In item 3, shareholders are called to an advisory vote on the Annual Remuneration Report, including the remuneration policy and the amounts paid in the last year. The Company has improved the quality of disclosure, including the performance metrics used to calculate the 2017 bonus, but individual weightings are not disclosed and it is not clear whether a percentage of the bonus will depend on a discretionary assessment. In 2016, the Company paid an additional fee of € 1 million to a non-executive Director, for his "dedication and efforts". We strongly regret that extraordinary bonuses are allowed for non-executive Directors, as it risks to undermine their independent judgement. Longterm incentives do not depend on any performance conditions and short-term
performance conditions are not adequately disclosed. We also note that the same bonus amount was paid to the CEO at least in the last 4 years, regardless of the actual performance (the Company does not disclose the level of achievement of short-term targets). Also taking into account the egregious severance payments for the Chairman- CEO (aggregate pension contributions of € 39.7 million plus a severance pay capped at 5 years of total remuneration), we recommend opposition.
In item 6, the Audit Committee proposes to re-appoint Deloitte as the Company's auditor for an additional year. Although the level of non-audit fees does not raise concerns, the number of years in office is above the threshold defined by ECGS guidelines (10 years). We also note that the term of office of Deloitte is not in compliance with the new Spanish Accounting Auditing Law (Law n. 22/2015), prescribing a total maximum period of 10 years for the duration of the contract of listed companies' auditors. Therefore, we recommend opposition.
In item 9, we recommend opposing the authorization to repurchase treasury shares, as the maximum price of the repurchases (120% of the share market price) exceeds our voting policy limit of 110% and treasury shares may be used to cover the Company's stock option plans, which are not linked to any performance conditions.
ACS Actividades de Construccion y Servicios is a holding company. Through its subsidiaries, Co.'s activities are divided into the following areas: Construction, engaged in the construction of civil works, and residential and non-residential building construction; industrial services, engaged in the development of applied engineering services, installations and the maintenance of industrial infrastructures in the energy, communications and control systems sectors; services, groups together environmental services, the outsourcing of building maintenance services, logistics and transport services; and concessions, mainly engaged in transport infrastructure concessions.
Founded in 1995, Proxinvest is an independent proxy firm supporting the engagement and proxy analysis processes of investors. Proxinvest mission is to analyse corporate governance practices and resolutions proposed at general meetings of listed firms.
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The independent financial analyst theScreener just lowered the general evaluation of ACS ACTIV.CONSTR.Y SERV. (ES), active in the Heavy Construction industry. As regards its fundamental valuation, the title now shows 1 out of 4 stars while market behaviour can be considered moderately risky. theScreener believes that the title remains under pressure due to the loss of a star(s) and downgrades its general evaluation to Neutral. As of the analysis date May 7, 2019, the closing price was EUR 38.39 and its target price was estimated at EUR 35.36.
In items 5.1 - 5.12, twelve of the board's eighteen members are standing for re-election. We have recommended shareholders vote against all but three of the directors due to the lack of independence on the Board. We are further concerned with the large size of the board, lack of gender diversity and the failure to propose all directors for annual re-election. The separation of powers between the Executive Chairman and the CEO continues to be confusing with some of the company's materials referring to the Chairman as an "Executive Chairman" and others referring to a "Chairman-CEO". In particul...
L'ensemble des rémunérations des dirigeants mandataires sociaux font l'objet des résolutions 6 à 11. La particularité d'Infotel est de présenter des politiques de rémunération ne comportant aucune part variable. Cette spécificité n'est pas en accord avec notre politique de vote. Toutefois, les mandataires sociaux dirigeants sont tous actionnaires à au moins 1,99% du capital et les montants sont raisonnables, ce qui atténue nos réserves et permet des recommandations positives. Les caractéristiques du conseil d'administration ne répondent pas à nos attentes en matière de gouvernance puisqu'il e...
Suite au transfert des titres de la Société sur Euronext Growth le 6 août 2018, la Société n’a plus d’obligation de se référer au Code de Gouvernance MIDDLENEXT auquel elle se référait depuis 2010 pour l’élaboration du rapport du Président sur le gouvernement d’entreprise, le contrôle interne et la gestion des risques prévu à l’article 225-37 du Code de Commerce et relatif à l’exercice clos le 31 décembre 2009. La société ne précise pas à quel code elle se réfère. Proxinvest avait déjà souligné l’année précédente que ce changement vers un marché moins règlementé était regrettable ; communicati...
Proxinvest veut attirer l'attentions sur quelques points majeures: D'une part, nous félicitons la Société pour la modification statutaire visant à réduire la durée du mandat des membres du Conseil de Surveillance de 6 à 3 ans. D'autre part, nous regrettons les montants des membres du Directoire (en cours) qui sont trop élevés par rapport à la médiane des rémunérations totales des dirigeants de leur indice. Enfin, nous encourageons la Société à améliorer le taux d'indépendance du Conseil, qui est pour le moment de seulement 25%.
Le conseil présente une majorité de membres non libres de conflits d'intérêts d’après Proxinvest à cause surtout de l’ancienneté des administrateurs qui dépasse notre seuil de 11 ans. Il est présidé par le Directeur général. Par ailleurs, les mandats d'une durée de 6 ans semblent trop longs car ils ne permettent pas aux actionnaires de se prononcer assez fréquemment sur la composition du conseil. Les différentes autorisations financières ne respectent pas la politique de vote de Proxinvest en termes de montants mais également en raison de leur possible utilisation en période d'offre publique. ...
ITEM 10: Benoit Bazin was designated Deputy CEO as of 1 January 2019. The company proposes therefore to approve its 2019 remuneration policy, as well as its post-employments benefits. Overall, his remuneration policy structure is more in line with our recommendations and amounts at stake are more moderate than the CEO’s. Thus we support it. Regarding his post-employments benefits, his severance indemnity and non-compete clause do not respect our Guidelines. However, his supplementary pension plan does. Thus, we support Item 12.
GOVERNANCE On 1 June 2018, Laurent Mignon left his position as Chief Executive Officer to become Chairman of the Management Board of BPCE, Natixis' main shareholder with 71% of the capital. He succeeded François Pérol as Chairman of the Board of Directors of Natixis and François Riahi became the new Chief Executive Officer. The Board remains composed of a majority of members who are not free of potential conflicts of interest, which makes it impossible to support most of the many co-optations and renewals proposed (resolutions 12 to 22). REMUNERATION Due to changes in governance, in a...
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