Proxinvest Corporate Governance Rating ® helps investors integrate governance into their investment decision and identify governance risks and opportunities within their portfolio.
Proxinvest Corporate Governance Rating ® Service rates European issuers through the analysis of four main themes :
Each theme is rated taking into account several comprehensive sub-categories.
Our unique two-step process to achieve each rating includes a first step quantitative valuation and a second step qualitative filter. Indeed, our process is supported by a network of local experts that have a deep knowledge of each local market best practices (from both customs and regulatory points of views).
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Julius Baer is engaged in private banking activities primarily in Switzerland, Europe, Asia and South America. Co. focuses in private banking, which includes certain internal supporting functions which serve entirely the core business activities.
Founded in 1995, Proxinvest is an independent proxy firm supporting the engagement and proxy analysis processes of investors. Proxinvest mission is to analyse corporate governance practices and resolutions proposed at general meetings of listed firms.
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Proxinvest has been a pioneer and champion of good corporate governance and has grown into a recognised expert in the field.
Proxinvest is independently-owned and only works for investors : Proxinvest does not provide consulting services to the companies it covers, mitigating related risks to its clients and ensuring the independence of our analysis. As a result Proxinvest is able to take a robust, independent, engaged and unconflicted view of the companies in which our clients invest.
As Managing Partner of Expert Corprate Governance Service Ltd (ECGS), Proxinvest has built a large network of corporate governance experts to support clients in corporate governance analysis worldwide.
The de-rating visible since end-September 2018 largely integrates the areas of uncertainty hanging over the stock. It is now time to focus on Thales’ strengths and the levers that the integration of Gemalto will offer. Buy, target price of € 130 vs € 126. - ...
Le de-rating visible depuis fin septembre 2018 intègre désormais largement les incertitudes qui entourent le titre. Il est temps de se tourner vers les atouts de Thales et les leviers que va offrir l’intégration de Gemalto. Achat – OC de 130 € vs. 126 €. - - ...
>Etude d’impact « Bâle 4 » mise à jour - L’EBA publie une nouvelle étude sur l’impact de « Bâle 4 » (version finale de Bâle 3). Comme pour la précédente, (mars 2019), les hypothèses sont conservatrices :Application des règles 2027 aux bilans arrêtés à fin juin 2018 en excluant toute adaptation sur la période.Exclusion des aménagements propres à la transposition en droit européen.Risques de marché calculés avec la version de décembre 2016 au lieu de la d...
Item 3: Approve the Remuneration ReportThe remuneration structure is satisfactory, though accelerated vesting is possible. Potential and actual total variable remuneration exceed guidelines, but not very much. They are moderate in comparison with UK market practice. Overall, the quantum during the year was not excessive. We recommend shareholders vote in favor.
Item 3: Approve the Remuneration Report The structure is weighted more heavily towards short-term performance. One of the performance metrics for the LTI is the payment of sustainable dividends, which is not considered appropriate as executives can potentially influence the payout level. The LTI also includes relative TSR as a performance metric. Nevertheless, the quantum is not excessive and even maximum potential amounts are moderate. On balance, we recommend shareholders vote in favor. Item 4: Approve the Remuneration PolicyThe main concern with the Company's remuneration policy is that pa...
Item 2: Approve the Remuneration ReportThe remuneration structure is unsatisfactory. The main concern at the Company is that the potential maximum incentive pay including the bonus, matching shares on the deferred portion of the bonus and the LTI amounts to 1000% of base salary, which is considered grossly excessive. Actual incentive pay during the year was1.6 times the ECGS limit. Furthermore, variable remuneration is overly reliant on a single performance metric, benchmark profit before tax. A second performance criteria will be used in the coming year. We note that the Company has adjusted ...
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