We alerted shareholders on several occasions regarding the excessive amount of dividends, which appear to be motivated by BPCE’s attempt to extract profits in its capacity as major shareholder as opposed to actual capital levels at Natixis itself.
Item 5 and 7:
We have no concerns about the remuneration of the Chairman of the board, who receives his entire compensation directly from BPCE, and not from Natixis.
Items 6 and 8:
With slightly excessive quantum, a lack of transparency makes it difficult to assess the alignment between performance and remuneration for the CEO, Laurent Mignon.
Natixis is a player in the European banking industry. As the banking partner of large companies in France, Co. also plays an active role in serving financial institutions (banks, insurance companies, pension funds, etc.). Co.'s activities are divided into in three main business lines: Wholesale Banking, Investment Solutions (Asset Management, Private Banking, Insurance, and Private Equity) and Specialized Financial Services. Co. operates in four geographical regions: France; other EU countries; North America (Canada, USA); and other OECD countries. As of Dec. 31 2013 Co.'s total assets totaled Euro510,131,000,000.
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The de-rating visible since end-September 2018 largely integrates the areas of uncertainty hanging over the stock. It is now time to focus on Thales’ strengths and the levers that the integration of Gemalto will offer. Buy, target price of € 130 vs € 126. - ...
Le de-rating visible depuis fin septembre 2018 intègre désormais largement les incertitudes qui entourent le titre. Il est temps de se tourner vers les atouts de Thales et les leviers que va offrir l’intégration de Gemalto. Achat – OC de 130 € vs. 126 €. - - ...
>Etude d’impact « Bâle 4 » mise à jour - L’EBA publie une nouvelle étude sur l’impact de « Bâle 4 » (version finale de Bâle 3). Comme pour la précédente, (mars 2019), les hypothèses sont conservatrices :Application des règles 2027 aux bilans arrêtés à fin juin 2018 en excluant toute adaptation sur la période.Exclusion des aménagements propres à la transposition en droit européen.Risques de marché calculés avec la version de décembre 2016 au lieu de la d...
Item 3: Approve the Remuneration ReportThe remuneration structure is satisfactory, though accelerated vesting is possible. Potential and actual total variable remuneration exceed guidelines, but not very much. They are moderate in comparison with UK market practice. Overall, the quantum during the year was not excessive. We recommend shareholders vote in favor.
Item 3: Approve the Remuneration Report The structure is weighted more heavily towards short-term performance. One of the performance metrics for the LTI is the payment of sustainable dividends, which is not considered appropriate as executives can potentially influence the payout level. The LTI also includes relative TSR as a performance metric. Nevertheless, the quantum is not excessive and even maximum potential amounts are moderate. On balance, we recommend shareholders vote in favor. Item 4: Approve the Remuneration PolicyThe main concern with the Company's remuneration policy is that pa...
Item 2: Approve the Remuneration ReportThe remuneration structure is unsatisfactory. The main concern at the Company is that the potential maximum incentive pay including the bonus, matching shares on the deferred portion of the bonus and the LTI amounts to 1000% of base salary, which is considered grossly excessive. Actual incentive pay during the year was1.6 times the ECGS limit. Furthermore, variable remuneration is overly reliant on a single performance metric, benchmark profit before tax. A second performance criteria will be used in the coming year. We note that the Company has adjusted ...
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