Item 4: Since there is no vote on Management Board members' remuneration in Austria, we take this opportunity to voice our concerns regarding the remuneration system currently in place at Raiffeisen Bank International AG which we consider has several shortcomings: The targets for the short-term incentive (STI) have not been adequately disclosed. Likewise, there is no disclosure provided on maximum amounts. Since financial year 2014, there is no long-term incentive (LTI) in place. Benefits in kind and pension provisions are not disclosed separately but included in the fixed and other remuneration respectively. Although we consider the absolute amounts paid to the Management Board members as still acceptable, we urge the Supervisory Board to review the remuneration system and bring it in line with international standards. In line with our guidelines we would in principle recommend opposing the discharge of the Chairmen of the Supervisory Board's Personnel Committee, Dr. Walter Rothensteiner (until 22 June 2017) and Mag. Erwin Hameseder (since 22 June 2017), in financial year 2017. As the discharge is proposed in a bundled resolution, however, we recommend shareholders to oppose the discharge of the Supervisory Board as a whole.
Item 5.1: We recommend to oppose the proposed increase in remuneration of the Supervisory Board as we assess the absolute amount of remuneration under the amended system as above market practice and consider the increase as not acceptable.
Item 6: KPMG Austria, Vienna, is proposed as auditor for the current financial year. Ratio of non-audit/audit fees was 38.48% during the year under review and 57.89% over a three-year aggregate period which exceeds our guidelines. Furthermore, we note that KPMG has audited the Company since at least the financial year 2005 (no earlier data available) which exceeds our maximum acceptable term of office. We therefore recommend opposing the re-election of KPMG as auditor.
Item 9: The Boards request approval to acquire the Company's own shares within legal boundaries (5% of share capital within 30 months) for trading purposes. The maximum consideration for the repurchased shares might be up to twice the closing price on the Vienna Stock Exchange on the last trading day preceding the acquisition which exceeds our guidelines. We therefore recommend opposing this proposal.
Raiffeisen Bank International is a universal bank focusing on corporate and retail customers in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and on corporate customers in Austria. In CEE, Co. consists of a network of banks, leasing companies and financial service providers. In Austria, Co. is involved in corporate finance and export and trade finance banks. Co. provides services to customers in 2,800 branch offices. In the retail banking business, Co.'s product and service portfolio comprises inter alia credit services (mortgages, credit cards and personal loans), as well as payment transaction and current account package services. As of Dec 31 2014, Co.'s total assets amounted to Euro121.6 million
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The independent financial analyst theScreener just lowered the general evaluation of RAIFFEISEN BANK INTL.AG (AT), active in the Money Center Banks industry. As regards its fundamental valuation, the title now shows 2 out of 4 stars while market behaviour can be considered risky. theScreener believes that the title remains under pressure due to the loss of a star(s) and downgrades its general evaluation to Slightly Negative. As of the analysis date May 17, 2019, the closing price was EUR 21.64 and its target price was estimated at EUR 18.30.
Raiffeisen Bank reported first-quarter results of EUR 226 million compared with EUR 399 million for the same period last year. Although the 43% drop in the bottom line appears alarming, we think this quarter was not as dramatic and underlying performance was robust. Operations and results have been impacted by the sale of its Polish core banking operations, negative valuation effects on derivatives held for hedging purposes, and impairment reversals that boosted the comparable period last year. As these items are one-off charges in our view and we already factor in a less favourable loan loss ...
Raiffeisen Bank reported first-quarter results of EUR 226 million compared with EUR 399 million for the same period last year. Although the 43% drop in the bottom line appears alarming, we think this quarter was not as dramatic and underlying performance was robust. Operations and results have been impacted by the sale of its Polish core banking operations, negative valuation effects on derivatives held for hedging purposes, and impairment reversals that boosted the comparable period last year. ...
L'ensemble des rémunérations des dirigeants mandataires sociaux font l'objet des résolutions 6 à 11. La particularité d'Infotel est de présenter des politiques de rémunération ne comportant aucune part variable. Cette spécificité n'est pas en accord avec notre politique de vote. Toutefois, les mandataires sociaux dirigeants sont tous actionnaires à au moins 1,99% du capital et les montants sont raisonnables, ce qui atténue nos réserves et permet des recommandations positives. Les caractéristiques du conseil d'administration ne répondent pas à nos attentes en matière de gouvernance puisqu'il e...
Suite au transfert des titres de la Société sur Euronext Growth le 6 août 2018, la Société n’a plus d’obligation de se référer au Code de Gouvernance MIDDLENEXT auquel elle se référait depuis 2010 pour l’élaboration du rapport du Président sur le gouvernement d’entreprise, le contrôle interne et la gestion des risques prévu à l’article 225-37 du Code de Commerce et relatif à l’exercice clos le 31 décembre 2009. La société ne précise pas à quel code elle se réfère. Proxinvest avait déjà souligné l’année précédente que ce changement vers un marché moins règlementé était regrettable ; communicati...
Proxinvest veut attirer l'attentions sur quelques points majeures: D'une part, nous félicitons la Société pour la modification statutaire visant à réduire la durée du mandat des membres du Conseil de Surveillance de 6 à 3 ans. D'autre part, nous regrettons les montants des membres du Directoire (en cours) qui sont trop élevés par rapport à la médiane des rémunérations totales des dirigeants de leur indice. Enfin, nous encourageons la Société à améliorer le taux d'indépendance du Conseil, qui est pour le moment de seulement 25%.
Le conseil présente une majorité de membres non libres de conflits d'intérêts d’après Proxinvest à cause surtout de l’ancienneté des administrateurs qui dépasse notre seuil de 11 ans. Il est présidé par le Directeur général. Par ailleurs, les mandats d'une durée de 6 ans semblent trop longs car ils ne permettent pas aux actionnaires de se prononcer assez fréquemment sur la composition du conseil. Les différentes autorisations financières ne respectent pas la politique de vote de Proxinvest en termes de montants mais également en raison de leur possible utilisation en période d'offre publique. ...
ITEM 10: Benoit Bazin was designated Deputy CEO as of 1 January 2019. The company proposes therefore to approve its 2019 remuneration policy, as well as its post-employments benefits. Overall, his remuneration policy structure is more in line with our recommendations and amounts at stake are more moderate than the CEO’s. Thus we support it. Regarding his post-employments benefits, his severance indemnity and non-compete clause do not respect our Guidelines. However, his supplementary pension plan does. Thus, we support Item 12.
GOVERNANCE On 1 June 2018, Laurent Mignon left his position as Chief Executive Officer to become Chairman of the Management Board of BPCE, Natixis' main shareholder with 71% of the capital. He succeeded François Pérol as Chairman of the Board of Directors of Natixis and François Riahi became the new Chief Executive Officer. The Board remains composed of a majority of members who are not free of potential conflicts of interest, which makes it impossible to support most of the many co-optations and renewals proposed (resolutions 12 to 22). REMUNERATION Due to changes in governance, in a...
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