : La rémunération attribuée au titre de 2018/19 au PDG aurait pu être acceptable ...
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