During tthe year under review, the Company has been involved in litigation related to pesticide use, climate change, investments in Nigeria and an accident in Pakistan.
Item 2: Approve the Remuneration Report.
The structure is unsatisfactory. Although performance is weighted toward the long-term, the bonus exceeds guidelines, qualitative criteria exceed our limits, the severance provisions exceed guidelines and an excessive loss of office payment has been made during the year. There is overlap between the performance conditions used for the STI and LTI with cash flow from operating activites accounting for 30% of the bonus and 25 of the LTI. Actual and potential incentive pay is grossly excessive. In addition, the accrual rate used to calculate the pension contribution is not disclosed.
Approve share buybacks. Although FCF covered the dividend this year, we believe that Shell should prioritize debt repayment as it pays down its massive debt pile resulting from the BG acquisition.
Moreover, we are concerned by the fact that shareholders were not offered the opportunity to vote on the dividend.
Item 19: External Resolution.
Shareholders are asked to approve a shareholder proposal submitted by Follow This, a Dutch group representing shareholders that collectively hold 645,314 shares in Shell. The resolution requests that the Company set and publish targets that are aligned with the goal of the Paris Climate Agreement to limit global warming to below 2 degrees
Despite our misgivings regarding the lack of detail in the resolution, we do believe that oil majors such as Shell should play a fundamental role in promoting a low-carbon future and this starts by honoring the commitments under the Paris Agreement. Although the Company has made progress in reducing its GHG emissions in recent years, the lack of long-term targets critically undermines this process and fails to appropriately incentivize executives. Case in point is in 2017 where both Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions increased.
We additionally find it unacceptable that Shell did not make an attempt to link investments in New Energies to executive compensation. Moreover, a target annual budget of $1-$2 billion for said investments is abysmally low considering a capital budget that can easily exceed $20 billion in a given year. Shareholders should also note that, like most of its oil major peers, Shell is not a signatory to the Science-Based Targets Initiative.
As we concluded last year, the unwillingness to set tangible reduction targets for GHG emissions makes it difficult to truly measure Shell’s progress towards transitioning to cleaner energy and alludes to the fact that its strategy to reduce its carbon footprint rests heavily on the transition towards natural gas, especially after the BG acquisition.
Royal Dutch Shell is a holding company. Through its subsidiaries, Co. is engaged in the oil and gas industry. Co. reports its business through four segments: Integrated Gas, which engaged in the liquefaction and transportation of gas and the conversion of natural gas to liquids to provide fuels and other products; Upstream, which engaged in the exploration for and extraction of crude oil, natural gas and natural gas liquids; Downstream, which engaged in oil products and chemicals manufacturing and marketing activities; and Corporate, which comprising Co.'s holdings and treasury organisation, its self-insurance activities and its headquarters and central functions.
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Item 2: Approve the Remuneration Report The structure is unsatisfactory, though it is sufficiently weighted toward the long-term. Nevertheless, the bonus exceeds guidelines, qualitative criteria exceed our limits, and the severance provisions exceed guidelines. Although the pension contribution for the year was within guidelines, the accrual rate used to calculate the pension contribution is not disclosed. There is overlap between the performance conditions used for the STI and LTI with cash flow from operating activites accounting for 30% of the bonus and 25% of the LTI. Actual and potenti...
With the restoration of its cash dividend, Shell has demonstrated that it has taken the necessary steps to remain competitive in a world of $60/barrel oil. Like the rest of the integrated group, Shell has reduced its cost base, which had become bloated, in part by reducing headcount and improving its supply chain. Furthermore, the addition of BG’s low-cost production reduces Shell’s per-barrel operating cost, which ranked among the highest in its peer group. Shell already reduced operating cost by 20% from 2014 levels and holds that potential further reductions are possible in later years.At t...
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL (NL), a company active in the Integrated Oil & Gas industry, loses a star(s) at the fundamental level and sees its general evaluation downgraded. The independent financial analyst theScreener just removed a fundamental star(s) for a 2 over 4-star rating. As such, market behaviour remains unchanged and is evaluated as moderately risky. theScreener believes that the loss of a star(s) merits downgrade to the general evaluation of the title, which passes to Neutral. As of the analysis date May 7, 2019, the closing price was EUR 27.75 and its expected value was estimated at EUR 28...
L'ensemble des rémunérations des dirigeants mandataires sociaux font l'objet des résolutions 6 à 11. La particularité d'Infotel est de présenter des politiques de rémunération ne comportant aucune part variable. Cette spécificité n'est pas en accord avec notre politique de vote. Toutefois, les mandataires sociaux dirigeants sont tous actionnaires à au moins 1,99% du capital et les montants sont raisonnables, ce qui atténue nos réserves et permet des recommandations positives. Les caractéristiques du conseil d'administration ne répondent pas à nos attentes en matière de gouvernance puisqu'il e...
Suite au transfert des titres de la Société sur Euronext Growth le 6 août 2018, la Société n’a plus d’obligation de se référer au Code de Gouvernance MIDDLENEXT auquel elle se référait depuis 2010 pour l’élaboration du rapport du Président sur le gouvernement d’entreprise, le contrôle interne et la gestion des risques prévu à l’article 225-37 du Code de Commerce et relatif à l’exercice clos le 31 décembre 2009. La société ne précise pas à quel code elle se réfère. Proxinvest avait déjà souligné l’année précédente que ce changement vers un marché moins règlementé était regrettable ; communicati...
Proxinvest veut attirer l'attentions sur quelques points majeures: D'une part, nous félicitons la Société pour la modification statutaire visant à réduire la durée du mandat des membres du Conseil de Surveillance de 6 à 3 ans. D'autre part, nous regrettons les montants des membres du Directoire (en cours) qui sont trop élevés par rapport à la médiane des rémunérations totales des dirigeants de leur indice. Enfin, nous encourageons la Société à améliorer le taux d'indépendance du Conseil, qui est pour le moment de seulement 25%.
Le conseil présente une majorité de membres non libres de conflits d'intérêts d’après Proxinvest à cause surtout de l’ancienneté des administrateurs qui dépasse notre seuil de 11 ans. Il est présidé par le Directeur général. Par ailleurs, les mandats d'une durée de 6 ans semblent trop longs car ils ne permettent pas aux actionnaires de se prononcer assez fréquemment sur la composition du conseil. Les différentes autorisations financières ne respectent pas la politique de vote de Proxinvest en termes de montants mais également en raison de leur possible utilisation en période d'offre publique. ...
ITEM 10: Benoit Bazin was designated Deputy CEO as of 1 January 2019. The company proposes therefore to approve its 2019 remuneration policy, as well as its post-employments benefits. Overall, his remuneration policy structure is more in line with our recommendations and amounts at stake are more moderate than the CEO’s. Thus we support it. Regarding his post-employments benefits, his severance indemnity and non-compete clause do not respect our Guidelines. However, his supplementary pension plan does. Thus, we support Item 12.
GOVERNANCE On 1 June 2018, Laurent Mignon left his position as Chief Executive Officer to become Chairman of the Management Board of BPCE, Natixis' main shareholder with 71% of the capital. He succeeded François Pérol as Chairman of the Board of Directors of Natixis and François Riahi became the new Chief Executive Officer. The Board remains composed of a majority of members who are not free of potential conflicts of interest, which makes it impossible to support most of the many co-optations and renewals proposed (resolutions 12 to 22). REMUNERATION Due to changes in governance, in a...
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