We have serious concerns over the remuneration paid by the Group to the Lead Independent Director Mr. de Paz Mancho (€ 564'000 in 2017, € 485'000 in 2016 and € 500'000 in 2015), which seriously risks to compromise his independence. Therefore, we recommend that shareholders oppose his reappointment in item 3.2.
We also have concerns on the overrepresentation of the shareholders BBVA and CaixaBank, which are represented by 12% of Directors each with only 5% of the share capital. Therefore, we recommend that shareholders oppose the reappointment of Mr. Abril Pérez (item 3.3) and the appointment of Mr. Gual Solé (item 3.5), respectively representing BBVA and CaixaBank.
In item 6, shareholders are called to a binding vote on the 2019-2021 remuneration policy. The quality of disclosure is good, but we have serious concerns over the excessive fixed remuneration of the LID and the base salary of the executive Directors, which is used to calculate the variable remuneration. Although the fixed remuneration of the executive Chairman is 13.8% lower than that of his predecessor Mr. Alierta Izuel (Chairman-CEO until 2016), it is still significantly higher than the average of approximately € 1.1 million at largest European telecommunication companies. Furthermore, the annual bonus of the executive Chairman is capped at 233% of his base salary (194% for the CEO), significantly exceeding our voting policy limit of 150%. Also taking into account the egregious severance payments for the executive Directors (4 years of cash remuneration, significantly exceeding our voting policy limit of 2 years of remuneration), we recommend opposition. For the same reasons, we recommend that shareholders oppose the Annual Remuneration Report (advisory vote in item 10).
In item 8, we recommend that shareholders approve the 2018-2022 performance share plan. In our opinion, the Plan is adequately structured to achieve an alignment of interests between executives and shareholders in the long term, all performance conditions are disclosed and the maximum number of shares to be allocated to the Plan is in line with our voting policy limit of 5%.
Telefonica is engaged in the provision of public or private telecommunications services, including ancillary or complementary telecommunications services or related services. Co.'s fixed business includes: traditional fixed telecommunication services, Internet and broadband multimedia services, data and business-aplications services, and wholesale services for telecommunication operators. Co. also provides a range of mobile and related services and products to consumer and business customers, including mobile voice services, value added services, mobile data and Internet services, wholesale services, corporate services, roaming, fixed wireless, and, trunking and paging.
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Le renouvellement des mandats de Philippe Maubert, Christophe Maubert, Catherine Canovas, et Lionel Picolet sont soumis à l’approbation des actionnaires. Au regard du manque d’indépendance au conseil d’administration, Proxinvest s’opposera aux résolutions 5 à 8. La politique de rémunération pour 2019 présentée par la société dans le Rapport de Gouvernance d’entreprise est très insuffisante. L’absence de nombreuses informations ne permet pas à l’actionnaire d’estimer la rémunération attribuable aux dirigeants pour 2019. Ainsi, Proxinvest s’opposera à la résolution 9. Concernant la rémunératio...
GouvernanceLa société propose le renouvellement de 3 administrateurs et la nomination de 2 administrateurs indépendants. Parmi les renouvellements proposés figure celui de Julie Guerrand. Selon la politique de vote de Proxinvest, en cas de conseil ne comprenant pas une majorité de membres indépendants, Proxinvest soutient 1 représentant pour chacun des 3 principaux actionnaires. En l'occurrence, le représentant le plus légitime de H51, le premier actionnaire, est sa Présidente, Julie Guerrand. Nous soutenons donc son renouvellement, mais pas celui de M. Bauer. Concernant Mme Sénéquier, bien qu...
Le conseil n'est pas majoritairement composé de membres libres de conflits d'intérêts. Par conséquent, parmi les renouvellements proposés, seul le Président du conseil sera soutenu en raison de la séparation des fonctions avec la Direction Générale (résolutions 5 à 7). En ce qui concerne la rémunération 2018 du Directeur Général, l'absence de communication des taux de réalisation de chacun des critères financiers du bonus constitue un manque rédhibitoire pour Proxinvest. Par ailleurs, l'attribution d'actions gratuites est basée sur des critères non vérifiables et qui sont calculés sur une pér...
ITEM 10: Although the board does not comprise a majority of independent members, Julie Guerrand is the most legitimate representative of the main shareholder as she is its Chairman. Thus, we recommend approval. ITEMS 7 and 8: Axel Dumas’ additional remuneration is indexed to the Group’s revenue, but only in an upward direction. If the company underperforms, executive will not be impacted. This is not acceptable. Moreover, Emile Hermès SARL’s total remuneration reached €9.6 M in 2018, which widely exceeds the median CAC 40 executives and represents 458 times the French minimum wage (SMIC), wh...
The majority of the Board is not composed of independent members. Consequently, among the proposed renewals, only the Chairman of the Board will be supported due to the separation of functions with the Executive Management (resolutions 5 to 7). With regard to the 2018 remuneration of the CEO, the failure to communicate the achievement rates of each of the financial criteria related to the bonus constitutes a fundamental flaw for ECGS. In addition, the allocation of performance shares is based on criteria that cannot be verified and are calculated over a period of only two years, which is insu...
The Annual General Meeting will be held foreseeable on the second call on May 31st, 2019, at 12 p.m. The re-election of the Chairman is proposed in item 10. Mr. Antonio Brufau Niub has served on the Board since 1996 and has been Chairman for fifteen years. Prior to serving as Chairman, he served as CEO of the Company and Executive Chairman. There are concerns that his fixed fees of EUR 2.5 million per year imply that he continues to perform some executive functions. Furthermore, ECGS guidelines do not support the appointment of a former CEO as Chairman. This can undermine the Boardns supe...
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