There are concerns over the composition of the Board. There is insufficient independent representation, an insufficient number of women on the Board, and directors appointed by shareholder agreement who do not stand for annual re-election.
Cobega SA (through Olive Partners) owns 35.03% of the share capital and has nominated six directors to the Board, pursuant to the shareholder agreement. Of particular concern is the Chairman Sol Daurella Comadrán, who was not considered independent on appointment to the Board as she is a representative of Olive Partners. She is not standing for election at the AGM, which does not meet UK best practice or ECGS guidelines.
Coca-Cola European Partners was formed in May 2016 from the merger of three companies: Coca-Cola Enterprises, Coca-Cola Iberian Partners and Coca-Cola Erfrischungsgetränke. There are three directors on the Board, Mr. Ingram, Mr. Watts and Mr. Johnson, who served on the Board of Coca-Cola Enterprises at the time of the merger. While the Company continues to consider them independent, ECGS does not as they now have an association with the Company, or its predecessors, of more than nine years.
Item 2: Approve the Remuneration Report
The structure is unsatisfactory. The main concern is the grossly excessive level of potential incentive pay, especially given that the performance modifier used for the bonus makes it difficult to fully assess the alignment of pay with performance. The quantum for the year was excessive. We recommend shareholders oppose.
Founded in 1995, Proxinvest is an independent proxy firm supporting the engagement and proxy analysis processes of investors. Proxinvest mission is to analyse corporate governance practices and resolutions proposed at general meetings of listed firms.
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COCA COLA EUR.PTNS.PLC. (US), a company active in the Soft Drinks industry, is favoured by a more supportive environment. The independent financial analyst theScreener has confirmed the fundamental rating of the title, which shows 4 out of 4 stars, as well as its unchanged, defensive market behaviour. The title leverages a more favourable environment and raises its general evaluation to Positive. As of the analysis date March 22, 2019, the closing price was USD 49.42 and its potential was estimated at USD 51.89.
Plusieurs points peuvent mériter l'attention des actionnaires. D'une part, le Conseil est majoritairement indépendant (70%), ce qui n'est pas si courant dans une société de cet indice et qui mérite d'être relevé. La société a su prendre en compte les recommandations faites par Proxinvest. D'autre part, il serait appréciable que la société soit encore plus transparente sur les rémunérations, notamment sur les conditions de performances. Par ailleurs, les montants sont excessifs par rapport aux rémunérations des dirigeants du même indice boursier. Enfin l'indemnité de révocation et l'indémnit...
A l'image de l'exercice précédent, la société continue d'associer le quitus aux administrateurs à la résolution d'approbation des comptes sociaux, ce qui entraîne nécessairement une recommandation négative. Malgré l'absence de part variable dans la rémunération du Directeur Général, Proxinvest soutient les résolutions 15 et 17, en raison de la faiblesse des montants proposés. Cependant, on encourage la société à s'améliorer sur ce point, afin de permettre un meilleur alignement de la rémunération du dirigeant sur les performances de la société.
La situation financière de la société s'est rapidement et assez sévèrement dégradée en 2017 et 2018. Elle nécessitait d’une recapitalisation. Pour ce faire, la société a proposé 2 options (Option Principale et Option Alternative). La première option a été retenue par le conseil : l’opération a permis à un actionnaire et concurrent (COFEPP) de prendre le contrôle du capital de la société, sans qu’il n’ait eu à payer de prime de contrôle ou à lancer d’OPA sur les titres. Cela présente un fort risque d’abus pour les actionnaires minoritaires. De plus, non seulement COFEPP contrôle le capital, mai...
Item 4: We recommend to oppose the discharge of the Supervisory Board as we have concerns over the Management Board's remuneration system - both regarding transparency and content. Items 6.1-6.8: We recommend to oppose the (re-)election of all candidates to the Supervisory Board due to independence concerns, concerns over aggregate time commitments and/or over insufficient information provided about the candidates. Items 9 and 11: We recommend to oppose the creation of a new authorised and a new conditional capital as the potential dilution level may exceed our guidelines.
General: Porsche Automobil Holding SE has issued ordinary shares and non-voting preference shares. All ordinary shares are owned by the Porsche and Piëch families. Only the preference shares are listed on the stock exchange. Preference shares have a voting right whenever their membership rights are affected. Therefore, ECGS only provides a voting advice on the items where preference shareholders are able to vote and gives a basic analysis of the other proposals
Shareholders should note that this is an EGM of depository receipt holders of Stichting Administratiekantoor Unilever N.V. ("the Trust Office"). Under ITEM 2, The board of directors of the Trust Office seeks approval to terminate the current depositary receipt (DR) structure. As a matter of principle, ECGS strongly supports the "one-share, one-vote" principle upholding the democratic notion that shareholder rights and voting power should be proportional to ownership risk. ECGS furthermore notes that holders of Bearer Certificates may exchange their Bearer Certificates for ordinary shares fre...
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