In item 4.1, the Board proposed to re-appoint the executive Chairman Mr. José Oliu Creus. Although we recognize that the independent representation on the Board is sufficient (53% as per our guidelines and 60% according to the Company), ECGS believes that the Chairman should not carry executive responsibilities, as he is responsible for leadership of the Board and ensuring its effectiveness on all aspects of its role. As we continue to be concerned over the concentration of powers at the Bank, we recommend shareholders oppose.
In item 8, the Board asks the authorization to acquire own shares. The resolution also includes the authority to reduce the share capital. In our opinion, the authorization to reduce the share capital should always be subject to a separate vote of the General Meeting, and it should be clearly justified by the Board. Also taking into account that the maximum pricing of the repurchases exceeds the ECGS voting policy limit of 110% the market price, we recommend opposition.
In item 10, the Board proposes to replace the remuneration policy approved in 2018 by a new policy, which will apply for the 2019-2021 period (binding vote). We welcome the improvements proposed to the policy, through more robust malus and clawback conditions, the introduction of "gate conditions" and a clear cap on compensation for non-competition. However, we continue to be concerned over several aspects of Banco Sabadell's remuneration policy: excessive pension contributions, excessive fixed remuneration of the Chairman and variable remuneration more depending on annual than long-term results. Therefore, we recommend opposition. For the same reasons, we also recommend opposition to the advisory vote on the Annual Remuneration Report (item 11).
In item 12, the Board proposes to re-appoint PricewaterhouseCoopers ("PwC") as statutory auditor for fiscal year 2019. PwC has been the Group's auditor for the last 36 years (since 1982). We have serious concerns over the excessive tenure of the auditor, and we note that ECGS has expressed such concerns in all its reports covering Banco Sabadell. Therefore, we recommend opposition.
Banco de Sabadell is a bank holding company. Through its subsidiaries, Co. provides a range of banking and financial services in Spain and internationally. Co.'s activities include investment banking, private banking, portfolio management, mortgage loans, commercial loans and other financial products and services, deposits and international banking operations. Co. is also engaged in life insurance underwriting and brokerage. Additionally, Co. is engaged in capital property and development, as well as investing in environmental projects. As of Dec 31 2014, Co. had total assets of Euro163,345,673,000 and total customer deposits of Euro98,208,370,000.
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The independent financial analyst theScreener just requalified the general evaluation of BANCO DE SABADELL SA (ES), active in the Money Center Banks industry. As regards its fundamental valuation, the title still shows 3 out of 4 stars and its market behaviour is seen as risky. theScreener believes that the unfavourable environment weighs on the sector and penalises the company, which sees a downgrade to its general evaluation to Slightly Negative. As of the analysis date April 26, 2019, the closing price was EUR 1.01 and its target price was estimated at EUR 0.78.
A director at Banco De Sabadell Sa bought 57,344 shares at 0.897EUR and the significance rating of the trade was 55/100. Is that information sufficient for you to make an investment decision? This report gives details of those trades and adds context and analysis to them such that you can judge whether these trading decisions are ones worth following. Included in the report is a detailed share price chart which plots discretionary trades by all the company's directors over the last two years clearly showing Close periods where trading activity is restricted under listing rules. The names o...
Même si la société est familiale et contrôlée, la gouvernance présente de nombreuses faiblesses qui ne respectent pas les principes de Proxinvest avec notamment un conseil composé très majoritairement de membres non-libre de conflits d'intérêts, l'existence de droits de vote double. La société propose de reverser un dividende de 0,80 € aux actionnaires. Compte tenu de son endettement significatif, la société devrait allouer cette somme à l’apurement de ses dettes. Par ailleurs la société s’autorise toujours à intervenir en période d’offre publique, cela ne respecte pas nos préconisations. E...
La présenté assemblée se concentre essentiellement sur la nomination de Julie Walbaum au poste de Directrice Générale. Ainsi il est proposé aux actionnaires d'approuver la clause de non-concurrence de la nouvelle dirigeante. Proxinvest recommande une durée de 2 années pour une compensation d'une année de rémunération. Ici la société propose une durée d'une année pour 50% de la rémunération annuelle. Proxinvest recommande d'approuver cet engagement au regard des montants. Ensuite concernant les rémunérations Proxinvest recommandera de s'opposer à la rémunération attribuée en 2018 à Julie Walb...
L'ensemble des rémunérations des dirigeants mandataires sociaux font l'objet des résolutions 6 à 11. La particularité d'Infotel est de présenter des politiques de rémunération ne comportant aucune part variable. Cette spécificité n'est pas en accord avec notre politique de vote. Toutefois, les mandataires sociaux dirigeants sont tous actionnaires à au moins 1,99% du capital et les montants sont raisonnables, ce qui atténue nos réserves et permet des recommandations positives. Les caractéristiques du conseil d'administration ne répondent pas à nos attentes en matière de gouvernance puisqu'il e...
Le conseil présente une majorité de membres non libres de conflits d'intérêts d’après Proxinvest à cause surtout de l’ancienneté des administrateurs qui dépasse notre seuil de 11 ans. Il est présidé par le Directeur général. Par ailleurs, les mandats d'une durée de 6 ans semblent trop longs car ils ne permettent pas aux actionnaires de se prononcer assez fréquemment sur la composition du conseil. Les différentes autorisations financières ne respectent pas la politique de vote de Proxinvest en termes de montants mais également en raison de leur possible utilisation en période d'offre publique. ...
ITEM 10: Benoit Bazin was designated Deputy CEO as of 1 January 2019. The company proposes therefore to approve its 2019 remuneration policy, as well as its post-employments benefits. Overall, his remuneration policy structure is more in line with our recommendations and amounts at stake are more moderate than the CEO’s. Thus we support it. Regarding his post-employments benefits, his severance indemnity and non-compete clause do not respect our Guidelines. However, his supplementary pension plan does. Thus, we support Item 12.
GOVERNANCE On 1 June 2018, Laurent Mignon left his position as Chief Executive Officer to become Chairman of the Management Board of BPCE, Natixis' main shareholder with 71% of the capital. He succeeded François Pérol as Chairman of the Board of Directors of Natixis and François Riahi became the new Chief Executive Officer. The Board remains composed of a majority of members who are not free of potential conflicts of interest, which makes it impossible to support most of the many co-optations and renewals proposed (resolutions 12 to 22). REMUNERATION Due to changes in governance, in a...
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