In item 6, shareholders are called to ratify the appointment of the non-executive Chairman Mr. Miguel Ángel López Borrego (former CFO of Siemens Gamesa and executive at Siemens Group companies since 2001). We have serious concerns over the lack of independent representation on the Board (23% as per our guidelines and 38% according to the Company) and the high number of Directors representing Siemens AG (6, or 38%, including the Chairman). In addition, according to the ECGS' guidelines, a former executive should not be appointed as Chairperson without applying a reasonable cooling-off period. Therefore, we recommend opposition.
In item 7, shareholders are called to ratify the appointment of the non-executive Director Mr. Rudolf Krämmer. Independent according to the Company, he is not independent according to our guidelines, as he was a partner of the auditor of Siemens AG from 2002 to 2016, and less than 5 years passed from the end of his business relationship with the Group. Therefore, we recommend opposition.
In item 12, the Board of Directors proposes to approve a new remuneration policy for the 2019-2021 period (binding vote). We regret that the Board proposes to increase the maximum annual cash bonus payable to the CEO from 130% to 200%, which is above the ECGS' voting policy limit of 150%. However, the CEO's fixed remuneration is reasonable (€ 700'000, which is approximately 28% lower than the medians at European utilities and large Spanish non-financial companies), and the aggregate variable remuneration is in line with the ECGS' voting policy limit of 400% of the base salary. The quality of disclosure has significantly improved, and an additional cap has been introduced on the value of shares to be delivered on the vesting date of the long-term incentive (1.7 times the sum of fixed remuneration, annual bonus and target incentive). Also taking into account that termination payments (2 years of base salary, including the compensation under a 1-year non-competition agreement) are in line with our guidelines and best practices in the Spanish market, we recommend approval.
Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy is a holding company. Through its subsidiaries, Co. is engaged in the business of renewable energy sources, primarily wind power but also including solar energy where its acts as a supplier and manufacturer of technological products, installations and services. Co. is organized along the lines of: promotion, construction and sale of wind farms, engineering, design, manufacture and sale of wind turbines, manufacture of thermic and photovoltaic solar components, promotion and sale of photovoltaic solar farms. Co. also participates in both Spanish and European working groups aimed at establishing priorities for its sector's research & development work.
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No-moat Siemens Gamesa reported 7% revenue growth in the second quarter thanks to strength in offshore and services. The onshore division was a drag on the top line and group profitability. Unsurprisingly, the main culprit was pricing, negatively affected by project and regional mix. The price decline was partially offset by volume, productivity improvements, and cost savings thanks to the firm's cost-cutting program. These dynamics are in line with our expectations for high-volume activity and pricing headwinds for the wind turbine market. We maintain our EUR 16.80 fair value estimate and bel...
La société fait preuve d'une grande transparence concernant les montants attribués aux mandataires sociaux. En revanche, elle l'est beaucoup moins concernant les critères de performances des parts variables de la rémunération, qui restent inconnus. Par ailleurs, l'indépendance du Conseil d'administration est particulièrement préoccupante puisqu'il n'est composé que d'un administrateur indépendant sur six. Pour cette raison la résolution 11 portant sur le renouvellement de Marie Meynadier (membre non indépendante) n'est pas soutenue.
Suite à l'augmentation de capital lancée en mars 2019, 4 nouveaux actionnaires ((i) Latricogne Capital, (ii) les SCI Allianz Immobilier Durable et SCI Alliance Value Pierre, (iii) Cargo Investment B.V. et (iv) Madame Danièle Fredj) ont demandé à obtenir un siège au conseil. Il est donc proposé la nomination de 4 de ces représentants. Comme le conseil ne comprend pas une majorité d'administrateurs indépendants et que ces nouveaux actionnaires ne sont pas les principaux actionnaires de la société, conformément à notre politique de vote, nous ne soutenons aucun de ces candidats. Par ailleurs, la...
"Le 16 novembre 2018, les conseils d’administration de Groupe SFPI et DOM Security ont constaté la réalisation définitive de la fusion absorption de Dom Security SA par Groupe SFPI. "(Document de référence 2018 - Groupe SFPI) La gouvernance pourrait être améliorée en augmentant le taux d'indépendance du Conseil. Nous recommandons l'opposition à la nomination d'ARC Management, notamment pour cette raison. La société ne communique pas suffisamment d'informations sur les politiques de rémunération. Bien que les montants en ex-post soient raisonnables, il serait positif que la société s'améliore...
In item 6, we recommend opposing the authorization to increase the share capital by up to 50%, as the authority includes the power to exclude pre-emptive rights in connection with 20% of the share capital, exceeding ECGS' voting policy limit of 10%. In item 7, we also recommend opposing the authorization to reduce the minimum advance notice period for calling an EGM from 30 to 15 days, because it would strongly limit the time for foreign shareholders to adequately inform, analyse the resolutions and cast their votes through the custodian chain. In item 8.3, the Board proposes to appoint Ms. ...
WFD Unibail-Rodamco N.V. is part of the Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield Stapled Group which gathers WFD Unibail-Rodamco N.V. (“WFD”) and Unibail-Rodamco SE (“UR SE”). WFD portfolio consists of assets in the United States and The Netherlands. Class A shares of WFD and UR SE shares are stapled and have the same ISIN Code. Thus, on the market, buying a FR0013326246 share gives right to 2 securities: one from WFD and one from UR SE (each security giving right to attend their respective General meetings). The company proposes to amend its article 31.3 of the Articles of Association so that if applicabl...
The meeting is expected to be held on second call on 7 June 2019. The positions of Chairman and CEO were separated in practice in July 2017 through the appointment of Mr. Vilá Boix. Although the Company defines Mr. Álvarez-Pallete López as Chairman-CEO and Mr. Vilá Boix as COO, we note that the COO is responsible for the "highest executive functions over all the Company's business areas", which, in our opinion, are the typical responsibilities of a Chief Executive Officer. This is why this report refers to Mr. Álvarez-Pallete López as Executive Chairman and Mr. Vilá Boix as CEO. In any case...
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