Item 3a: We recommend to oppose the discharge of the Chairman of the Supervisory Board and its Remuneration Committee, Dr. Martin Enderle. The remuneration system for the Management Board has not yet been put to shareholder approval and we have concerns over the structure and certain features of the Management Board members' remuneration.
Items 5 and 6: We recommend to oppose two capital measures due to our concerns over the potential maximum dilution level.
Item 10: The Supervisory Board and the Management Board propose to amend § 12 of the Company's Articles of Association which stipulates that the consent of the Supervisory Board is required in the event of the institution or termination of a court case or arbitration proceeding involving an amount in controversy of more than EUR 1,000,000. We consider that a formal resolution of the Supervisory Board is an additional safeguard that should not unneccesarily be abandoned and recommend shareholders to oppose this proposed amendment to the Articles of Association.
Item 11: We recommend to oppose the Share Option Plan 2019. We are concerned that no absolute performance target exists and note that - although the Company may settle the options in cash - no maximum cap exists except in cases of extraordinary developments.
Delivery Hero SE is a Germany-based company, which is primarily engaged in the food industry. The Company operates as a provider of online food delivery services from restaurants and cafes. The Company offers pizza, burger, organic food, vegan cuisine, and Asian dishes, among others. Its portfolio of brands comprises Foodpanda, Lieferheld, Foodora, PedidosYa, Clickdelivery, Talabat, Yemeksepeti, Donesi, Pauza, Hungerstation, Hellofood, Otlob and others. The Company operates globally, on the territory of more than 40 countries, comprising Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, Asia, and the Americas. The Company's services are available through Web version and mobile application.
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The independent financial analyst theScreener just lowered the general evaluation of DELIVERY HERO AG. (DE), active in the Food Retailers & Wholesalers industry. As regards its fundamental valuation, the title still shows 0 out of 4 possible stars. Its market behaviour, however, has slightly deteriorated and will be qualified as moderately risky moving forward. theScreener considers that these new qualifications justify an overall rating downgrade to Slightly Negative. As of the analysis date October 9, 2018, the closing price was EUR 36.26 and its target price was estimated at EUR 34.45.
Summary Hero AG - Strategy, SWOT and Corporate Finance Report, is a source of comprehensive company data and information. The report covers the company's structure, operation, SWOT analysis, product and service offerings and corporate actions, providing a 360˚ view of the company. Key Findings - Detailed information on Hero AG required for business and competitor intelligence needs - A study of the major internal and external factors affecting Hero AG in the form of a SWOT analysis - An in-depth view of the business model of Hero AG including a breakdown and examination of key business segmen...
Plusieurs points peuvent mériter l'attention des actionnaires. D'une part, le Conseil est majoritairement indépendant (70%), ce qui n'est pas si courant dans une société de cet indice et qui mérite d'être relevé. La société a su prendre en compte les recommandations faites par Proxinvest. D'autre part, il serait appréciable que la société soit encore plus transparente sur les rémunérations, notamment sur les conditions de performances. Par ailleurs, les montants sont excessifs par rapport aux rémunérations des dirigeants du même indice boursier. Enfin l'indemnité de révocation et l'indémnit...
A l'image de l'exercice précédent, la société continue d'associer le quitus aux administrateurs à la résolution d'approbation des comptes sociaux, ce qui entraîne nécessairement une recommandation négative. Malgré l'absence de part variable dans la rémunération du Directeur Général, Proxinvest soutient les résolutions 15 et 17, en raison de la faiblesse des montants proposés. Cependant, on encourage la société à s'améliorer sur ce point, afin de permettre un meilleur alignement de la rémunération du dirigeant sur les performances de la société.
La situation financière de la société s'est rapidement et assez sévèrement dégradée en 2017 et 2018. Elle nécessitait d’une recapitalisation. Pour ce faire, la société a proposé 2 options (Option Principale et Option Alternative). La première option a été retenue par le conseil : l’opération a permis à un actionnaire et concurrent (COFEPP) de prendre le contrôle du capital de la société, sans qu’il n’ait eu à payer de prime de contrôle ou à lancer d’OPA sur les titres. Cela présente un fort risque d’abus pour les actionnaires minoritaires. De plus, non seulement COFEPP contrôle le capital, mai...
Item 4: We recommend to oppose the discharge of the Supervisory Board as we have concerns over the Management Board's remuneration system - both regarding transparency and content. Items 6.1-6.8: We recommend to oppose the (re-)election of all candidates to the Supervisory Board due to independence concerns, concerns over aggregate time commitments and/or over insufficient information provided about the candidates. Items 9 and 11: We recommend to oppose the creation of a new authorised and a new conditional capital as the potential dilution level may exceed our guidelines.
General: Porsche Automobil Holding SE has issued ordinary shares and non-voting preference shares. All ordinary shares are owned by the Porsche and Piëch families. Only the preference shares are listed on the stock exchange. Preference shares have a voting right whenever their membership rights are affected. Therefore, ECGS only provides a voting advice on the items where preference shareholders are able to vote and gives a basic analysis of the other proposals
Shareholders should note that this is an EGM of depository receipt holders of Stichting Administratiekantoor Unilever N.V. ("the Trust Office"). Under ITEM 2, The board of directors of the Trust Office seeks approval to terminate the current depositary receipt (DR) structure. As a matter of principle, ECGS strongly supports the "one-share, one-vote" principle upholding the democratic notion that shareholder rights and voting power should be proportional to ownership risk. ECGS furthermore notes that holders of Bearer Certificates may exchange their Bearer Certificates for ordinary shares fre...
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