ITEM 4, 5.6: we note that the Company fails once again to disclose the date on which the current statutory auditor, Deloitte Reviseurs d'Entreprises, was appointed. According to the oldest Annual Report available on Company’s website (2007), Deloitte was already the Company's statutory auditor at that time. Hence, we cannot support both proposals concerning the discharge and the renewal of Deloitte's mandate.
ITEM 5.2.1, 5.2.2: Given our concerns regarding independence on the board (25% only), we oppose to the elections of Xavier Le Clef and Claude Généreux.
ITEM 5.4.2, 5.4.4, 5.4.5, 5.4.6: Given our concerns regarding independence on the board (25% only), we oppose to the re-elections of Paul Desmarais Jr., Cédric Frère, and Gérard Lamarche.
The number of directors seems excessive, diluting the independence of the Board with only 25% (5 out of the 20 directors are considered independent by ECGS guidelines).
Furthermore, we reiterate our concerns with the excessive remuneration, as such we recommend that shareholders oppose the remuneration policy (item 6) as well as the authority to grant share options in items 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5.
Groupe Bruxelles Lambert is a holding company. Through its subsidiaries, Co. operates through the following segments: Imerys, which consists of the Imerys group that operates in four business lines of energy solutions and specialties, filtration and performance additives, ceramic materials, and high resistance minerals; and Financial Pillar, which includes, on the one hand, under investment activities, the companies Sienna Capital, Ergon Capital Partners (ECP), ECP II, ECP III, PAI Europe III, Sagard, Sagard II and Sagard III, Kartesia and Merieux Participations I and II and, on the other hand, under consolidated operating activities, the operating subsidiaries of ECP III.
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GBL has entered in exclusive negotiations to acquire a 60% stake in Webhelp group, together with its co-founding shareholders, Olivier Duha and Fréderic Jousset, who would retain their role as founding executive directors, and its management team. In our recent report (“The beginning of a new era”), we explained that GBL was to increase strongly its exposure to private equity assets. The pending bid on Parques Reunidos (€340m) and the acquisition of a 60% stake in Webhelp group (deal value of GBL's stake estimated at €0.6bn) nicely fit with this statement. Next to the potential to generate hig...
Item 3: Approve the Remuneration ReportThe remuneration structure is satisfactory, though accelerated vesting is possible. Potential and actual total variable remuneration exceed guidelines, but not very much. They are moderate in comparison with UK market practice. Overall, the quantum during the year was not excessive. We recommend shareholders vote in favor.
Item 3: Approve the Remuneration Report The structure is weighted more heavily towards short-term performance. One of the performance metrics for the LTI is the payment of sustainable dividends, which is not considered appropriate as executives can potentially influence the payout level. The LTI also includes relative TSR as a performance metric. Nevertheless, the quantum is not excessive and even maximum potential amounts are moderate. On balance, we recommend shareholders vote in favor. Item 4: Approve the Remuneration PolicyThe main concern with the Company's remuneration policy is that pa...
Item 2: Approve the Remuneration ReportThe remuneration structure is unsatisfactory. The main concern at the Company is that the potential maximum incentive pay including the bonus, matching shares on the deferred portion of the bonus and the LTI amounts to 1000% of base salary, which is considered grossly excessive. Actual incentive pay during the year was1.6 times the ECGS limit. Furthermore, variable remuneration is overly reliant on a single performance metric, benchmark profit before tax. A second performance criteria will be used in the coming year. We note that the Company has adjusted ...
La communication de la société en termes de rémunérations ne s’est malheureusement pas améliorée. En effet, la société ne communique ni les poids de chacun des critères du bonus annuel, ni les taux de réalisation de ces critères alors même que la pratique s'est généralisée au sein du SBF120 (indice auquel la société appartient). Puisque la société tient son assemblée générale près de 2 mois après le pic des assemblées générales du SBF120 (en raison de sa clôture d'exercice décalée), elle aurait dû, a minima, s'inspirer des meilleures pratiques observées depuis plusieurs années maintenant. Ce ...
ABEO a annoncé le vif succès de son introduction en bourse sur marché Euronext à Paris. L'offre, clôturée le 5 octobre 2016, a bénéficié d'une demande très soutenue émanant d'une quarantaine d'investisseurs institutionnels français et internationaux ainsi que des investisseurs particuliers. Le taux d’indépendance de la société étant particulièrement bas (25%), nous nous opposerons à la résolution 8 concernant la ratification de la cooptation de Jean Ferrier. Proxinvest regrette que la société s’autorise à intervenir en période d’offre publique d’achat.
En résolution 7, il est proposé de renouveler le mandat de Richard Mamez en tant que censeur pour une durée d’un an. Proxinvest n'est pas défavorable à la nomination par le conseil d'un censeur qui serait révocable à la demande d'un seul membre du conseil et qui ne bénéficierait pas de la protection de mandat qu'offre le processus de nomination via l'assemblée générale. Richard Mamez sera renouvelé comme censeur par l'assemblée générale, et non par le Conseil d'administration. Il ne pourra donc pas être révoqué à la demande d'un seul membre du Conseil. Par conséquent, nous recommandons l’oppos...
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