ITEM 6: the company proposes to amend the CEO remuneration policy regarding its indemnity and non-compete clause (applicable for the new CEO, not for Tom Enders). These amendments will, mainly, allow limiting amounts that could be granted, which we welcome. However, we regret that the company did not make any change in the supplementary pension plan as it is very generous (we remind that for Tom Enders, as of 31 December 2018,the defined benefit obligation amounts to € 26.3 M vs € 21.2 M at the end of 2017).
We note that Tom Enders will not receive any severance payment and no LTI was granted for 2018 or 2019. However, his non-compete clause is generous (€3.2 M) and it seems that the company may not apply any prorate on ongoing plans (considering a share price of €99/share as of 31/01/19, provided that performance conditions are met and that plans fully vest, the total value of this ongoing plans is estimated to be €7.3 M).
In this same Item 6, the company also proposes to amend the non-executive board members remuneration policy by granting them additional fees. Nevertheless, we note that the 2018 global amount granted is the highest amount granted in the CAC 40 and it did not prevent the board from having a poor track record, mainly regarding its lack of prevention of corruption practices within the group. Therefore, granting them additional fees does not seem acceptable and we do not support Item 6.
ITEMS 4 and 5: The Company is currently under investigations by the Parquet National Financier (France), the Serious Fraud Office (UK) and the Department of Justice (USA) (/content/aa1f65a8-0448-11e9-99df-6183d3002ee1), which may lead to material fines and impact significantly the company’s value. Shareholders should be able to use any legal recourse they can and, thus, they should not grant any discharge of liability. Thus, we do not support items 4 and 5.
Airbus is an European Aeronautic Defense and Space company whose core business is the manufacturing of commercial aircraft, civil and military helicopters, commercial space launch vehicles, missiles, military aircraft, satellites and defense systems and defense electronics and the rendering of services related to these activities. Co. organizes its businesses into the following five operating divisions: Airbus Commercial, Airbus Military, Eurocopter, Cassidian and Astrium. In addition, Co.'s Other Businesses division engages in the development, manufacturing, marketing and sale of regional turboprop aircraft and aircraft components.
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While the 2019 Paris Air Show ended on a lacklustre note in terms of orders, it was marked by the launch of the A321XLR (which complicates the equation for the NMA) and the shelving of a rapid increase in production rates to 70 aircraft per month (a relief for the supply chain). Our hierarchy of recommendations is unchanged and we continue to prefer engine makers with MTU our Top Pick (Buy - € 220). - >A disappointing show - The 2019 Paris Air Show ended on an even low...
Si le salon du Bourget 2019 se clôture comme attendu sur un terne bilan commercial, il reste marqué par le lancement de l’A321XLR (complique l’équation du NMA) et l’abandon d’une hausse rapide des cadences à 70 a/c par mois (un soulagement pour la chaine fournisseurs). Notre hiérarchie de recommandations est inchangée et nous continuons de favoriser les motoristes avec une préférence pour MTU (Achat – 220 €). - >Un salon en demi-teinte - Le millésime 2019 du salon du B...
Activity at this year’s Paris Air Show was muted compared with prior years, but it was not short on surprises. The A320neo collected the most aircraft orders of any program, securing 232, and helped Airbus close the week with 166 more orders than Boeing. Expectations headed into this year’s show were restrained thanks to Boeing’s ongoing MAX challenges and Airbus’ soft order activity early in the year. Boeing stunned by securing a 200-order commitment from airline conglomerate IAG for its embattled single aisle MAX aircraft. The market welcomed Boeing’s announcement, sending shares 5% higher. ...
Item 3: Approve the Remuneration ReportThe remuneration structure is satisfactory, though accelerated vesting is possible. Potential and actual total variable remuneration exceed guidelines, but not very much. They are moderate in comparison with UK market practice. Overall, the quantum during the year was not excessive. We recommend shareholders vote in favor.
Item 3: Approve the Remuneration Report The structure is weighted more heavily towards short-term performance. One of the performance metrics for the LTI is the payment of sustainable dividends, which is not considered appropriate as executives can potentially influence the payout level. The LTI also includes relative TSR as a performance metric. Nevertheless, the quantum is not excessive and even maximum potential amounts are moderate. On balance, we recommend shareholders vote in favor. Item 4: Approve the Remuneration PolicyThe main concern with the Company's remuneration policy is that pa...
Item 2: Approve the Remuneration ReportThe remuneration structure is unsatisfactory. The main concern at the Company is that the potential maximum incentive pay including the bonus, matching shares on the deferred portion of the bonus and the LTI amounts to 1000% of base salary, which is considered grossly excessive. Actual incentive pay during the year was1.6 times the ECGS limit. Furthermore, variable remuneration is overly reliant on a single performance metric, benchmark profit before tax. A second performance criteria will be used in the coming year. We note that the Company has adjusted ...
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