Default Research

US Municipal Bond Defaults and Recoveries, 1970-2016

This study updates our statistics and observations concerning the default, loss, and rating transition experience of Moody’s-rated US municipal bond issuers for 2016, as well as for the historical period since 1970. Key findings include:

» There were four Moody’s-rated municipal defaults in 2016, all related to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Caa3 negative). Total debt affected was $22.6 billion in 2016, by far the highest annual default volume in the 47-year study period.

» The number of rated municipal defaults will more than double in 2017 if the various Puerto Rico credits now entering court-ordered resolution are restructured with bondholder losses or otherwise default. An additional $41.7 billion rated debt is at risk.

» Municipal defaults and bankruptcies have become more common in the last decade, but are still rare overall. The five-year municipal default rate since 2007 was 0.15%, compared to 0.07% for the entire study period. In contrast, the five-year global corporate default rate was 6.92% since 2007.

» Competitive enterprises, such as housing and healthcare, account for most rated default events since 1970, while general governments and municipal utilities led in default volume.

» Rating volatility was high in 2016 relative to the historical municipal experience, but low compared to corporates; drift was positive, as upgrades narrowly outpaced downgrades.

» Municipal ratings successfully differentiate defaulters from non-defaulters. On average, municipal defaulters in 2016 were rated below 99.9% of the rated municipal universe, as of January 1, 2016. On average, municipal defaulters over the period 2012-2016 were rated below 96.8% of the rated municipal universe, as of January 1, 2012.

» Municipal credits remain highly rated since the recalibration to Moody’s global long-term rating scale in 2010. Cumulative default rates for municipals are comparable to global corporates in lower rating categories, but tend to be lower in higher rating categories.

» The differences in aggregate municipal and global corporate default performance are driven by the distinct strengths of state and local governments — namely delinked revenues and spending, and the ability to defer if not deter financial crisis — that cause most municipals to be rated in the high investment-grade ranges. Proportionally fewer municipals are rated speculative-grade, but those that are can transition quickly and their default rates are similar to like-rated global corporates.
Updates to this Year’s Study

Two significant updates have been made in order to more meaningfully measure the performance of Moody’s-rated public finance universe.

1. We shifted away from our prior security-based categorization framework and adopted a sector-based focus. This focus more accurately captures inherent credit distinctions and ratings volatility in the municipal sector. Our universe is consequently now divided into three broad sectors:

- **General Governments**, encompassing state and local governments, as well as school and other municipal districts supported by general obligation (GO), lease, and special tax revenues;
- **Municipal Utilities**, encompassing essential-service, revenue-based water, sewer, electric, gas, drainage, and transportation systems that often have monopoly status; and
- **Competitive Enterprises**, comprised of the revenue-supported healthcare, housing, and higher education sectors, as well as project finance transactions that operate in a competitive environment.

While our prior framing compared the transition and cumulative default rates of GO and non-GO credits, a sector-based framing is more meaningful for several reasons. First, many healthcare, housing, and higher education issuers invoke a "general obligation" pledge that has nothing to do with property tax revenues or pledges. These credits are better compared against other competitive enterprises and not against a local government that is primarily tax supported.

Second — and more significant for the number of ratings involved — general governments increasingly use non-GO debt instruments, such as a special tax (e.g., sales or gas taxes) or appropriation-backed debt like leases and moral obligation pledges. The credit quality of these instruments is often tied, either explicitly or implicitly, to the general health of the parent government; special tax ratings may be capped at the GO rating of the government, while lease and moral obligation debt ratings are explicitly notched off of the GO rating and will transition in lockstep. Revenue-backed debt, however, is still primarily characteristic of municipal utilities and competitive enterprises.

2. We smoothed the rating refinements of the late 1990s to more accurately reflect credit-based changes. In 1997, Moody's comprehensively applied 2s and 3s to our municipal alpha-numeric ratings. (Until this point, for example, municipal ratings in the A range were typically "A1" or "A"). The addition of 2s and 3s were previously reflected as upgrades and downgrades, and appeared as increased rating volatility. Since these changes reflect a change in Moody's published scale and not a change in underlying credit quality, they have been smoothed for the purpose of measuring rating volatility. The smoothing was achieved by applying the refined rating back to the date of the last rating action prior to refinement.

Introduction

This study evaluates the performance of Moody’s municipal ratings and their consistency with global corporate ratings. It covers public underlying ratings for all public finance issuers, including US state and local governments, municipal utilities, not-for-profit hospitals, housing agencies, colleges and universities, as well as other municipal issuers with long-term debt ratings. It also includes certain infrastructure and project finance credits that are tracked in parallel in our infrastructure default study. Insured, enhanced, and letter of credit-backed ratings are excluded.

We have been identifying and tracking important trends affecting municipal credit since our 2013 municipal default study. These trends support our contention that the US municipal sector, while broadly stable, is evolving in fundamental ways. We have also looked back to past periods of credit stress to reassess the lessons for default and recovery — for example, the liquidity-driven, relatively short lived defaults of the Great Depression, in contrast to the debt-driven defaults and repudiations of state debt from the 1840s.1

This publication does not announce a credit rating action. For any credit ratings referenced in this publication, please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on www.moodys.com for the most updated credit rating action information and rating history.
Within the 47-year study period, any one default may reflect the idiosyncrasies of an individual credit and not any general credit trend. This particularly applies to the long period up to 2008 during which general government defaults were exceedingly rare. Other observed defaults may be tightly clustered given credit events within a specific sub-sector, such as the incidence of multi-family housing defaults between 2003 and 2008. Broader default patterns will emerge as a sector's risk profile shifts.

**Municipal Defaults in 2016**

**Four Defaults by Puerto Rico in 2016, Likely More to Come in 2017**

There were four defaults in 2016, and while these are a small number relative to the total number of municipal credits they are extremely large in terms of debt affected. The defaults were all related to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and were separately secured. This makes Puerto Rico an extreme example of correlated risk within a single credit family that not only includes GO bonds but extends to lease and revenue debt. The four defaults were from the Puerto Rico Infrastructure Finance Authority (PRIFA), the Government Development Bank (GDB), the Highways and Transportation Authority, and Puerto Rico's general GO-backed debt.

Measured by debt outstanding these defaults together comprise the largest annual default by a single US municipal credit family in Moody's history, affecting about $22.6 billion rated debt through the end of 2016. The GO debt alone encompassed about $13.3 billion. The commonwealth had defaulted on $1.1 billion of rated Public Finance Corporation debt in 2015 such that cumulative debt in default grew to $23.7 billion by year end 2016.

Because much of Puerto Rico's rated debt is separately secured across its various issuers, the number of individual defaults could grow significantly in 2017. Of the 14 deep speculative grade rated Puerto Rico issuers, excluding subordinate liens, five defaulted through 2016. A total of $64.3 billion of rated debt may be in default by the end of 2017, compared to the total $66.3 billion of rated debt outstanding. Total rated and unrated debt is $68.4 billion, which includes less risky housing finance agency and tobacco settlement debt. Much of this debt will either be renegotiated, or restructured in court under the Title III bankruptcy-like process created under the PROMESA law. Puerto Rico also has $48.8 billion of pension liabilities, largely unfunded, as of 2015.

**Sector Overview**

**Three Broad Types of Public Finance Issuers**

The US public finance sector is notable for its variety and diversity. Compared to global corporate issuers and sub-sovereigns outside the US, the US municipal sector is highly disaggregated, both by type of issuer and by legal pledge.

For the purposes of this study, we have grouped our rated public finance universe into three broad types: general governments, municipal utilities, and competitive enterprises.

**General Governments:** This group is primarily comprised of state and local governments (cities, counties, K-12 public school districts). It also includes a wide variety of special districts for discrete services such as fire, parks, and libraries, as well as tax-backed hospital and community college districts. Though diverse, these entities share the common purpose of providing essential public services and they often have a monopoly over their service area. Unlike commercial and enterprise entities, they can sharply reduce spending in the short term without undue effect on their revenues, simply because tax revenues are delinked from the provision of any one service. Capital and maintenance expenditures can be deferred without immediate consequence.

Most general government debt is secured by an issuer's full faith and credit taxing power, often referred to as a general obligation (GO) pledge. While the GO pledge is the dominant security for general government debt, not all GO pledges are created equal. Some GO bonds have an unlimited tax (GOLT) pledge, with the issuer promising to raise taxes as necessary to repay debt. Other GO limited tax bonds (GOLT) have restrictions on the rate, levy, or dollar yield pledged. Even GOLT pledges will vary state by state; potentially significant features such as a statutory lien or third-party "lockbox" collection of the debt service levy are not consistent.

Also included in this category are bonds backed by a general government's operating funds without a specific pledge, including lease revenues, appropriations, and moral obligations. Forms of appropriation debt or other non-GO instruments are the dominant issuing vehicle for local governments in some states such as California, where GO debt is subject to strict voter approval. It is also dominant for some state governments such as New Jersey for the same reason. The general government group also includes bonds backed by a pledge of specific tax revenue such as income, sales, gasoline, or hotel taxes, which often are important components of operating revenues.
Municipal Utilities: Municipal utilities include enterprises providing essential services with a monopoly or near-monopoly over the service area. Unlike general governments, these entities don’t have broad taxing power. Revenues are instead derived from charges to customers of the enterprise system and their debt is typically secured by a gross or net pledge of that revenue.

Issuers in this group include environmental utilities (water, sewer, solid waste), power utilities (electric distribution and generation, gas), and transportation utilities (airports, parking, toll roads, mass transit, ports). This group does not include corporate investor-owned utilities.

Competitive Enterprises: This group includes not-for-profit enterprises that provide an important public function such as housing, higher education or healthcare, but do so in a competitive environment. It also includes project financings that can have relatively high enterprise risk, such as deals backed by revenues from sports or convention facilities or start-up transportation ventures. Since 1970, the majority of Moody’s-rated municipal defaults have been by competitive enterprises, particularly in housing and healthcare. While these subsectors are typically riskier than general governments or municipal utilities, the Moody’s-rated universe reflects a degree of issuer self-selection that boosts average credit quality. It includes, for example, many private universities with strong endowments, and well-managed state housing authorities with large pools of mortgages.

Characteristics of the Public Finance Sector
Moody’s maintained approximately 14,500 fundamental US public finance ratings at the end of 2016. General governments made up the vast majority of those ratings (70%, or about 10,200 ratings). Municipal utilities and competitive enterprises each comprised about 15% of the rated universe.

Exhibit 1 shows the number of rated credits by municipal sector since 1970. The total number of Moody’s municipal ratings has declined almost every year since 2008 and is down from a peak of nearly 17,600 in 2007. This decline reflects general market trends and is not driven by any one broad municipal sector.

Exhibit 2 shows the distribution of the rated universe since 1970. The municipal sector is highly rated overall. Nearly 93% of all Moody’s-rated municipal credits were in the A category or higher in 2016.

The median rating for US municipal credits at the end of 2016 was high at Aa3, which is a testament to the broad stability and low default rates of the sector. The median ratings by individual municipal sector were Aa3 for general governments, Aa3 for municipal utilities, and A1 for competitive enterprises. This stands in sharp contrast to global corporates, which have a median rating of Baa3 at the end of 2016.
Municipal Sector is Highly Rated: Typically Rated A and Above

Municipal Rating Counts By Broad Rating Category, Year End 1970-2016

The increase in A and Aa ratings since 2000 reflects the recalibration to a global rating scale in 2010 and not a fundamental shift in credit quality. The increase appears gradual instead of as a sudden shift because rating histories were also recalibrated. This affected all credits that were outstanding at the time of the recalibration, comprising about half of all ratings; any ratings that were withdrawn prior to the recalibration were not adjusted (See Municipal Ratings Performance Since the Recalibration of the US Municipal Scale).

Source: Moody's Investors Service

Only 1.4% of all public sector credits were rated below Baa3 (the market’s investment-grade threshold) at year-end 2016, compared to 49.6% of global corporate credits as shown in Exhibit 3. Speculative-grade ratings have been about 1.0% of all municipal ratings historically, but were as high as 2.7% in 1970.

Overall Sector Stability, But Long-Term Headwinds Have Not Abated

Most municipal credits have stabilized since the Great Recession (2007-2009), having done the hard work to rebalance operations through cutting costs, raising revenues, dipping into and then rebuilding reserves as tax bases recovered, or combinations of all three. The majority of US state and local governments also have strong institutional frameworks. Their revenues are generally not linked to expenditures, in contrast to corporate issuers that must reinvest in order to generate future revenues. As such, our various outlooks for 2017 for most US public finance sectors are once again stable. Nevertheless, a confluence of events has fostered a “new normal” of more fragile budgetary balance. These include uneven economic recovery and tepid growth, rising deferred maintenance, higher fixed costs, and changing demographics as populations age or relocate. A small but growing minority of the rated universe now has less resilience, less margin or appetite to tax further, and a weaker position to weather the next recession.
As a result, credit quality has softened marginally since 2010, and particularly in the Aa and A category, because of a host of increased credit pressures arising out of the Great Recession as well as the concurrent rise of unfunded pension liabilities. Exhibit 4 shows the rating distribution by alpha-numeric rating for the years 2010-2016. While the vast majority of municipal ratings remain firmly in investment grade, there are now, for example, proportionally fewer Aaa ratings and more A2 and A3 ratings.

The dominant headwind may well be the growth in general government leverage and the resulting increase in fixed cost burdens on operations. Overall state and local government’s leverage has grown substantially since 2001, primarily because of pension liabilities. Unfunded pension liabilities for state and local governments barely existed 15 years ago, and now total approximately $5 trillion when calculated using Moody’s standard adjustments. Bonded debt has increased about 25% since 2004 to about $3.05 trillion by 2016 (nominal dollars), based on Federal Reserve data. Indeed direct debt remains moderate for most rated issuers.

An Evolving Sector
The US public finance sector is notable for infrequent defaults and extraordinary stability since 1970. However, rating volatility, rating transition rates, and cumulative default rates (CDR) have all increased since 2007 (see Ratings Performance and Accuracy) and this trend will continue in 2017.

The sector has changed over the past decade and more profound changes may be in the offing. The once-comfortable aphorism that “munis don’t default” is no longer credible, although default rates remain low.

An important and recurring theme in the following discussions concerns the essential differences between corporate and municipal credits, particularly state and local government issuers. Municipal governments have the advantage of delinked revenues and expenditures, but they are also political entities whose decisions may not be driven by financial and economic considerations. In extreme stress, confronted by the inability to continue essential services, a municipal government will very likely choose to maintain basic services, and pay teachers and policemen before bondholders. At this point, the municipal government has exhausted its ability to "kick the can" to a future date of reckoning and has reached service insolvency, where essential services can no longer be maintained without deleveraging.

Municipal defaults and bankruptcies are still rare, however, especially compared to global corporates, but they are no longer unknown. The pace of municipal defaults accelerated leading up to and in the wake of the Great Recession as demonstrated in Exhibit 5. Forty-five of the 103 defaults since 1970 have occurred since 2007 and increasingly include general governments.
Exhibit 5
Overall Default Frequency Has Increased
Number of Defaults per Calendar Year, 1970-2016

Source: Moody’s Investors Service

Default volumes for recent defaults have been larger. The $2.25 billion default of the Washington Public Power Supply System Projects 4 & 5 in 1983 remained the largest municipal default for 25 years until it was eclipsed by Jefferson County in 2008, roughly matched by Detroit in 2013, and now dwarfed by Puerto Rico (Exhibit 6).

Exhibit 6
Default Volume is Driven by Large General Governments and Utilities
Default Amount by Sector per Calendar Year (billion USD)

Source: Moody’s Investors Service

Exhibits 5 and 6 illustrate a stark difference between the count of default events and volume. While competitive enterprises made up 72.8% of rated defaults, by default volume these projects were relatively small. The many housing defaults in the 2004-2008 period, for instance, concerned small-scale, stand-alone rental project financings. However, the overwhelming bulk of debt in the housing sector is issued by the large state housing finance agencies; here, there has been only a single default, which concerned a Connecticut Housing Authority multi-family project in 1994. General governments accounted for 20.4% of the overall count of rated defaults since 1970, followed by municipal utilities with only 6.8%.
Exhibit 7
Competitive Enterprises Comprise the Majority of Municipal Defaults
Defaults by Sector, 1970-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Number of Defaults</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Default Volume (million USD)</th>
<th>Default Volume as %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City GO</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>916</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Lease</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>1,767</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County GO</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Lease</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-12 SD GO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Governments</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>27,890</td>
<td>68.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Increment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL GOVERNMENTS</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>31,078</td>
<td>76.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric Utility</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>2,387</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Transit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toll Facility</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water/Sewer Utility</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>3,109</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUNICIPAL UTILITIES</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>6,151</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charter School</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>2,455</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not-For-Profit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private K-12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISES</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>72.8%</td>
<td>3,492</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL**                | **103**            | **100%**   | **40,721**                   | **100.0%**          |

*Source: Moody's Investors Service*

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**General Government Defaults, Once Rare, Are Becoming More Common**

Puerto Rico is only the latest, if extreme, example of general government distress. Of the 21 general government defaults since 1970, sixteen have occurred since 2007, at which point only a paltry 0.1% of general government ratings were below investment grade. Exhibit 8 shows that by the end of 2016, this percentage had increased tenfold, though still relatively small at 1.1%. A similar trend also occurred in the municipal utilities sector. Distress in the competitive enterprises sector has been historically more common, with 3.4% of the sector’s ratings below investment grade in 2016, down from 4.3% in 2007.
As seen in Exhibit 9, the general government share of all municipal speculative-grade credits has grown considerably, to 54% in 2016 from 7% in 2007, although the numbers are still small. There were 205 speculative-grade municipal credits in 2016 compared to 168 in 2007. The competitive enterprises share of speculative-grade credits fell to 35% in 2016 from 86% in 2007.

Municipal Credits Can Be Strongly Correlated to One Another

Municipal entities are tied together by overlapping debt burdens and shared economies and tax bases. This connection has become more important in recent years; Puerto Rico is only the most recent, if salient, example. Increased pension leverage and consequently rising annual funding costs, along with the effects of the recession upon employment, tax base, and taxing ability have aggravated the competition for revenues across clusters or linked “families” of municipal governments. For some of these credit families, “revenue headroom” has become an important credit consideration, and not just a matter of legal taxing limitation but a broader issue of practical economic and political ability to increase taxes or other fees.

A new correlation that has arisen in the last decade is the exposure of state and local governments to the asset markets through their pension trust funds. Even as fund assets are inadequate to fully meet pension liabilities, they have still risen to an all-time high as a share of governmental revenues, giving the sponsoring state and local governments particular exposure to equity markets and financial market volatility in general.
Pledge Still Matters, But May Not Shield Against Loss in Bankruptcy or Default

We have now seen several significant situations where municipal bonds, although secured by formal legal pledges of revenue, are displaced in bankruptcy, receivership or simple default in favor of pensions that have no such formal pledge or revenue claim. The evidence of the few large municipal bankruptcies to date suggests that pledge still matters by providing bondholders a seat at the restructuring table. The stronger the pledge, the stronger the negotiating position as the bankruptcy settlement proceeds, and the stronger the ability to minimize any loss.

When a government has reached a point of service insolvency, or if the pension trust funds themselves are depleted, the liability for payment of pension benefits in bankruptcy is likely to move to the front of the line, which may diminish the status of bondholders, despite their legal pledges.

Municipal Bankruptcy Is No Longer Taboo

The cultural taboos to bankruptcy have weakened in the past decade, due to multiple factors, including the growth of personal filings. The political incentives for municipal bankruptcy may also be shifting, particularly given the pattern of favorable outcomes for pensions. One of the significant lessons of the recent large bankruptcies – and in particular Detroit’s relatively speedy resolution of its filing – is that market access may not suffer for long after bankruptcy.

In early 2017, the GO-backed Gainesville Hospital District in Texas strategically employed Chapter 9 bankruptcy to close its pensions and bond out the pension liabilities in order to facilitate a shift to private sector contract operations. While no impairment was intended nor has resulted so far — the bankruptcy was itself uncontested – Chapter 9 itself poses unpredictable risks for bondholders. In large part, this is because Chapter 9 cases are rare and most are settled before adjudication; there is consequently very little if any applicable precedent.
Municipal Ratings Performance Since the Recalibration of the US Municipal Scale

US municipal sector ratings were recalibrated to Moody's global rating scale in May 2010 in order to align the expected credit risk of a given municipal rating with the other Moody's ratings, including those assigned to corporate obligors. This was accomplished by raising ratings for municipal bonds, especially for general governments. Generally, Aa-rated credits moved one notch up, A-rated credits moved two notches, and Baa-rated credits moved three notches up. These new rating assignments did not reflect an improvement in credit risk, but simply a rescaling of that risk.

The rating histories that underpin this study were adjusted for all bonds that were outstanding at the time of the recalibration. Thus ratings prior to recalibration also reflect the uplift observed during the recalibration. This adjustment explains the gradual increase of Aa credits as a share of the rated universe in Exhibit 10 instead of a more pronounced rating shift in 2010.

Recalibration of Rating Histories Creates Appearance of Upward Trend of Aa Ratings

Distribution of Ratings by Broad Rating Category, 1970-2016

Ratings that had already been withdrawn prior to the recalibration, about half of all ratings in the study, were not adjusted. As a result, municipal performance and accuracy metrics since 1970 reflect the performance of some ratings not on the global scale. The Baa cohort in particular is affected because it includes ratings that would have moved as many as three notches higher during the recalibration. Consequently, the Baa cohort may suggest more stability and fewer cumulative defaults when compared to global corporates.

Recalibration shrunk the number of ratings in the Baa cohort by some 59%. While the total number of Baa-rated municipal credits has increased only marginally since recalibration, the number of Baa general government credits has increased nearly 40%. This increase is due to emerging and fundamental credit pressures.

At the same time as the recalibration — and only obvious in retrospect — two major credit changes were afoot in the municipal sector. First, the fallout from the Great Recession was hitting general governments, imposing often sharp losses in tax base, revenues, and employment. Second, by 2010, the building pension crisis was gaining momentum and emerging as a potent credit constraint. In consequence, downgrades generally outpaced upgrades from 2012 through 2015. Nevertheless, the number of Baa credits overall is still very small in the context of all municipal ratings and has not significantly changed, although the proportion to total ratings has increased about 25%.
Recalibration has thus held, producing thinner Baa and speculative-grade cohorts that are much more consistent in default performance with other Moody's ratings on the global rating scale. Exhibit 11 demonstrates that most credits that recalibrated to a higher rating either remained in that higher category seven years later, or were withdrawn.

**Exhibit 11**

**Recalibrated Ratings Are Largely Stable**

**Rating Transition Matrix, 10/1/2010-12/31/2016 (Horizon: 75 months)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From/To: (Counts)</th>
<th>Aaa</th>
<th>Aa</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>Baa</th>
<th>Ba</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Caa-C</th>
<th>Withdrawn</th>
<th>Default</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recalibrated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaa</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>63.1%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>20.83%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aa</td>
<td>7,552</td>
<td>0.85%</td>
<td>63.20%</td>
<td>6.20%</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>29.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>4,422</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>6.72%</td>
<td>47.49%</td>
<td>3.08%</td>
<td>0.72%</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td>41.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baa</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>21.65%</td>
<td>18.56%</td>
<td>1.55%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>1.55%</td>
<td>55.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caa-C</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The time horizon begins at October 1, 2010 to ensure that all recalibrated credits are included. Only investment-grade credits were recalibrated. The lone B-rated credit above refers to the City of Central Falls, which was Baa3 when it recalibrated to Baa1 in May 2010. By October, the city had been downgraded to the single-B category.

Source: Moody's Investors Service

The evidence increasingly indicates that the recalibration has better aligned the ratings of municipals and global corporates, though some key differences remain. Municipal default rates are still low relative to global corporates across high investment-grade categories. Speculative-grade municipals, however, have become more comparable with global corporates, though these rates may be colored by the relatively low number of municipal ratings in those categories (see Exhibit 12).

**Exhibit 12**

**Post-Recalibration Municipal Cumulative Default Rates Are Better Aligned, But Some Differences Remain**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Year 4</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Year 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aaa</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>Aaa</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aa</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>Aa</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
<td>0.23%</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baa</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
<td>0.43%</td>
<td>Baa</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>0.34%</td>
<td>1.13%</td>
<td>1.92%</td>
<td>3.11%</td>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>0.59%</td>
<td>1.45%</td>
<td>1.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>1.12%</td>
<td>3.37%</td>
<td>6.29%</td>
<td>9.88%</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>2.38%</td>
<td>5.82%</td>
<td>8.41%</td>
<td>9.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caa-C</td>
<td>6.81%</td>
<td>12.74%</td>
<td>18.48%</td>
<td>23.81%</td>
<td>Caa-C</td>
<td>15.28%</td>
<td>25.35%</td>
<td>31.65%</td>
<td>38.76%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Period calculations begin in October 2010

Source: Moody's Investors Service

See Appendix E for more discussion on the recalibration to the global scale.
Ratings Performance and Accuracy

Transitions Demonstrate the Overall Stability of the Sector

US public finance ratings are more stable and transition less frequently than global corporates simply because of the inherent credit strengths of the sector. As noted earlier, general governments in particular have a critical ability to manage financial stress because revenues and expenditures are delinked, which allows them time to recover and rebalance. As such, they predominantly occupy higher rating categories. But even with this advantage, volatility has increased in the wake of the Great Recession when we compare recent trends to the longer history.

Exhibit 13 shows the longer history since 1970, where municipal ratings transitioned less frequently than their global corporate counterparts for each broad rating category. As noted, the municipal distribution is significantly more skewed toward investment-grade ranges, where ratings tend to be more stable.

Exhibit 13
Municipal Ratings Transition Less Frequently Than Global Corporates
Average One-Year Rating Transition Rates, 1970-2016; Municipals vs Global Corporates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From/To:</th>
<th>Average Cohort Count</th>
<th>Aaa</th>
<th>Aa</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>Baa</th>
<th>Ba</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Caa-C</th>
<th>Withdrawn</th>
<th>Default</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muni</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaa</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>94.67%</td>
<td>1.55%</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>3.58%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aa</td>
<td>4,836</td>
<td>0.43%</td>
<td>95.46%</td>
<td>1.31%</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>2.75%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>5,543</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>1.69%</td>
<td>92.99%</td>
<td>0.68%</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>4.53%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baa</td>
<td>2,081</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
<td>1.67%</td>
<td>91.07%</td>
<td>0.61%</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>6.49%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>0.65%</td>
<td>5.15%</td>
<td>80.78%</td>
<td>3.03%</td>
<td>0.70%</td>
<td>9.32%</td>
<td>0.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.11%</td>
<td>0.59%</td>
<td>1.62%</td>
<td>4.42%</td>
<td>77.76%</td>
<td>5.15%</td>
<td>7.63%</td>
<td>2.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caa-C</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
<td>0.56%</td>
<td>1.32%</td>
<td>2.53%</td>
<td>71.70%</td>
<td>14.90%</td>
<td>8.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaa</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>87.56%</td>
<td>6.04%</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>3.70%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aa</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>0.83%</td>
<td>85.23%</td>
<td>8.41%</td>
<td>0.43%</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>4.96%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>2.51%</td>
<td>86.69%</td>
<td>5.41%</td>
<td>0.49%</td>
<td>0.11%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>4.64%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baa</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>4.21%</td>
<td>85.48%</td>
<td>3.88%</td>
<td>0.71%</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td>5.19%</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
<td>0.43%</td>
<td>6.10%</td>
<td>76.18%</td>
<td>7.25%</td>
<td>0.83%</td>
<td>8.24%</td>
<td>0.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>0.45%</td>
<td>4.76%</td>
<td>73.49%</td>
<td>7.15%</td>
<td>10.57%</td>
<td>3.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caa-C</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
<td>0.41%</td>
<td>6.33%</td>
<td>68.35%</td>
<td>14.89%</td>
<td>9.89%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The first cohort considered is the 1-yr cohort starting on January 1, 1970. The last cohort considered is the 1-yr cohort starting on January 1, 2016.
2. Transition rates are averaged over cohorts spaced 1 month apart.
3. Ratings outstanding at the time of recalibration have been adjusted to be consistent with the Global Rating Scale (see Municipal Ratings Performance Since the Recalibration of the US Municipal Scale). Withdrawn ratings were not recalibrated.

Source: Moody’s Investors Service

Over this longer period, transition rates were largely comparable for general governments, municipal utilities, and competitive enterprises, especially for investment-grade rating categories. But Exhibit 14 shows that competitive enterprises actually transitioned more than the other municipal sectors in speculative-grade categories. Ratings within the speculative-grade competitive enterprises cohorts generally experienced more downgrades, as well as higher overall rates of withdrawal and default.
Exhibit 14
Transition Rates Comparable Across Individual Municipal Sectors
Average One-Year Rating Transition Rates, 1970-2016; General Governments vs Municipal Utilities vs Competitive Enterprises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From/To:</th>
<th>Average Cohort Count</th>
<th>Aaa</th>
<th>Aa</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>Baa</th>
<th>Ba</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Caa-C</th>
<th>Withdrawn</th>
<th>Default</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Governments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaa</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>94.19%</td>
<td>3.14%</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>2.53%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aa</td>
<td>3,807</td>
<td>0.37%</td>
<td>95.80%</td>
<td>1.31%</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>2.47%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>3,915</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>1.80%</td>
<td>93.07%</td>
<td>0.55%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baa</td>
<td>1,447</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>1.48%</td>
<td>91.22%</td>
<td>0.35%</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>6.86%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>1.06%</td>
<td>6.14%</td>
<td>82.27%</td>
<td>1.19%</td>
<td>0.41%</td>
<td>8.74%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.27%</td>
<td>0.62%</td>
<td>2.29%</td>
<td>3.14%</td>
<td>85.94%</td>
<td>1.98%</td>
<td>5.01%</td>
<td>0.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caa-C</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>1.56%</td>
<td>1.82%</td>
<td>5.45%</td>
<td>72.21%</td>
<td>9.48%</td>
<td>9.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Utilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaa</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>92.13%</td>
<td>2.64%</td>
<td>0.32%</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>4.72%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aa</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>0.38%</td>
<td>95.15%</td>
<td>1.36%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>3.05%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>1.24%</td>
<td>93.37%</td>
<td>0.58%</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>4.71%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baa</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>1.83%</td>
<td>91.56%</td>
<td>0.31%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>6.18%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>0.45%</td>
<td>5.42%</td>
<td>83.28%</td>
<td>2.51%</td>
<td>0.76%</td>
<td>7.51%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
<td>8.97%</td>
<td>71.95%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>7.18%</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caa-C</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
<td>1.04%</td>
<td>2.42%</td>
<td>1.04%</td>
<td>84.60%</td>
<td>7.08%</td>
<td>3.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaa</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>95.20%</td>
<td>0.46%</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>4.13%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aa</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>0.95%</td>
<td>93.16%</td>
<td>1.24%</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>4.54%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
<td>1.66%</td>
<td>92.13%</td>
<td>1.44%</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>4.41%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baa</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
<td>2.50%</td>
<td>89.63%</td>
<td>2.38%</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>4.92%</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
<td>3.87%</td>
<td>78.22%</td>
<td>5.39%</td>
<td>1.03%</td>
<td>10.57%</td>
<td>0.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.67%</td>
<td>0.24%</td>
<td>4.69%</td>
<td>72.21%</td>
<td>7.69%</td>
<td>9.78%</td>
<td>4.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caa-C</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.39%</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
<td>0.78%</td>
<td>2.36%</td>
<td>66.75%</td>
<td>19.16%</td>
<td>10.42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The first cohort considered is the 1-yr cohort starting on January 1, 1970. The last cohort considered is the 1-yr cohort starting on January 1, 2016.
2. Transition rates are averaged over cohorts spaced 1 month apart.
3. Ratings outstanding at the time of recalibration have been adjusted to be consistent with the Global Rating Scale (see Municipal Ratings Performance Since the Recalibration of the US Municipal Scale). Withdrawn ratings were not recalibrated.
Source: Moody’s Investors Service

When looking at the trend in the past decade, however, we see that transition rates have increased for both municipals and global corporates. Since 2007, 89% of Aaa municipal entities stayed the same compared to 81.9% of Aaa-rated global corporates, down from 94.7% and 87.6%, respectively, over the longer study period. More striking is the heightened transition for lower-rated municipal entities, which reflects less predictable, often politically motivated behavior under stress. Exhibit 15 shows that Baa-and-below-rated municipals have demonstrated less stability than like-rated global corporates. Each municipal sector also saw reduced stability, particularly competitive enterprises, as seen in Exhibit 16.
### Exhibit 15

**Overall Municipal Transition Rates Increased in the Last Decade**

**Average One-Year Rating Transition Rates, 2007-2016, Municipals vs Global Corporates**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From/To:</th>
<th>Average Cohort Count</th>
<th>Aaa</th>
<th>Aa</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>Baa</th>
<th>Ba</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Caa-C</th>
<th>Withdrawn</th>
<th>Default</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Municipals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaa</td>
<td>1,232</td>
<td>89.02%</td>
<td>1.93%</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>8.76%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aa</td>
<td>8,381</td>
<td>0.26%</td>
<td>94.15%</td>
<td>1.48%</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>4.07%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.75%</td>
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<td>1.08%</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baa</td>
<td>907</td>
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<td>0.09%</td>
<td>3.13%</td>
<td>81.67%</td>
<td>3.29%</td>
<td>0.34%</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
<td>11.32%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
<td>1.03%</td>
<td>7.59%</td>
<td>70.12%</td>
<td>4.79%</td>
<td>1.29%</td>
<td>14.76%</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>0.35%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.98%</td>
<td>6.31%</td>
<td>66.04%</td>
<td>10.97%</td>
<td>12.29%</td>
<td>3.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caa-C</td>
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<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
<td>2.15%</td>
<td>63.87%</td>
<td>20.18%</td>
<td>13.69%</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<th>From/To:</th>
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<th>Aaa</th>
<th>Aa</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>Baa</th>
<th>Ba</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Caa-C</th>
<th>Withdrawn</th>
<th>Default</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaa</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>81.89%</td>
<td>11.78%</td>
<td>0.38%</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>5.76%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aa</td>
<td>507</td>
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<td>78.88%</td>
<td>14.37%</td>
<td>0.88%</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>5.20%</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.47%</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>4.99%</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1,483</td>
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<td>0.06%</td>
<td>2.65%</td>
<td>87.66%</td>
<td>3.75%</td>
<td>0.54%</td>
<td>0.11%</td>
<td>5.01%</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>682</td>
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<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>5.24%</td>
<td>77.12%</td>
<td>7.93%</td>
<td>1.09%</td>
<td>7.97%</td>
<td>0.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
<td>0.38%</td>
<td>4.17%</td>
<td>72.57%</td>
<td>9.72%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
<td>5.56%</td>
<td>72.95%</td>
<td>13.25%</td>
<td>8.05%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The first cohort considered is the 1-yr cohort starting on January 1, 1970. The last cohort considered is the 1-yr cohort starting on January 1, 2016.
2. Transition rates are averaged over cohorts spaced 1 month apart.
3. Ratings outstanding at the time of recalibration have been adjusted to be consistent with the Global Rating Scale (see Municipal Ratings Performance Since the Recalibration of the US Municipal Scale). Withdrawn ratings were not recalibrated.

*Source: Moody’s Investors Service*
### Exhibit 16

Increase in Transition Rates are Apparent in Each Municipal Sector; Greatest Increase in Competitive Enterprises

Average One-Year Rating Transition Rates, 2007-2016, General Governments vs Municipal Utilities vs Competitive Enterprises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From/To: General Governments</th>
<th>Average Cohort Count</th>
<th>Aaa</th>
<th>Aa</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>Baa</th>
<th>Ba</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Caa-C</th>
<th>Withdrawn</th>
<th>Default</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aaa</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>94.93%</td>
<td>2.37%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>2.68%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aa</td>
<td>6,291</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
<td>94.74%</td>
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<td>0.04%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>3.52%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.89%</td>
<td>90.81%</td>
<td>0.92%</td>
<td>0.24%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>6.12%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baa</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>3.47%</td>
<td>76.61%</td>
<td>4.17%</td>
<td>0.48%</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>15.04%</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.27%</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>2.26%</td>
<td>12.57%</td>
<td>63.35%</td>
<td>3.96%</td>
<td>1.67%</td>
<td>15.79%</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>1.43%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>3.56%</td>
<td>8.76%</td>
<td>65.58%</td>
<td>10.49%</td>
<td>6.21%</td>
<td>3.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.51%</td>
<td>7.65%</td>
<td>66.33%</td>
<td>6.89%</td>
<td>18.62%</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>From/To: Municipal Utilities</th>
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<th>Aa</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>Baa</th>
<th>Ba</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Caa-C</th>
<th>Withdrawn</th>
<th>Default</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aaa</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>92.58%</td>
<td>2.84%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
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<td>0.00%</td>
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<td>0.00%</td>
<td>4.58%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aa</td>
<td>1,188</td>
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<td>93.82%</td>
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<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>90.28%</td>
<td>0.93%</td>
<td>0.11%</td>
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<td>0.00%</td>
<td>7.08%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>82.66%</td>
<td>1.36%</td>
<td>0.38%</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
<td>11.80%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
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<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.66%</td>
<td>7.69%</td>
<td>76.33%</td>
<td>3.15%</td>
<td>1.83%</td>
<td>10.34%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>31.56%</td>
<td>43.85%</td>
<td>11.96%</td>
<td>12.29%</td>
<td>0.33%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caa-C</td>
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<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>70.54%</td>
<td>2.68%</td>
<td>26.79%</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>From/To: Competitive Enterprises</th>
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<th>Aa</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>Baa</th>
<th>Ba</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Caa-C</th>
<th>Withdrawn</th>
<th>Default</th>
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</thead>
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<td>1.34%</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>15.17%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aa</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
<td>90.49%</td>
<td>1.47%</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>7.37%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>1.29%</td>
<td>90.51%</td>
<td>2.03%</td>
<td>0.29%</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>5.78%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baa</td>
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<td>86.80%</td>
<td>3.19%</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
<td>7.02%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.26%</td>
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<td>73.57%</td>
<td>5.69%</td>
<td>0.92%</td>
<td>14.92%</td>
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</tr>
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<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
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<td>68.71%</td>
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<td>3.02%</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.28%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.83%</td>
<td>62.42%</td>
<td>25.12%</td>
<td>11.36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The first cohort considered is the 1-yr cohort starting on January 1, 1970. The last cohort considered is the 1-yr cohort starting on January 1, 2016.
2. Transition rates are averaged over cohorts spaced 1 month apart.
3. Ratings outstanding at the time of recalibration have been adjusted to be consistent with the Global Rating Scale (see Municipal Ratings Performance Since the Recalibration of the US Municipal Scale). Withdrawn ratings were not recalibrated.

Source: Moody’s Investors Service
Several factors explain the lower stability. First, withdrawal rates increased during this period. One driver of this, particularly for Aaa-rated competitive enterprises, which had a withdrawal rate of 15.2%, was the reduction in housing sector ratings due to refundings or redemptions as transactions that began with the 2006 housing boom reached their ten-year call period, followed by limited new activity. Rating withdrawals were also high in other municipal sectors, including general governments and municipal utilities, particularly in lower-rated cohorts that were already relatively thin. Other factors may include changing issuance practices and higher standards for reporting and disclosure.

Second, recalibration migrated many Baa-rated credits into the A category, leaving a significantly smaller Baa cohort (see Municipal Ratings Performance Since the Recalibration of the US Municipal Scale). One consequence of the thinner population is that rating transitions have a proportionally larger impact on the cohort. The Baa cohort also remained thin relative to most municipal ratings, despite some downgrades because of the recession and the growing pension crisis.

A third factor contributing to the lower stability is that lower-rated municipal credits, particularly for general governments, are often much less predictable and subject to political factors that can move the credit quality up or down. While stressed local governments may choose to fund operations over debt, they also have many tools to defer the tipping point of service insolvency as long as possible.

As such, very similar fact patterns can result in starkly different outcomes. This is seen in examples from the very beginning of our default histories, as well as in more recent years. For instance, Case Study 4 describes the 1983 default of the Washington Public Power System’s Nuclear Project 4 & 5 bonds, which at $2.25 billion remained the largest single municipal default until Jefferson County, AL took the crown in 2008. Projects 4 & 5 defaulted when, after their cancellation, the project’s 28 municipal utility participants sued to have their obligation to fund debt service obligations invalidated in court, despite the “take-or-pay” pledge to pay regardless of project operation. This is famous in the municipal sector, but what is often not remembered is that sister Projects 1 & 3 were also not completed and also eventually canceled. Here, Bonneville Power continued to pay debt service, funding the costs from its Columbia River hydropower revenues.

More recently, we have the example of two mid-sized cities in California’s Central Valley, Stockton and Fresno, which were both hard hit but the recession and aftermath of the sub prime housing debacle. Stockton filed under Chapter 9 and defaulted on its debts; Fresno refused, fought back, stabilized its operations, and has now rejoined the ranks of stable investment-grade credits. Yet another example is Atlantic City, which with the help of state oversight may yet be able to avoid default despite significant challenges.

These political factors are typically not present for corporate issuers. Speculative-grade competitive enterprises may perform more like corporates, driven by the loss of pricing power or markets. When a general government has reached the speculative ranges, it has typically begun to lose the ability to defer financial crisis.
Transition and Volatility Metrics

A rating transition matrix summarizes the cumulative changes – upgrades, downgrades, withdrawals and defaults – in credit ratings over a given period for a fixed cohort of credits. Here we use a one year or 12 months time horizon. Only net changes are reflected in the transition matrix. For example, if a Aaa-rated bond was downgraded and then promptly upgraded back to Aaa during a 12 month interval, it will appear as if the rating remain unchanged.

Each cell shows the percentage of ratings that held a given row’s rating at the beginning of the period and the column’s rating at the end of the period. The matrices also include columns showing the fraction of debts that defaulted or had their ratings withdrawn. The largest values in the average one-year transition matrix are the diagonal elements, which show the percentage of ratings that remained the same at the end of the period. Cells left of the diagonal reflect a net upgrade and those to the right reflect a net downgrade.

Volatility metrics measure the incidence, magnitude, and direction of rating changes. Rating volatility measures the gross average number of notches a credit will change over the study period, in this case one year. It is defined as the average upgraded notches per issuer plus the average downgraded notches per issuer.

Rating drift measures the net average number of notches a credit will change over the study period. It is defined as the average upgraded notches per issuer minus the average downgraded notches per issuer.

Accuracy Metrics

Accuracy metrics measure the relative or ordinal accuracy of a rating. Average defaulter position measures the ordinal power of Moody’s ratings and is an indication of how well Moody’s rank-orders default risk. A given credit’s position is defined as the share of all credits rated better than it, assuming each credit occupies the midpoint of its rating category, as of a fixed cohort formation date. The AP is the average position of the defaulted credits.

A more powerful rating system will have lower-rated defaults and higher rated non-defaults, meaning the average position of defaulters should be high for an effective rating system. AP is bounded between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating perfect sorting power, 0.5 indicating no power, and 0 indicating perfectly negative power.

Cumulative Default Rates

The average Cumulative Default Rates (CDRs) show the historically-observed probability that a credit that would have otherwise remained outstanding will default over a given time. CDRs are calculated by grouping credits by their rating on a particular date into cohorts and then tracking their performance over time. Cohorts are formed at monthly frequencies and then averaged over a year. For example, if a credit is rated Aaa on January 1, 2014 it would be grouped into a cohort of other credits rated Aaa on that date, regardless of their original rating.

Recovery Rates

Ultimate recovery rates are calculated, whenever possible and to the extent data is available, as the discounted recovery rate based on the value creditors actually received at the resolution of the default relative to what they should have contractually received, inclusive of any accrued interest. Recovery rates do not include payments received from insurance providers or other types of guaranty.

For more information on transition and volatility metrics, accuracy metrics, cumulative default rates, and recovery rates please see Glossary of Moody’s Rating Performance Metrics.
Rating Drift is More Positive, But Volatility is Still Elevated

Rating volatility is again elevated in 2016, but ratings drift was slightly positive. The direction of both volatility metrics is driven by an increase in notch-weighted upgrades combined with a still elevated level of downgrades. This continues a trend begun in mid-2012 and lends credence to our general narrative of the sector: Most credits are recovering or are stable in the aftermath of the recession, but some still face steep credit challenges.

Exhibit 17 shows that notch-weighted downgrades have outpaced upgrades for every monthly cohort since mid-2008, reversing only very recently. While the increase pace of upgrades indicates generally improving credit quality, the churn will contribute to higher rating volatility for the foreseeable future.

Exhibit 17
Volatility Still High, But Drift Trending Positive
Drift and Volatility Ratios of US Municipal Issuers, 1970-2016

Exhibit 18 provides a comparison of the disaggregated notch-weighted drift over the past ten years for each municipal sector, highlighting the effects of the recession and subsequent recovery. Competitive enterprises was the first municipal sector to be hit by the recession. Here the pace of downgrades over upgrades accelerated rapidly beginning in late 2008 and early 2009.

General governments and municipal utilities, however, were more resilient at first. But by early 2009 downgrades began to outnumber upgrades. This initial resilience owed to several different factors. First, there can be a considerable time delay between changes in property market values and changes in a municipality’s tax base. As a result, property taxes, the main source of revenue for many local governments, were not immediately affected. Second, many municipal utilities provide essential services such as water, sewer and electricity, and for most, consumption levels were not dramatically impacted. For both of these sectors, the negative notch-weighted drift peaked sometime in late 2011 and early 2012.

The negative drift moderated for all three sectors beginning in 2013. Municipal utilities are now beginning to see a rebound in credit quality, with more upgrades than downgrades and it appears the same may now be true for general governments. While competitive enterprises briefly saw upgrades surpass downgrades in late 2014, downgrades soon after picked up again. These downgrades reflect general pressures in the healthcare sector related to a more competitive market with greater number of mergers and acquisitions, and also in the higher education sector due to statewide budget strain.
Municipal Sectors Reacted Differently in the Wake of the Great Recession

Notch-weighted Drift Summary, 2007-2016; General Governments vs Municipal Utilities vs Competitive Enterprises

Municipal Ratings Have a High Degree of Accuracy

Municipal ratings generally have a high level of accuracy in differentiating defaulters from non-defaulters, even compared to global corporate ratings. In 2016, the one-year average defaulter position for municipal issuers was 100.0% compared to 92.3% for global corporate issuers.

The downward spikes in average position in the 1990s are attributable to idiosyncratic defaults by highly rated issuers for a given year. For example, Baldwin County (1988), Polk County (1991), and Orange County (1994) were all rated A1 one year before default and account for three of the spikes in Exhibit 19. The largest downward spike occurred in July 1994 due to the default of a multi-family transaction by the Connecticut Housing Authority, which was rated Aa2 one-year before default. This was the only default by any rated state housing authority. (Appendix A for case studies for each of our municipal defaults).

Municipal Ratings Have Successfully Differentiated Defaulters From Non-Defaulters

One-year Average Default Position of US Municipals vs Global Corporates, 1970-2016

The sharp downward spikes are also a reflection of the low number of municipal defaults in most years. As a result, the one-year average position is not particularly robust.

In contrast, the five-year average position averages the rating positions over larger numbers of defaults, and hence provides a more robust estimate of the municipal ratings’ ordinal sorting power, albeit over a longer horizon. Exhibit 20 shows that since the mid-1990s,
municipal ratings have had more ordinal power than global corporate ratings over a five-year horizon. The five-year AP for cohorts formed on January 1, 2012 was 96.8% and 86.4% for municipal and global corporate issuers, respectively.

Exhibit 20
Municipal Defaulters are Generally Lower Rated than Non-Defaulters
Five-year Average Default Position of US Municipals vs Global Corporates, 1970-2016

Three defaulted credits are not reflected in this exhibit because they were not rated as of any cohort dates (i.e., month starts) within one year prior to defaulting. Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel District, VA was rated by Dun & Bradstreet at the time of its default. The ratings for Washington Power Supply System, WA and Downtown Hospital, TN were withdrawn prior to default.

Source: Moody’s Investors Service

Exhibit 21 shows that in the 47-year study period, 90% of all municipal defaults had speculative-grade ratings at the time of default, but only 70% had speculative-grade ratings one year before default. The median rating one year before default for municipals was Ba3, while the median rating five years before default was Baa3, one notch above speculative grade.

Exhibit 21
Municipal Ratings Are Generally Caa-C at Default

For credits that defaulted in 2016, the median rating for credits one year before default was Caa2 and ranged from B3 to Ca. This is a very narrow range because they were all related to Puerto Rico. In contrast, as shown in Exhibit 22, the range of ratings one year before default was higher in 2015, ranging from A2 (Cardinal Local School District, OH) to C (Cook County - Single Family Mortgage Revenue Bonds).
Exhibit 22

Median Ratings One-Year Before Default Broadly Accurate, But Idiosyncratic Outliers Persist
Rating One-Year Before Default

1. Green dots indicate the median rating one-year before default. Vertical blue lines show the highest and lowest ratings held one year before the default.
2. Three defaulted credits are not reflected in this exhibit because they were not rated as of any cohort dates (i.e., month starts) within one year prior to defaulting. Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel District, VA was rated by Dun & Bradstreet at the time of its default. The ratings for Washington Power Supply System, WA and Downtown Hospital, TN were withdrawn prior to default.

Source: Moody's Investors Service

Cumulative Default Rates Have Increased in the Last Decade, But Are Low Compared to Global Corporates
Moody's ratings accurately rank-order default risk at any given horizon for both municipal and global corporate issuers, as the probability of default rises with lower ratings. Exhibit 23 shows that municipals credits had lower one-year through ten-year average cumulative default rates (CDR) for all horizons over the entire period of study. As we have noted, the period is marked by general tranquility through 2008. The all-rated municipal default rate after five years was very low at 0.08% Even for speculative-grade municipal issuers, the 5-year CDR of 5.36% was a little less than a third of that for global corporates at 18.98%.
Exhibit 23

Municipal Default Rates Lower Than Global Corporates For All Broad Categories
Average Cumulative Default Rates, 1970-2016, Municipals vs. Global Corporates

### Municipals

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<tr>
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<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Year 4</th>
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<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
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<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aa</td>
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<td>0.03%</td>
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<td>0.04%</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
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### Global Corporates

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<th>Year 8</th>
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</table>

1. The first cohort considered is the 1-yr cohort starting on January 1, 1970. The last cohort considered is the 1-yr cohort starting on December 1, 2016.
2. Transition rates are averaged over cohorts spaced 1 month apart.
3. Ratings outstanding at the time of recalibration have been adjusted to be consistent with the Global Rating Scale (see Municipal Ratings Performance Since the Recalibration of the US Municipal Scale). Withdrawn ratings were not recalibrated.

Source: Moody's Investors Service

Each of the three broad municipal sectors exhibits somewhat unique cumulative default profiles with general governments and municipal utilities being most similar (see Exhibit 24). Defaults were exceedingly rare for both sectors, with a 5-year all-rated CDR of .02% and .04%, respectively. The 5-year all-rated CDR for competitive enterprises was much higher at 0.38%, which was still small compared to the 5-year all-rated CDR for global corporates of 6.72%.
Exhibit 24

Cumulative Default Rates Are Generally Higher For Competitive Enterprises

Cumulative Default Rates, Average over the Period 1970-2016, General Governments vs Municipal Utilities vs Competitive Enterprises

### General Governments

<table>
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<tr>
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### Municipal Utilities

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### Competitive Enterprises

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1. The first cohort considered is the 1-yr cohort starting on January 1, 1970. The last cohort considered is the 1-yr cohort starting on December 1, 2016.
2. Transition rates are averaged over cohorts spaced 1 month apart.
3. Ratings outstanding at the time of recalibration have been adjusted to be consistent with the Global Rating Scale (see Municipal Ratings Performance Since the Recalibration of the US Municipal Scale). Withdrawn ratings were not recalibrated.

Source: Moody's Investors Service

Exhibit 25 shows that the CDR for municipals and global corporates have begun to converge since 2007. This is largely because of the recalibration to the global rating scale in 2010 (see Municipal Ratings Performance Since the Recalibration of the US Municipal Scale). Investment-grade cohorts since 1970 reflect the performance of some credits that would have been rated higher on the global scale. As noted earlier, ratings that were withdrawn at the time of recalibration, about half of the credits in longer study period, were not adjusted. For example, many Baa ratings migrated three notches higher to the A category. The 5-year CDR for Baa-rated municipal credits is now comparable to the CDRs for Baa-rated global corporates. The CDRs for A-and-above cohorts, however, are still lower than like-rated global corporates. The 2007-2016 period was also a time of heightened municipal credit stress compared to the longer study period, especially for lower-rated municipals. For example, the 5-year speculative-grade CDR for municipals doubled to 10.95%, approaching the 16.37% rate for global corporates.
Exhibit 25

Recent Municipal and Global Corporate Default Rates Converging
Cumulative Default Rates, Average over the Period 2007-2016, Municipals vs. Global Corporates

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<th>Year 3</th>
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<td>Aa</td>
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<td>51.27%</td>
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<td>1.17%</td>
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<td>16.37%</td>
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<td>9.13%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1. The first cohort considered is the 1-yr cohort starting on January 1, 1970. The last cohort considered is the 1-yr cohort starting on December 1, 2016.
2. Transition rates are averaged over cohorts spaced 1 month apart.
3. Ratings outstanding at the time of recalibration have been adjusted to be consistent with the Global Rating Scale (see Municipal Ratings Performance Since the Recalibration of the US Municipal Scale). Withdrawn ratings were not recalibrated.
Source: Moody’s Investors Service

Exhibit 26 shows that in the last decade the speculative-grade default CDRs for each municipal sector have been comparable after five years. Competitive enterprises still have a higher aggregate cumulative default rate than both general governments and municipal utilities, and, after ten years, the speculative-grade competitive enterprises CDR is about twice the rate of the others. While the CDR for speculative-grade competitive enterprises approximates the global corporate rate, the aggregate CDR is still much lower.
Exhibit 26

Recent Aggregate Cumulative Default Rates Still Low For All Sectors
Cumulative Default Rates, Average over the Period 2007-2016, General Governments vs Municipal Utilities vs Competitive Enterprises

### General Governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
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<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Year 4</th>
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### Municipal Utilities

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### Competitive Enterprises

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1. The first cohort considered is the 1-yr cohort starting on January 1, 1970. The last cohort considered is the 1-yr cohort starting on December 1, 2016.
2. Transition rates are averaged over cohorts spaced 1 month apart.
3. Ratings outstanding at the time of recalibration have been adjusted to be consistent with the Global Rating Scale (see Municipal Ratings Performance Since the Recalibration of the US Municipal Scale). Withdrawn ratings were not recalibrated.

Source: Moody’s Investors Service

Default rates for speculative-grade municipal credits have been generally elevated since 2003 compared to the historical period, approximating or even exceeding the global corporate rate at times. This was driven by a wave of housing defaults between 2003 and 2008. At the beginning of 2016, the average trailing 12-month speculative-grade (SG) municipal default rate was 2.2%, about half of the global corporate rate of 4.5%. Although low relative to global corporates, the rate is double the average trailing municipal SG default rate of 1% since 1970 (Exhibit 27). Since 2007, the average SG municipal default rate has been about 2.0%.
Municipal Speculative-Grade Default Rates Have Approximated Global Corporates Since 2003

Trailing Twelve-Month Speculative-Grade Default Rates

Source: Moody’s Investors Service

Recovery Rates

Average ultimate recoveries on individual Moody’s-rated municipal bonds since 1970 have been about 66% and are somewhat higher than the average 53% recovery rate for senior secured debt of global corporate issuers over a similar period. Municipal recovery rates, however, have been highly variable across individual bonds, with some recovering 100% and others receiving as little as 2%. Recoveries would be lower on a weighted-average dollar basis, about 50%, particularly given large recent general governments defaults.

The recent general governments that have defaulted — small in number but sizeable by volume — have approximated the recovery for global corporate defaults. Pensions have played a prominent role in this trend because they have typically been protected, either suffering no impairment or considerably less impairment than bondholders. Other Post-Employment Benefits (OPEBs, or retiree health benefits), have arguably played the role of a first-lost stalking horse in many of these situations. When these benefits are cut sharply, they set up a political argument that retirees have already been hurt enough such that pensions must be inviolate.

There have also now been several instances where even debt issued to fund pensions has been impaired such as Stockton, San Bernardino, and most significantly to date in Detroit. Only in the Central Falls, RI (Ba1 stable) bankruptcy were bondholders favored over pensioners, suffering neither impairment nor default. Central Falls is unusual; there is at least some argument that Rhode Island’s actions to help drive the Central Falls settlement were strategically aimed at averting a larger and more damaging crisis across several cities in the state.

To the degree more defaults are driven by pension-related pressures, recoveries could shift lower. Puerto Rico could well shift the recent recovery paradigm lower because of the sheer scale of the leverage involved, the high proportion of unfunded pension liabilities therein (over 40%), and the significant dependence of the Commonwealth population upon pension benefits.

The examples of several idiosyncratic defaults by highly rated entities in late 1980s and early 1990s had high recoveries. For example, Baldwin County (1988), Polk County (1991), and Orange County (1994) were all rated A1 one year before default and all had recoveries of 100%. That such defaults were idiosyncratic and short-lived is perhaps emblematic of the broadly supportive credit environment for US general governments at the time — a paradigm that appears to have now shifted. The other two defaults in these cluster, Metropolitan Hospital (1989) and City of Choate - Symmes Hospitals (1990), were both rated Baa1 one year before default and had recovery rates of 60% or higher.
Housing Sector Defaults and Recoveries: A Saga of Unique Circumstances

Most of the defaults in the housing sector — 18 of the total 30 — involved bond financings for stand-alone, uninsured multifamily properties generally issued between 1999 and 2002. The lower financing costs of this tax-exempt bond financing constituted the sole form of subsidy for these projects, which were geared to low- and moderate-income tenants and priced at below market rental rates. Although the properties were older, with limited amenities and 'curb appeal', they had historically experienced strong occupancy levels such that their lower rent levels would continue to make them attractive to low- and moderate-income tenants.

By 2003, however, the single family market began heating up with low mortgage interest rates and easier homeownership credit conditions for first-time buyers, which put unusual pressure on the multifamily rental market. With local rental rates dropping at all properties, including newer market rate properties, the rent advantage of the older affordable properties deteriorated and vacancy levels grew as tenants either opted to live in higher quality properties or buy single family homes. The resulting higher vacancy rates and limited ability to raise rents sufficient to cover expenses caused the financial position of these properties to deteriorate, often rapidly. With limited outside resources to mitigate the weakened financial position, 12 of the 18 projects defaulted between 2003 and 2008. The multifamily properties that were sold after default in this period experienced senior bond recoveries averaging 65%.

Since 2008, however, as the rental housing market has improved with the return of renters, the result has been that full recovery upon the sale of the property is not unusual, which has driven average recovery rates to over 85%. As of this publication, all of the defaulting properties now recovered, in many cases fully.

Exhibit 28
Recovery Rates Generally High For Municipal Credits

<table>
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<th>Defaulted Obligor</th>
<th>Default date</th>
<th>Municipal Sector</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Security Class</th>
<th>Seniority</th>
<th>Ultimate Recovery</th>
<th>Rating at Default</th>
<th>Rating 1-Year Before Default</th>
<th>Rating 5-Year Before Default</th>
<th>Debt Affected (million USD)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel District</td>
<td>7/1/1970</td>
<td>Municipal Utilities</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
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<td>Senior</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Midlands Community Hospital</td>
<td>1/1/1978</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>85%-100%</td>
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<td>Ba2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>21.70</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1/1/1978</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>85%-100%</td>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>11.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Washington Power Supply System</td>
<td>8/1/1983</td>
<td>Municipal Utilities</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>2,250.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bellfield (City of)</td>
<td>4/1/1987</td>
<td>General Governments</td>
<td>General Obligation</td>
<td>General Obligation</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>55% of principal</td>
<td>Ba2</td>
<td>Baa2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Vanceburg (City of)</td>
<td>12/1/1987</td>
<td>Municipal Utilities</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Caa2</td>
<td>Caa2</td>
<td>A2</td>
<td>137.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Baldwin County</td>
<td>10/1/1988</td>
<td>General Governments</td>
<td>General Obligation</td>
<td>General Obligation</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Metropolitan Hospital</td>
<td>12/1/1989</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>Caa2</td>
<td>Baa1</td>
<td>Baa1</td>
<td>63.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Choate (City of) – Symmes Hospitals</td>
<td>1/1/1990</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>Caa2</td>
<td>Baa1</td>
<td>Baa1</td>
<td>320.00</td>
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<td>#</td>
<td>Defaulted Obligor</td>
<td>Default date</td>
<td>Municipal Sector</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Security Class</td>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>Ultimate Recovery</td>
<td>Rating at Default</td>
<td>Rating 1-Year Before Default</td>
<td>Rating 5-Year Before Default</td>
<td>Debt Affected (million USD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Northwest General Hospital</td>
<td>4/1/1991</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Caa2</td>
<td>Ba2</td>
<td>4.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Downtown Hospital Association</td>
<td>8/1/1991</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>100% of principal and 50% of interest</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Baa2</td>
<td>Baa2</td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Polk County</td>
<td>12/1/1991</td>
<td>General Governments</td>
<td>Lease Rental</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>A2</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>39.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Connecticut Housing Authority</td>
<td>7/1/1994</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage: Multi-Family; Credit Enhanced</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>Aa2</td>
<td>Aa2</td>
<td>4.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Orange County</td>
<td>12/6/1994</td>
<td>Counties</td>
<td>Lease Rental</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Aa3</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>Aa3</td>
<td>110.00</td>
<td></td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Michigan Health Care Corporation</td>
<td>6/1/1995</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>24% - 54%</td>
<td>Caa2</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>Ba2</td>
<td>262.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Graduate Health System (via AHERF)</td>
<td>7/21/1998</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>41.6% (expected)</td>
<td>Caa1</td>
<td>Ba2</td>
<td>Baa1</td>
<td>200.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Delaware Valley Obligated Group (via AHERF)</td>
<td>7/21/1998</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>200.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Boston Regional Medical Center</td>
<td>2/1/1999</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>Caa2</td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>Ba2</td>
<td>30.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Greater Southeast Healthcare System</td>
<td>5/27/1999</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Less than 50%</td>
<td>Caa3</td>
<td>Baa3</td>
<td>Baa2</td>
<td>46.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Tarrant Housing Finance Corporation</td>
<td>11/15/1999</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage: Single-Family; Whole Loans</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Caa3</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>Baa2</td>
<td>37.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Marine Military Academy</td>
<td>5/1/2000</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>100% of principal</td>
<td>Bas2</td>
<td>Bas2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>10.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Citizens General Hospital</td>
<td>1/1/2001</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Baa3</td>
<td>Baa3</td>
<td>Baa1</td>
<td>30.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Genesee Hospital</td>
<td>5/1/2001</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Undisclosed</td>
<td>Caa2</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>32.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Erie County Hospital Authority / Metro Health Center</td>
<td>7/1/2002</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Default Obligor</td>
<td>Default date</td>
<td>Municipal Sector</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Security Class</td>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>Ultimate Recovery</td>
<td>Rating at Default</td>
<td>Rating 1-Year Before Default</td>
<td>Rating 5-Year Before Default</td>
<td>Debt Affected (million USD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
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<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Nebraska Investmen</td>
<td>10/1/2002</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage: Multi-Family: Subsidized</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>100% of principal</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>A2</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>St. Francis Medical Center</td>
<td>11/1/2002</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Less than 100% for the uninsured bonds</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>Ba3</td>
<td>A3</td>
<td>79.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Indianapolis Econ Dev Authority / The Meadows (aka Phoenix Project)</td>
<td>7/1/2003</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage: Multi-Family: Subsidized</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Caa3</td>
<td>Caa3</td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Lakeview Apartments</td>
<td>7/1/2003</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage</td>
<td>Subordinate</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>Ba3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>27.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1/1/2004</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage</td>
<td>Junior Subordinate</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Caa2</td>
<td>Ba3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2/1/2005</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage</td>
<td>Subordinate</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Cicero Local Development Corporation</td>
<td>11/1/2003</td>
<td>General Governments</td>
<td>Cities</td>
<td>Lease Rental Subordinate</td>
<td>10% of principal</td>
<td>Ba2</td>
<td>Ba2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>15.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Tarrant County Housing Finance Corporation—Fair Oaks Apartments</td>
<td>1/1/2004</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage</td>
<td>Junior Subordinate</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Caa2</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>Ba3</td>
<td>8.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1/1/2004</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>Ba1</td>
<td>A3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2/1/2004</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage</td>
<td>Subordinate</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Caa1</td>
<td>Ba1</td>
<td>Ba3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Mercy Hospital and Medical Center</td>
<td>1/2/2004</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>Baa1</td>
<td>63.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>National Benevolent Association</td>
<td>2/16/2004</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>Baa3</td>
<td>Baa1</td>
<td>153.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Magnolia Apartments</td>
<td>5/1/2004</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>66% recovery on senior series and 0% on unrated subordinate series</td>
<td>Caa1</td>
<td>Ba1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>10.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Westridge Apartments</td>
<td>6/1/2004</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage</td>
<td>Subordinate</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Caa1</td>
<td>Ba1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5.60</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6/1/2005</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>Caa1</td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>Ba3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Fort Worth Osteopathic Hospital</td>
<td>8/1/2004</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>21% for the uninsured series</td>
<td>Baa3</td>
<td>Baa3</td>
<td>Baa2</td>
<td>79.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Defaulted Obligor</td>
<td>Default date</td>
<td>Municipal Sector</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Security Class</td>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>Ultimate Recovery</td>
<td>Rating at Default</td>
<td>Rating 1-Year Before Default</td>
<td>Rating 5-Year Before Default</td>
<td>Debt Affected (million USD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Bay Club at Mesa Cove</td>
<td>9/1/2004</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage</td>
<td>Subordinate</td>
<td>36% of principal</td>
<td>Caa2</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>r/n</td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9/1/2005</td>
<td>Enterprises</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Insured bonds paid in full by MBIA</td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Riverbend Apartments</td>
<td>9/15/2004</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage</td>
<td>Junior Subordinate</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>Ba1</td>
<td>Ba1</td>
<td>14.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9/15/2004</td>
<td>Enterprises</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Ba1</td>
<td>A3</td>
<td>A3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9/15/2004</td>
<td>Enterprises</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Subordinate</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>Baa3</td>
<td>Baa3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Crossroads Apartments</td>
<td>12/31/2004</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>The senior series was paid by bond insurance policy and proceeds from foreclosure</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>Baa3</td>
<td>Baa3</td>
<td>14.80</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12/31/2004</td>
<td>Enterprises</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Subordinate</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Legacy at Anderson</td>
<td>2/1/2005</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>86% recovery on senior series and 89% on taxable series</td>
<td>Caa1</td>
<td>Caa1</td>
<td>Ba3</td>
<td>8.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Park at Wells Branch Apartments</td>
<td>6/1/2005</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage</td>
<td>Subordinate</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Caa1</td>
<td>Caa1</td>
<td>Ba3</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
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<td>41</td>
<td>Ashton Place and Woodstock Apartments</td>
<td>8/1/2005</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>Ba3</td>
<td>Ba3</td>
<td>Ba3</td>
<td>10.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>8/1/2005</td>
<td>Enterprises</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Subordinate</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Ba2</td>
<td>Ba2</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8/1/2005</td>
<td>Enterprises</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Junior Subordinate</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>B2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>River Falls Project</td>
<td>1/1/2006</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Ba3</td>
<td>Ba3</td>
<td>A3</td>
<td>19.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Lee County Industrial Development Authority / Legacy at Lehigh Project</td>
<td>6/1/2006</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>r/n</td>
<td>8.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Canterbury/3 Fountains/River Falls/Puckett Place</td>
<td>9/1/2006</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage: Multi-Family: Unenhanced</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>36% of principal</td>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>Ba2</td>
<td>Baa3</td>
<td>24.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Defaulted Obligor</td>
<td>Default date</td>
<td>Municipal Sector</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Security Class</td>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>Ultimate Recovery</td>
<td>Rating at Default</td>
<td>Rating 1-Year Before Default</td>
<td>Rating 5-Year Before Default</td>
<td>Debt Affected (million USD)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Forum Health</td>
<td>9/1/2006</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Ba2</td>
<td>Baa1</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>24.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Jefferson Commons at the Ballpark</td>
<td>1/1/2007</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage: Multi-Family: Unenhanced</td>
<td>Subordinate</td>
<td>Less than 1%</td>
<td>Caa2</td>
<td>Ba3</td>
<td>Baa3</td>
<td>31.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Tampa Home Mortgage Series 1983 A</td>
<td>4/1/2007</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage: Single-Family: Whole Loans</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>Caa3</td>
<td>Caa3</td>
<td>Caa1</td>
<td>2.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Sankofa Shule (A Michigan Public School Academy)</td>
<td>12/1/2007</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Lease Rental</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>5% of principal and accrued interest (expected)</td>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>Caa3</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Nob Hill Apartments</td>
<td>12/1/2007</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage: Multi-Family: Unenhanced</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>100% plus accrued upon foreclosure and sale</td>
<td>Ba3</td>
<td>Ba1</td>
<td>A3</td>
<td>15.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>North Oakland Medical Center</td>
<td>2/1/2008</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>Ba3</td>
<td>Ba1</td>
<td>38.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Jefferson (County of) Sewer Enterprise</td>
<td>4/1/2008</td>
<td>Municipal Utilities</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>Caa3</td>
<td>A3</td>
<td>A3</td>
<td>3,107.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Jefferson (County of)</td>
<td>9/15/2008</td>
<td>General Governments</td>
<td>General Obligation</td>
<td>General Obligation Limited Tax</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>Ba3</td>
<td>Aa2</td>
<td>Aa3</td>
<td>208.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Fullerton Village at DePaul University</td>
<td>12/1/2008</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>72.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>St. Louis Industrial Development Authority / St. Louis Convention Center Hotel</td>
<td>12/15/2008</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Lease Rental</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>Caa2</td>
<td>Caa2</td>
<td>Baa3</td>
<td>98.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Harrisburg (City of)</td>
<td>6/1/2009</td>
<td>General Governments</td>
<td>General Obligation</td>
<td>General Obligation</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>Baa2</td>
<td>Baa2</td>
<td>Baa2</td>
<td>353.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Lower Bucks Hospital</td>
<td>12/15/2009</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>Caa3</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>24.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Defaulted Obligor</td>
<td>Default date</td>
<td>Municipal Sector</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Security Class</td>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>Ultimate Recovery</td>
<td>Rating at Default</td>
<td>Rating 1-Year Before Default</td>
<td>Rating 5-Year Before Default</td>
<td>Debt Affected (million USD)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Las Vegas Monorail</td>
<td>1/13/2010</td>
<td>Municipal Utilities</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Revenue: Government</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>Caa2</td>
<td>Baa3</td>
<td>439.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>The Waters at Northern Hills Apartments</td>
<td>2/1/2010</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage: Multi-Family</td>
<td>Subordinate</td>
<td>100% plus accrued interest upon sale of project</td>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>Baa3</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Honey Creek Apartments</td>
<td>4/1/2010</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage: Multi-Family</td>
<td>Subordinate</td>
<td>100% plus accrued interest via refinancing</td>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>Baa3</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>AOH—Golf Villas, Rivermill, Village Square Apartments</td>
<td>6/1/2010</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage: Multi-Family</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>Caa1</td>
<td>Caa1</td>
<td>Baa3</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6/1/2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Caa3</td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>Baa2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Whispering Palms Apartments</td>
<td>7/1/2010</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage: Multi-Family</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Caa1</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Pegasus Landing &amp; Pegasus Pointe at University of Central Florida</td>
<td>10/1/2010</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Revenue: Government</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>Caa3</td>
<td>Baa3</td>
<td>Baa3</td>
<td>137.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Rutland Place Apartments</td>
<td>11/1/2010</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage: Multi-Family</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>73.6% of principal</td>
<td>Caa1</td>
<td>Caa1</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>11.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Boston Industrial Development Finance Authority / Crosstown Center Project</td>
<td>5/24/2011</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Revenue: Government</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>Caa3</td>
<td>Caa3</td>
<td>Baa3</td>
<td>41.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Santa Rosa Bay Bridge Authority</td>
<td>7/1/2011</td>
<td>Municipal Utilities</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Revenue: Government</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>5.08% to date</td>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>115.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Charitable Leadership Foundation</td>
<td>7/1/2011</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Revenue: Government</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>Caa1</td>
<td>Baa3</td>
<td>48.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Southern California Logistics Airport Authority / the City of Victor Valley and Victorville Economic Development Authority</td>
<td>12/1/2011</td>
<td>General Governments</td>
<td>Cities</td>
<td>Tax Allocation/Tax Increment</td>
<td>Subordinate</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>Baa2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>51.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Defaulted Obligor</td>
<td>Default date</td>
<td>Municipal Sector</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Security Class</td>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>Ultimate Recovery</td>
<td>Rating at Default</td>
<td>Rating 1-Year Before Default</td>
<td>Rating 5-Year Before Default</td>
<td>Debt Affected (million USD)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Kidspeace, Inc</td>
<td>1/15/2012</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>9.3% for principal and accrued interest; excludes any value for new bonds</td>
<td>Caa2</td>
<td>Caa2</td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>51.30</td>
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<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Wenatchee (City of)</td>
<td>6/1/2012</td>
<td>General Governments</td>
<td>General Obligation</td>
<td>General Obligation Limited Tax</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>9.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Stockton (City of)</td>
<td>6/28/2012</td>
<td>General Governments</td>
<td>Cities</td>
<td>Lease Rental</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Caa3</td>
<td>Baa2</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>302.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>American Opportunity for Housing-Colinas, LLC</td>
<td>7/1/2012</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage: Multi-Family; Unenhanced</td>
<td>Subordinate</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Caa2</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>27.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Oakdale (City of) Sewer Enterprise</td>
<td>8/31/2012</td>
<td>Municipal Utilities</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>Baa1</td>
<td>A3</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Jefferson (County of)</td>
<td>1/1/2013</td>
<td>General Governments</td>
<td>Counties</td>
<td>Lease Rental</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>Caa2</td>
<td>Aa3</td>
<td>78.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>West Penn Allegheny Health System</td>
<td>4/30/2013</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Hospitals &amp; Health Service Providers</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>87.5% for most debt; remainder pending</td>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>Caa1</td>
<td>Ba3</td>
<td>710.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Detroit (City of)</td>
<td>6/14/2013</td>
<td>General Governments</td>
<td>Cities</td>
<td>Lease Rental</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>Caa3</td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>Baa3</td>
<td>1,450.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Detroit (City of)</td>
<td>7/18/2013</td>
<td>General Governments</td>
<td>General Obligation</td>
<td>General Obligation Limited Tax</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>Caa3</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>Baa3</td>
<td>391.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>Detroit (City of)</td>
<td>7/18/2013</td>
<td>General Governments</td>
<td>General Obligation</td>
<td>General Obligation Limited Tax</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>Caa1</td>
<td>Ba1</td>
<td>161.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Detroit Academy of Arts and Sciences</td>
<td>10/1/2013</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>Caa2</td>
<td>Caa2</td>
<td>Ba1</td>
<td>25.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>Cook County—single family mortgage revenue bonds</td>
<td>7/1/2015</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Mortgage: Single-Family; Whole Loans</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Dowling College</td>
<td>7/20/2015</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprises</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Revenue: Government Enterprise</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>47.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Defaulted Obligor</td>
<td>Default date</td>
<td>Municipal Sector</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Security Class</td>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>Ultimate Recovery</td>
<td>Rating at Default</td>
<td>Rating 1-Year Before Default</td>
<td>Rating 5-Year Before Default</td>
<td>Debt Affected (million USD)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>8/3/2015</td>
<td>General Governments</td>
<td>State Governments</td>
<td>Lease Rental</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>Baa1</td>
<td>1,090.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Cardinal Local School District</td>
<td>12/1/2015</td>
<td>General Governments</td>
<td>General Obligation</td>
<td>General Obligation</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Baa2</td>
<td>A2</td>
<td>Aa3</td>
<td>8.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Puerto Rico Infra Finance</td>
<td>1/4/2016</td>
<td>General Governments</td>
<td>State Governments</td>
<td>Special Tax: Non-Sales/Non-Transportation</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>A3</td>
<td>1,600.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>Puerto Rico GDB</td>
<td>5/2/2016</td>
<td>General Governments</td>
<td>State Governments</td>
<td>General Obligation</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>Caa1</td>
<td>A3</td>
<td>3,900.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>Puerto Rico Highway</td>
<td>7/1/2016</td>
<td>General Governments</td>
<td>State Governments</td>
<td>Special Tax: Transportatio n-Related</td>
<td>Subordinate</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>Baa1</td>
<td>4,300.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>Puerto Rico GO</td>
<td>7/1/2016</td>
<td>General Governments</td>
<td>State Governments</td>
<td>General Obligation</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>Caa3</td>
<td>Caa2</td>
<td>A3</td>
<td>17,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Dun & Bradstreet rated Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel District at the time of default. The ratings of the issuer’s debt were migrated into Moody’s portfolio of ratings around 1972.
2. Ratings were withdrawn on Washington Power Supply System a year and half before default. Similarly, the ratings on Downtown Hospital Association were withdrawn a month before default.
3. Rating histories are adjusted for the recalibration to the global scale to the extent that ratings were outstanding at the time of the recalibration (see Appendix E for more details). In instances where more than one debt with the same financing purpose and security class exist at a given point in time for a given obligor, we choose the worst rating to represent the obligor’s rating for specific financing purpose and security class (see Appendix D for details on methodology).
4. n/a indicates no Moody’s rating at the time.
5. Average and median recoveries are over the recoveries of the most senior debt across all defaults for which we have recovery information.
6. For purposes of this study, California pension obligation bonds and certificates of participation are categorized as “lease rental” because they are secured by a general fund pledge, which analytically we view as more similar to a lease rental pledge than to a limited or unlimited general revenue pledge.
7. Estimated Average Recovery is calculated as final recoveries to date, not including defaults where recoveries are still pending.

Source: Moody’s Investors Service
Appendix A: Long-Term Municipal Defaults, in Chronological Order

The following appendix provides a brief case study for each of the Moody’s-rated defaults long-term municipal bond obligations between 1970 and 2015. The 84 case studies represent 99 distinct defaults by obligor, class, and security.

6. US Municipal Defaults 2010-2014 [58-80]
7. US Municipal Defaults 2015-2016 [81-88]
US Municipal Defaults 1970-1979 (#1-#3)
1) Chesapeake Bay Bridge & Tunnel District, VA
   » CUSIP: 165141A (applied retroactively as bond issue preceded CUSIPs)
   » Default Date: July 1, 1970
   » Obligor: Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel District
   » Issuer: Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel District
   » Defaulted Bonds: Series C Third Pledge Revenue Bonds dated July 1, 1960
   » Cause of Default: Insufficient vehicle toll revenues led to the failure to pay interest on $100 million third lien (interest only) Series C bonds beginning July 1970, six years after project completion in April 1964
   » Recovery: Increased traffic and toll revenues linked to the military build-up in the region in the late 1970s enabled the District to emerge from default in 1985 by repaying all past due interest. After refilling various reserve accounts, the District began redeeming Series C bonds in 1988.

The Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel is a classic example of a transportation infrastructure project foiled by overly optimistic toll revenue projections. Conceived of as a permanent replacement for the traditional ferry service between Virginia Beach and the southern tip of Eastern Shore across the mount of Chesapeake Bay, the project’s original financial feasibility reflected the assumption that a new highway linking Delaware and Virginia Beach would take long distance north-south traffic from I-95. But the destination attraction proved to be much more limited and local.

The project was authorized by the state of Virginia and bonds were sold in 1956. At the time, the 17.6 mile project was an engineering marvel, comprising two one-mile tunnels in mid Bay linked by 12 miles of two-lane trestle causeways with four man-made islands and two truss bridges; most of the project, including the tunnels, was built using prefabricated components. The bridge-tunnel configuration was necessary to ensure that the Navy's access to the Atlantic from its bases in Hampton Roads would not be blocked. Construction commenced in September 1960 and was finished in April 1964, financed entirely by the $200 million 1960 revenue bond issuance.

The 1960 toll revenue bonds comprised $70 million First Pledge Series A, $30 million Second Pledge Series B, and $100 million Third Pledge Series C; the Series C was interest only, without any scheduled amortization, and was to be redeemed with excess revenues at the bottom of the funds flow beginning July 1970.

The project risk was hinted at in the bond structure, where the third-lien interest-only Series C bonds comprised half of principal. Ultimately, the Series C bonds were taken out of default by the late 1970 military buildup in Hampton Roads, which led to substantial residential development on the Eastern Shore and the growth of daily commuting traffic over the bridge-tunnel.

The project was subsequently widened with a parallel trestle causeways beginning in 1995.

2) Midlands Community Hospital
   » CUSIP: 803728A
   » Default Date: January 1978
   » Obligor: Midlands Community Hospital
   » Issuer: Sarpy County Hospital Authority Number 1
   » Defaulted Bonds: Series 1973 bonds; approximately $21.7 million of debt affected including parity Series 1976 bonds
   » Cause of Default: Inability to recruit physicians
Recovery: 100% of missed principal payments due between January 1978 and January 1982 were paid between nine months and three years late. (Source: Moody’s reports).

Doctors Hospital in Omaha, Nebraska was an aging hospital with declining patient usage and outdated equipment. In the 1960s, its board of directors decided to close it and build a new 208-bed replacement called Midlands Community Hospital, located 12 miles from Omaha in the town of Papillion. The ability to recruit physicians from Omaha to practice at Midlands Community was a key factor in the future success of the new facility, but this did not go as planned and the hospital opened with only a few doctors. As a result, utilization fell far below the levels necessary to cover operations and maintenance expenses, as well as debt service. In 1976, a technical default was declared under the legal documents. Debt service reserves were used to make interest payments and a receiver for the hospital was appointed and approved by the District Court. A payment default commenced in 1978. While no interest payments were missed, the principal payments due between January 1978 and January 1982 were paid between nine months and three years late, with the final catch-up payment made September 1, 1992.

3) Hilton Head Hospital, SC

- CUSIP: 074349AH4
- Default Date: January 1, 1978
- Obligor: Hilton Head Hospital
- Issuer: Beaufort County
- Defaulted Bonds: Revenue Series 1974; approximately $11 million of debt affected
- Cause of Default: Over-optimistic feasibility forecasts and low patient utilization levels.
- Recovery: Bonds were redeemed at par plus call premium from the proceeds of the sale of the hospital. (Source: Moody’s files).

In 1974, Beaufort County, South Carolina issued $11.2 million of revenue bonds to finance the first healthcare facility on Hilton Head Island. The bonds were to be repaid by the gross revenues of the hospital. The development of healthcare facilities on Hilton Head was considered desirable given the already substantial growth on the island that was expected to continue. The feasibility study for the new hospital accordingly projected high utilization of the proposed 40 acute-care and 40 skilled nursing beds, and indicated that revenues would be sufficient to cover debt service after use of the capitalized interest fund. After construction, however, it became apparent that the growth forecasts for the Island had been overestimated, in part because of the national economic recession of 1974-75. Further, the hospital opened without being adequately staffed in certain areas so that patient flow was lost to hospitals in nearby Savannah, GA. Patient utilization and revenues were thus well below projected levels, financially straining the hospital. In April 1976, the hospital missed payments on a sixth of the upcoming interest due on the bonds. By January 1978, the capitalized interest and reserve funds had been depleted and the hospital failed to pay the interest payment due on January 1, 1978.

The bonds ultimately became current in December 1988, and were called in full in January 1995.


4) Washington Public Power Supply System, WA (now Energy Northwest)

- CUSIP: 939821
- Default Date: August 1983
- Obligor: Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS)
- Issuer: Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS)
- Defaulted Bonds: Nuclear Projects 4 & 5; approximately $2.25 billion of debt affected.
- Cause of Default: Declining demand for energy, rising construction costs.
Recovery: Approximately 40% after the settlement of a class action suit in December 1998. (Source: Moody's files).

The WPPSS default was a classic example of the potentially speculative nature of a construction project, where the confluence of cost overruns, schedule delays, design changes, and project management errors ultimately led to a bond default. It was also an example of how a nominally strong security pledge can be undercut when a project financing no longer has an economic rationale.

In August 1983, Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) defaulted on $2.25 billion of revenue bonds for Nuclear Projects 4 & 5. WPPSS was organized in 1957 as a municipal corporation that allowed publicly-owned utilities in the Pacific Northwest to jointly build power generation facilities. As part of the Ten-Year Hydro Thermal Power Plan, WPPSS and other Northwest utilities assumed that demand for electricity in the northwest region would double every ten years beyond the capacity of current power sources. In the early 1970s, WPPSS planned to construct five nuclear generation facilities to meet this forecasted demand. Bonds were sold to finance the cost of the power plants and were to be repaid through participation agreements with numerous municipal and cooperatively-owned electric utilities.

Construction delays and cost overruns on the multiple projects, in part caused by a redesign to meet new safety standards, drove the combined cost of completing the projects to three to four times the original estimate. At the same time, the demand for energy was declining due to energy conservation triggered by high energy bills and a regional economic slowdown. WPPSS abandoned construction on Projects 4 and 5 in January 1982. In January 1983, the WPPSS participants were obligated to begin repaying the debt incurred by the abandoned projects, even though the participants would never see any electricity from them. To repay the debt, the utilities would have had to dramatically increase electricity rates on their customers.

The uproar from the rate increases resulted in legal challenges to the enforceability of the contracts with participants for repayment of the construction and operation costs of Projects 4 and 5 (including repayment of debt service). In 1983, the Washington State Supreme Court ruled that the Washington State public agency participants in Projects 4 and 5 did not have the authority to enter into the Project 4 and 5 participation agreements, rendering void the agreements and the source of revenues to pay debt service. WPPSS became unable to service the debt on the $2.25 billion in bonds issued to finance construction of Projects 4 and 5, thereby precipitating the largest municipal bond payment default in history to that date.

5) Belfield, ND

- CUSIP: 077689C
- Default Date: April 1987
- Obligor: Belfield
- Issuer: Belfield
- Defaulted Bonds: General Obligation; $1.9 million of debt affected.
- Cause of Default: Insufficient property taxes to repay existing debt.
- Recovery: Approximately 55% of principal (Source: Moody's files).

The oil boom of the early 1980s led to a severe housing shortage in portions of North Dakota, as high paying jobs began attracting workers and their families. In order to help accommodate this influx of new residents, the town of Belfield, North Dakota, issued general obligation bonds to extend roads and water and sewer infrastructure to a tract of land planned for residential development. The bonds were expected to be repaid with taxes collected from the new properties within the development, but were backed by a GO ULT pledge. Within a few years, however, the oil market sharply reversed and the regional economic boom collapsed, as did the population influx. With only three homes built on the Belfield tract, the property taxes generated were insufficient to repay the existing debt. A deficiency levy was subsequently instituted on all properties in Belfield to make up the shortfall, but this levy rose to levels that forced an increasing number of homeowners to abandon their properties or otherwise fail to pay their property taxes. Ultimately, the town council refused to further raise the levy and Belfield defaulted on its outstanding debt.
In July 1991, bondholders agreed to accept a settlement of 55% of principal, with no back interest. The settlement was paid through a combination of the town’s deficiency levy and some state defaults.

6) Vanceburg, KY

- CUSIP: 921547A
- Default Date: December 1, 1987
- Obligor: Vanceburg
- Issuer: Vanceburg
- Cause of Default: Rising project costs, delays in completion, and consequent lawsuit by a key wholesale customer.
- Recovery: Bondholders received par plus accrued interest through May 26, 1988 from the sale of the project. (Source: Moody’s files).

Vanceburg issued its electric revenue bonds in 1979 to fund the construction of a new hydroelectric generating plant. The bonds were secured by a lien on revenues of the Vanceburg Electric System, but the bulk of the power produced from the new plant was to be sold to the Hamilton, Ohio Electric Utility, which was Vanceburg’s largest electricity customer. The project was plagued by a series of problems including cost overruns, the siting of the transmission lines that would deliver the power from Greenup to Hamilton, and a six-month delay in overall project completion. In 1984, the City of Hamilton filed a lawsuit seeking to have their power sales contract declared null and void, alleging various contract breaches and fraudulent inducement to enter into a contract. The December 1, 1987 default was part of the legal settlement between the towns of Vanceburg and Hamilton, in which Hamilton paid off the Vanceburg bonds and assumed the responsibility for the ongoing plant.

7) Baldwin County, AL

- CUSIP: 057845A, 057845B
- Default Date: October 1, 1988
- Obligor: Baldwin County
- Issuer: Baldwin County
- Defaulted Bonds: General Obligation Warrants Series 1984 and 1985; approximately $6 to $8 million of debt affected.
- Cause of Default: Diversion of funds to meet operating obligations instead of debt service.
- Recovery: 100% of principal and interest (Source: Moody’s reports).

Baldwin County is an example of a general governments with only moderate financial stress unexpectedly prioritizing current operations over the payment of debt service, and then quickly recovering as new funds became available.

On October 1, 1988, Baldwin County defaulted on two series of outstanding General Obligation Warrants. When faced with insufficient funds on hand, officials decided to use available monies to pay for operating expenses instead of scheduled debt service payments. The County carried an “A” rating on the bonds at the time. Moody’s dropped the County’s rating to “B” that month as a result of the default. With help from trustee AmSouth Bank, County management was able to come up with sufficient funds 15 days later, and bondholders received 100% of past due principal and interest.

8) Metropolitan Hospital, PA

- CUSIP: 717826
» Default Date: December 1989
» Obligor: Metropolitan Hospital
» Issuer: Philadelphia Hospitals Authority
» Cause of Default: Low occupancy rates led to financial distress.
» Recovery: Approximately 64% of par (Source: Moody’s files).

The Philadelphia Hospitals Authority bonds were issued to construct Metropolitan Hospital, a new osteopathic facility located in downtown Philadelphia. The hospital began experiencing severe cash flow problems primarily due to low occupancy rates. As a result of the financial stress, the hospital filed for bankruptcy protection on July 11, 1989. In December 1989, funds were not available to meet the debt service payment due, triggering the default.

Settlement disbursements on the defaulted bond commenced December 1991 after the October 29 plan of reorganization was approved, which involved liquidating the hospital’s three buildings. Through December 1994, six partial settlement payments were distributed, totaling $40.73 million to bondholders; settlement distributions included interest and partial principal payments ranging from about 25% to 65% of par.

US Municipal Defaults 1990-1999 (#9-#20)
9) Choate-Symmes Hospitals, MA
» CUSIP: 575850D
» Default Date: January 1, 1990
» Obligor: Choate-Symmes Hospitals (City of Choate)
» Issuer: Massachusetts Health and Educational Facilities Authority
» Defaulted Bonds: Revenue Bonds Series 1982; $32 million of debt affected.
» Cause of Default: Liquidity shortfall triggered by return of over-collected revenues.
» Recovery: Approximately 61% of par (Source: Moody’s files).

The 1982 Massachusetts Health and Educational Facilities Authority bonds were issued to help Choate-Symmes modernize its aged plant, thereby remedying code deficiencies, easing capacity constraints, and centralizing certain services. The bonds were secured by a mortgage pledge as well as a first lien on gross receipts of the hospitals.

In early 1989, the Massachusetts Rate Setting Commission required that Choate-Symmes refund approximately $5.5 million in over-collected revenue. The hospital was unable to deal with the resulting liquidity loss, leading it to file for bankruptcy protection in October 1989. The liquidity shortfall remained unresolved, and Choate-Symmes failed to make its debt service payment due on January 1, 1990. The hospital emerged from bankruptcy by August 1990 and began partial repayment that October, after the sale of its sister facilities. Bondholders received a combination of cash and replacement bonds equivalent to 61% of original par.

10) Northwest General Hospital, MI
» CUSIP: 594648PW1
» Default Date: April 1991
» Obligor: Northwest General Hospital
» Issuer: Michigan State Hospital Finance Authority
Defaulted Bonds: Revenue Bonds Series 1980; $4.8 million of debt affected.

Cause of Default: Inadequate federal reimbursements, decline in admissions and competitive position.

Recovery: Approximately 33% of par (Source: Moody’s files).

In 1980, the Michigan State Hospital Finance Authority issued bonds to construct an addition to Northwest General Hospital, a 104-bed facility located in Detroit. Despite the expansion project, and ongoing financial and managerial support from Botsford General Hospital, an outside organization, Northwest General’s financial operations deteriorated throughout the 1980s. The hospital suffered from declining admissions, an inability to recruit admitting physicians, an excess of available beds in the area, and inadequate state and federal reimbursements. The facility was eventually closed in September 1990.

Although it was not legally obligated to do so, the Michigan State Hospital Finance Authority provided funds to make the debt service payment immediately due in October 1990. But with no ongoing operations and no further external support, the bonds defaulted in April 1991.

The trustee made an initial distribution of about $800,000 to bondholders in September 1991 after selling the hospital and its equipment, collecting accounts receivables, and using other remaining funds. A final distribution was made December 15, 1993, bringing total recovery to about $1,867 per bond, equivalent to 33% of par.

11) Downtown Hospital Association, TN (dba Downtown General Hospital)

CUSIP: 162405AL8

Default Date: August 1, 1991

Obligor: Downtown Hospital Association

Issuer: Chattanooga Health and Education Facilities Board

Defaulted Bonds: Revenue Series 1975; $2.2 million of debt affected.

Cause of Default: Inability to respond to changing Medicare reimbursement and competitive environments.

Recovery: All principal and approximately 50% of interest owed (Source: Moody’s files).

In 1975, Chattanooga Health and Education Facilities Board issued bonds to finance the construction of Downtown General Hospital, a new 54-bed facility in Chattanooga that replaced an aging hospital of a similar size. The bonds were secured by a first lien on gross revenues of the hospital. By the 1980s several changes in the healthcare industry began to adversely affect smaller hospitals like Downtown General. The most notable was the introduction of the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) for Medicare reimbursements and the broader shift away from performing exclusively inpatient services. Downtown General handled neither transition well. The move from cost basis to PPS hurt the hospital financially, while its inability to diversify into new service lines rendered it susceptible to competition for outpatient services. As a result, the hospital’s average daily population dropped from over 50 to only 14. Beginning in November 1989, the hospital was unable to make its scheduled monthly payments for upcoming debt service. By August 1991, the reserve funds had been fully depleted, triggering a default.

Bondholders agreed to a two year moratorium on interest payments in the hope that this would allow the hospital time to regain its financial health, but Downtown ultimately put itself up for sale. The hospital was sold by the spring of 1993 and the proceeds enabled the bonds to be called in April 1993.

12) Polk County, IA

CUSIP: 731211A

Default Date: December 1991

Obligor: Polk County
The Polk County default was an early example of the automatic stay preventing debt service payments to municipal bondholders. Although the county itself had not filed for bankruptcy and was otherwise willing to make its debt service payments, the 3rd-party operator of its racetrack, the Racing Association of Central Iowa (RACI), filed for Chapter 11 and the county was caught up in the process.

In 1984, Polk County issued Sports Facility Revenue Bonds to finance track construction at Prairie Meadows racetrack. The bonds were secured by lease payments from RACI and by an unconditional commitment from Polk County, to the extent support was necessary. Racetrack construction was completed in 1989. But the bulk of RACI’s operating revenues were dedicated to debt service and it quickly faced cash-flow trouble. The county took steps to curb losses, made operating subsidies to RACI, and also advanced funds to the trustee for debt service. Eventually, on November 27, 1991, RACI filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Although the county had advanced funds for the upcoming debt service payments, these monies were subjected to the automatic stay under Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. They were unavailable to make the necessary debt service payment due December 1, 1991.

The bankruptcy court subsequently released sufficient funds to pay debt service on January 10, 1992. In May 1992 Funds were released to accrued interest on the late December 1991 payment, but this left only enough to cover 95% of the debt service due June 1, 1992. The County’s appropriation for the December 1992 payment was also delayed. By spring 1993, RACI emerged from bankruptcy. Polk County refunded the defaulted 1984 lease revenue bonds with GO debt in June 1993, which reportedly made whole all of bondholders owed principal, interest, and accrued interest.

13) Connecticut Housing Authority, CT

- CUSIP: 207747KS4
- Default Date: July 1, 1994
- Obligor: Connecticut Housing Authority
- Issuer: Connecticut Housing Authority
- Defaulted Bonds: Mortgage Revenue Bonds (New Haven FHA-Insured Projects, Series 1983); $4.8 million of debt affected.
- Cause of Default: Delinquencies and defaults on the loans.
- Recovery: Not available.

Connecticut Housing Authority’s Mortgage Revenue Bonds were issued to finance multi-family housing projects in the city of New Haven. The bonds were secured by the underlying mortgage loans that were in turn insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) pursuant to Section 203(k) of the National Housing Act. The housing projects performed poorly. Loan delinquencies and defaults, less than full payment from the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) on the defaulted loans, and lengthy foreclosure proceedings all combined to shrink program revenues to the point where the Authority was unable to make its scheduled debt service payments.

14) Orange County, CA

- CUSIP: 68428LAN4
- Default Date: December 6, 1994
The Orange County default and bankruptcy was the result of a liquidity crisis triggered by investment losses. At the time, it was the largest municipal bankruptcy in US history.

In late 1994, the Orange County Investment Pool (OCIP) suffered losses of approximately $1.5 billion out of a total $7.5 billion pool. The County Treasurer had pursued an investment strategy involving high-risk, rate-sensitive securities, and leveraging of the pool to maximize returns. During the period when interest rates had declined and remained low, the OCIP strategy succeeded. But when interest rates began to rise in 1994, OCIP’s gains turned into very large losses. The pool’s liquidity crisis was triggered when OCIP was unable to repay a $1.2 billion loan to a Wall Street creditor, who refused to extend the loan and began selling the securities that OCIP had pledged as collateral. To protect itself from other creditors, Orange County filed for bankruptcy for itself and OCIP on December 6, 1994.

Separately, the County had pledged that the OCIP would purchase any tendered Pension Obligation Series B bonds. As a result of the bankruptcy filing, however, OCIP was unable to fulfill this pledge and the pension bonds defaulted on December 8, 1994. The County did not, however, default on the scheduled principal and interest payments of the Series B bonds or any of its other long-term obligations.

In the aftermath of the filing, Orange County successfully petitioned the bankruptcy court to release funds for upcoming monthly interest payments on four series of short-term Tax and Revenue Anticipation Notes (TRANs) and Teeter Plan Notes, but payments were delayed by a few days each in January and February pending court approval. By March, however, the County had improved its procedures with the bankruptcy court, and note interest payments were timely thereafter.

15) Michigan Health Care Corporation, MI

Michigan Health Care Corporation’s main facilities were located in and around the Detroit area, which by the early 1990s was suffering from high unemployment and population losses from the contraction in the domestic automotive industry. The Corporation was increasingly strained by competition from an oversupply of beds in the Detroit healthcare market, substantial litigation costs, high debt, and inadequate reimbursement for its high Medicaid and indigent patient load. These factors eventually caused Michigan Health Care Corporation to file for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy on March 31, 1995. An automatic stay under Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code was invoked as a result of the bankruptcy filing, and the bond trustee was prohibited from using funds on hand to pay debt service, resulting in the June 1, 1995 payment default.
16 & 17) Allegheny Health and Education Research Foundation, PA

- CUSIP: 709172 (Delaware Valley Obligated Group); 717825, 717903 (Graduate Health System)
- Default Date: July 21, 1998
- Obligors: Delaware Valley Obligated Group (DVOG) and Graduate Health System (Graduate)
- Issuer: Pennsylvania Higher Educational Facilities Authority (for DVOG); Philadelphia Hospitals and Higher Education Facilities Authority (for Graduate)
- Defaulted Bonds: Delaware Valley Obligated Group and Graduate Health System; approximately $200 million of debt affected.
- Cause of Default: Financial deterioration, reduction in Medicaid payments, and an eventual bankruptcy filing.
- Recoveries: Pending the AHERF bankruptcy case was closed on May 29, 2013, according to bond trustee. AHERF reportedly made a final distribution in or about June 2014, after which no further distributions to creditors, including bondholders, would be made.
- DVOG: Although retail bondholders continue to be paid in full under MBIA insurance, it is unclear whether DVOG has paid any amounts to MBIA.
- Graduate: 41.5% recovery of principal and accrued interest, pending any final disbursements in June 2014 as mentioned above. Through June 2013, bondholders had received distributions of $75.015 million in principal (relative to $155.940 mm outstanding par) and $3.783 million in interest. (Sources: trustee’s reports; Moody’s files).

On July 21, 1998, after a long period of financial deterioration, Allegheny Health and Education Research Foundation (AHERF) filed to seek bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The filing triggered an automatic stay under Section 362(a) of the Code and as a result AHERF defaulted on some of its outstanding bond issues.

The filing by AHERF as the parent organization included several other entities including the Philadelphia operations of Delaware Valley Obligated Group and Graduate Health System, as well as the physician organization, Allegheny University Medical Practices.

Beginning in the mid 1980’s, AHERF began an expansion from its Pittsburgh base into the highly competitive Philadelphia healthcare market. From 1987 until 1997 the organization's debt grew from less than $70 million to over $1 billion, as AHERF acquired medical schools, numerous hospitals and physician practices. AHERF’s problems included operating in the highly competitive Philadelphia and Pittsburgh healthcare markets, and the curb in growth of Medicare reimbursements. Other factors included the increased penetration of managed care plans that negotiated discounts on hospital fees, curbed admissions, and mismanaged costly endeavors into physician practices. In 1998, AHERF attempted to sell a large portion of its Philadelphia holdings. When the transaction later fell apart in June 1998, AHERF’s options were limited, and one month later several of its entities filed for bankruptcy.

AHERF’s successor entity went on to manage a large Pittsburgh area health network. Although operationally unrelated to its forbear, West Penn Allegheny Health System was unable to sustain its competitive position and has commenced a major restructuring in 2013 that has resulted in a default via a forced exchange.

18) Boston Regional Medical Center, MA

- CUSIP: 575851
- Default Date: February 1999
- Obligor: Boston Regional Medical Center (BRMC)
- Issuer: Massachusetts Health and Educational Facilities Authority
- Cause of Default: Large operating deficits.
In February 1999, Boston Regional Medical Center (BRMC) declared bankruptcy after several years of financial decline, which resulted in a default on principal and interest payments due on the Series 1993B bonds.

Four years of large operating deficits eroded the hospital’s balance sheet leading to a dangerously low cash position steadily increasing and negative fund balance. The hospital also took on additional debt using of local lines of credit. In 1997, ongoing equity transfers to a physician practice subsidiary contributed to a violation of its debt service coverage test. Finally, the hospital filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and closed after an anticipated sale of the hospital did not occur as expected.

BRMC’s assets were liquidated as part of the liquidation plan approved by the bankruptcy court. At the time of the liquidation, approximately $30 million of Series 1993 bonds were still outstanding. The sale of the hospital’s tangible assets, including its hospital facility and property, generated approximately $23 million that was used to pay secured creditors first, and then unsecured creditors including Series 1993 bondholders. The partial distribution to bondholders was reportedly made December 9, 2005.

19) Greater Southeast Healthcare System, MD

- CUSIP: 741710A
- Default Date: May 1999
- Obligor: Greater Southeast Healthcare System
- Issuer: Prince George's County
- Cause of Default: Decreasing Medicaid reimbursement, declining patient volume, and managerial problems resulting in system bankruptcy.
- Recovery: Less than 50% recovery (Source: Moody's reports).

In May 1999, Greater Southeast Healthcare System filed for bankruptcy protection and suspended payments on its approximately $46 million of outstanding Series 1993 bonds.

Greater Southeast Healthcare System (GSHS) was a community-based health delivery system that included two hospitals, three nursing homes, a physician care network, and extensive community based programs. Prior to the bankruptcy, GSHS was viewed as an essential service provider for a portion of Washington D.C. The system’s flagship, the 450 bed Greater Southeast Community Hospital, was located in the southeast quadrant of Washington D.C. with a much smaller 33-bed facility in Fort Washington, Prince George's County. This service area was characterized by an aging and declining population, below average socioeconomic indicators, and an increasing reliance on governmental payers.

The System’s financial situation deteriorated significantly with changes in reimbursement from Medicaid, a legislative elimination of D.C. Medicaid Disproportionate Share payments, and new market forces, which together contributed to the declining patient volume and lower reimbursement rates. Management turnover and labor disputes further weakened the System’s credit profile, leading to the May 1999 bankruptcy filing and suspension of debt service payments.

Despite the local importance of the system, the District of Columbia did not act to provide financial assistance. In November 1999, the sale of Greater Southeast Community Hospital to Doctors Community Healthcare Inc. for $22.5 million was approved. The sale enabled a partial recovery for bondholders, and the resulting distribution was reportedly made on December 10, 2001.

20) Tarrant County Housing Finance Corporation

- CUSIP: 876394D
- Default Date: November 15, 1999
The Tarrant County Housing Finance Corporation defaulted after its mortgage guarantee and pool policies were canceled and the underlying mortgages deteriorated.

The Home Mortgage Revenue Bonds were issued in 1983 to finance a pool of single family mortgage loans. Many of the loans were originally covered by primary mortgage insurance policies issued by Ticor Mortgage Insurance Company, which also issued the mortgage pool policy. In 1988, after several years of financial difficulty, Ticor canceled all of its mortgage guarantee policies. The pool suffered significant asset deterioration when loans that were no longer covered by insurance ultimately defaulted. This eventually led to a failure to make a required redemption payment to bondholders on November 15, 1999.

**US Municipal Defaults 2000-2004 (#21-#38)**

**21) Marine Military Academy, TX**

- **CUSIP:** 413007A
- **Default Date:** May 2000
- **Obligor:** Marine Military Academy
- **Issuer:** Harlingen Higher Education Facilities Corporation
- **Defaulted Bonds:** Revenue bonds Series 1995 and 1997; $10.4 million of debt affected.
- **Cause of Default:** Civil lawsuits against the Academy.
- **Recovery:** Full principal recovery; partial payment of interest accrued during bankruptcy. (Source: Moody's reports).

In May 2000, Marine Military Academy declared bankruptcy and suspended payments on its $10.4 million of Series 1995 and 1997 debt issued through the Harlingen Higher Education Facilities Corporation, TX.

Several civil lawsuits accused the Academy of not adequately supervising cadets after hazing incidents occurred between 1993 and 1997. As a protective measure the Academy filed for bankruptcy because the potential liabilities from the litigation exceeded the Academy's insurance coverage. In 2004, the Academy emerged from bankruptcy and resumed making debt service payments on outstanding bonds. The Academy separately negotiated a settlement with bondholders for the 1995 and 1997 bonds. While all principal payments were made for both series of bonds, bondholders did not receive the full value of interest accrued during bankruptcy.

**22) Citizens' General Hospital, PA**

- **CUSIP:** 961008G
- **Default Date:** First Quarter, 2001
- **Obligor:** Citizens' General Hospital (CGH)
- **Issuer:** Westmoreland County Industrial Development Authority
- **Defaulted Bonds:** Series 1998; $30 million of debt affected.
- **Cause of Default:** Operating losses reflecting competition and scale.
Citizens’ General Hospital (CGH) was a small primary and secondary care facility located in New Kensington, Pennsylvania. The hospital incurred several years of large operating losses given its small size and pressures stemming from the highly competitive Pittsburgh healthcare market. As a result, CGH shut down operations on November 4, 2001. In the beginning of 2001, a forbearance agreement was signed by CGH, requiring the hospital to transfer all available and future funds directly to the bond trustee for the benefit of bondholders. Subsequently, by August 2003, CGH bondholders were fully repaid all owed principal and accrued interest.

**23) Genesee Hospital, NY**

- **CUSIP:** 610755P
- **Default Date:** May 2001
- **Obligor:** Genesee Hospital
- **Issuer:** Monroe County Industrial Development Agency
- **Defaulted Bonds:** Series 1991A tax-exempt and Series 1991B taxable; $32.5 million of debt affected.
- **Cause of Default:** Operating losses and overspending on capital.
- **Recovery:** Undisclosed; an October 2003 distribution of 6.71% of principal was reported but final distributions after the sale of the property in 2006 are unknown. (Source: Bloomberg).

In May 2001, Genesee Hospital defaulted on its 1991 bonds after suffering serious operating losses between 1998 and 2000. The hospital was ultimately be shut down by its parent, ViaHealth. Although certain of Genesee’s bank loans were guaranteed by ViaHealth, neither series of the 1991 bonds were. Rochester General Hospital, another ViaHealth entity, was also not legally obligated on Genesee’s debt. The Genesee Hospital company was legally dissolved and the project property was sold in April 2006 for redevelopment; certain unsecured creditors were paid in January 2007.

**24) Metro Health Center, PA**

- **CUSIP:** 295200N
- **Default Date:** July 01, 2002
- **Obligor:** Metro Health Center
- **Issuer:** Erie County Hospital Authority
- **Defaulted Bonds:** Series 1992; $9 million of debt affected.
- **Cause of Default:** Low liquidity levels and unprofitable operations.
- **Recovery:** Approximately 21% of principal (Source: Trustee notice to bondholders).


Metro Health Center was the smallest hospital in a highly competitive market, surrounded by a similarly sized osteopathic hospital and two large tertiary hospitals. With the other nearby hospitals, the community had little need for Metro Health’s services. Between 1998 and 2001, inpatient admissions declined 17% and revenues fell 19% leading the hospital to use cash reserves to fund current operations. The hospital’s low liquidity levels and unprofitable operations finally led to its bankruptcy filing in 2002.

Rather than seeking the hospital’s immediate liquidation, the bankruptcy trustee allowed Metro Health to reorganize and operate as a debtor-in-possession in bankruptcy. On June 6, 2005, the bondholders of the defaulted Series 1992 bonds received approximately
$910 of principal and interest for every $5,000 bond (representing about 18% recovery.) On September 15, 2005, after liquidation of the hospital’s collateral, the bond trustee declared a final payment to bondholders of $110.67 for each $5000 bond. Interest payments of $17.67 and $17.98 were made for each $5000 bond with maturities of 2012 and 2022, respectively. As the result of that liquidation payment, bondholder’s total principal and accrued interest recovery rate was approximately 21%.

25) Yorkshire Development Project, NE
» CUSIP: 639673HU9
» Default Date: October 1, 2002
» Obligor: Nebraska Investment Finance Authority (Yorkshire Development LTD)
» Issuer: Nebraska Investment Finance Authority
» Defaulted Bonds: Multi-Family Housing Revenue Bonds, Series 1993; $1,500,000 of debt affected.
» Cause of Default: Poor property management and upkeep that led to a loss of Section 8 subsidies for many units.
» Recovery: Bondholders recovered 100% of principal (Source: Bloomberg).

The Series 1993 Multi-Family Housing Revenue Bonds issued through the Nebraska Investment Finance Authority financed the acquisition and rehabilitation of 63 housing units in Omaha, Nebraska that were subsidized by Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments from HUD.

By 1998, many units in the project had fallen into disrepair. Twenty units failed to meet the local housing authority’s physical inspection standards rendering them ineligible to receive the Section 8 subsidy. The unwillingness and inability of the property owners to repair the debilitated housing units led to the project’s further financial deterioration, and a payment default on the $140,000 of principal and $15,618.75 of interest due on October 1, 2002. The project was sold relatively quickly thereafter, on May 2, 2003, and in the final distribution bondholders recovered 100% of principal.

26) St. Francis Medical Center, PA
» CUSIP: 04232L, 01728AP
» Default Date: November 2002
» Obligor: St. Francis Medical Center
» Issuer: Allegheny County Hospital Development Authority, PA
» Defaulted Bonds: $50 million of AMBAC-insured Series 1992 bonds; $29 million of uninsured Series 1997 bonds. St. Francis Medical Center also acted as a guarantor to St. Francis Hospital of New Castle (which defaulted on $15 million of its Series 1992 bonds) and St. Francis Health Care Services (defaulted on approximately $3 million of its Series 1993 bonds).
» Cause of Default: Operating losses and market competition.
» Recovery: Ambac-insured Series 1992 bonds paid in full; final recovery on other series unknown but less than 100%. (Source: Moody’s reports).

St. Francis Medical Center was another example of a hospital hard-pressed to compete in the challenging Pittsburgh healthcare market in the early 2000s. In November 2002, the hospital defaulted after several years of growing operating losses, a steady decline in cash, and increased dependence on investment income to offset operating deficits. The default occurred only months after the medical center entered into an asset purchase agreement with regional organizations to sell off portions of the system in August 2002.

The default directly affected approximately $50 million of insured Series 1992 bonds and approximately $29 million of uninsured Series 1997 bonds. But St. Francis Medical Center had also acted as a guarantor to St. Francis Hospital of New Castle, which defaulted on
$15 million of its Series 1992 bonds, as well as St. Francis Health Care Services, which defaulted on approximately $3 million of its Series 1993 bonds. A partial distribution of principal and accrued interest of approximately $2,447.03 per $5000 bond was paid to bondholders on November 17, 2003. A settlement with creditors was reached in December 2003 and a final distribution of settlement proceeds was made in January of 2004. With the exception of the Series 1992 St. Francis Medical Center bonds, which were insured by Ambac and paid in full, the final recovery for the bondholders was less than 100%.

**27) Meadows/ Phoenix Project, IN**

- **CUSIP:** 455261Q
- **Default Date:** July 1, 2003
- **Obligor:** Phoenix
- **Issuer:** Indianapolis Economic Development Authority
- **Defaulted Bonds:** City of Indianapolis Economic Development Revenue, Series 1993A; $3,600,000 of debt affected.
- **Cause of Default:** Low occupancy due to location and crime-related history.

The Indianapolis Economic Development Authority bonds were issued in 1993 to fund construction of The Meadows, a 330-unit Section 8 assisted apartment project in an economically depressed, high-crime section of Indianapolis. The project was later renamed the Phoenix Project.

In 1997, a few years after project completion, several murders occurred on the property causing the occupancy rate to fall to 75%. In subsequent years, occupancy fluctuated between 70% and 85% creating financial difficulties for the project that were compounded by high tenant turnover and significant capital improvement expenses.

The debt service reserve fund was depleted by the time of the July 2003 debt service date. The property entered into monetary default under the mortgage documents and without sufficient funds to cover debt expenses, the bonds defaulted on July 1, 2003. On November 30, 2005, distributions were made on Series 1993A bonds of varying dates of maturity. The average rate of recovery on the bonds was 4.37%.

**28) Lakeview Apartments, TX**

- **CUSIP:** 89438NA
- **Default Date:** July 1, 2003 (Series 2001C and Series 2001D); July 1, 2005 (Series 2001A)
- **Obligor:** Lakeview Apartments
- **Issuer:** Travis County Housing Finance Corporation
- **Defaulted Bonds:** Travis County Housing Finance Corporation Multifamily Housing Revenue Bonds, Senior Series 2001A, Junior Series 2001C and Subordinate Series 2001D; $27,690,000 of debt affected.
- **Cause of Default:** Adverse rental market conditions.
- **Recovery:** Senior bondholders recovered 8.3% of principal; Junior bondholders recovered 3.4%; Subordinate bondholders recovered less than 1%. (Source: Trustee notice to bondholders)

The Travis County Housing Finance Corporation bonds were sold in December 2001 to finance the acquisition and rehabilitation of the Lakeview Apartments, a 504-unit project in Austin, Texas. Initial project revenues were strong, reflecting sufficient market demand, the presence of an experienced management team, and the good physical condition of the apartments. But as early as July 2002...
revenues began to falter, as a downturn in the Austin economy and a softening in demand for multifamily affordable housing caused a significant decrease in occupancy. Revenues became insufficient to cover the full debt service payments, and the debt service reserve fund for each series was tapped. By July 2003, the debt service reserve funds for Series 2001C and Series 2001D were insufficient to cover the full payment due to bondholders, leading to a default for these Series on the July 1, 2003 payment date. Persistent financial deterioration then caused a Series 2001A default on January 1, 2005. On June 7, 2005, the final distribution to bondholders provided a recovery of 8.3% for Senior Series 2001A, 3.4% for Junior Series 2001C, and less than 1% for Subordinate Series 2000D.

29) Cicero Local Development Corporation, NY

- CUSIP: 171731A
- Default Date: November 2003
- Obligor: Cicero Local Development Corporation (CLDC)
- Issuer: CLDC (pledged by the Town of Cicero)
- Defaulted Bonds: Revenue Annual Lease Appropriation bonds, Series 2001A; $15.3 million of debt affected.
- Cause of Default: Over-optimistic development projections, followed by failures to honor obligations under a lease.
- Recovery: Reportedly 10.3% of par. (Source: Bloomberg)

The Cicero Local Development Corporation (CLDC) default was not only caused by poor project performance and revenue shortfall, but also because the Town of Cicero failed to honor its lease obligation to cure the resulting debt service deficiency. The town subsequently cured the deficiency, but then failed to include an appropriation for the lease in its 2004 budget, leading to a second default.

The CLDC undertook the financing for two ice rinks, a recreational center, and associated residential and commercial developments. The project was undertaken with the support of the Town of Cicero through its obligations under the Series 2001 Lease Appropriation Bonds. Although the construction was completed as anticipated, utilization estimates proved to be overly optimistic. The project performed poorly and failed to generate revenue forcing the CLDC to tap its debt service reserve fund for the November 2002 debt service payment. The development corporation then fully depleted the reserve fund for the following the May 2003 payment.

The CLDC entered into discussions with a developer for a land sale that was expected to close prior to the next debt service payment on November 1, 2003. As reported by the issuer’s counsel, the proposed sale fell through on October 27, leaving a debt service funding shortfall. Although the Town of Cicero had a legal obligation under the lease to cure the $244,000 deficiency in the bond fund, it failed to do so, causing a missed payment to bondholders on November 1, 2003. The Town of Cicero subsequently fulfilled its obligation under the lease and cured the deficiency. But it then failed to include the appropriation for the lease in its 2004 budget. Consequently, no funds were available to meet the debt service payment due in May 2004, inducing CLDC’s second default. On October 28, 2005 the Trustee commenced a foreclosure sale on the mortgages securing the obligations, generating approximately $2 million. Ultimately, the bondholders recovered $1.57 million of the $15.3 million par outstanding, or approximately 10.3%.

30) Fair Oaks Apartments, TX

- CUSIP: 876394N
- Default Date: January 1, 2004
- Obligor: Tarrant County HFC-Fair Oaks Apts. TX
- Issuer: Tarrant County Housing Finance Corporation
- Cause of Default: Adverse rental market conditions.
Recovery: Senior Series bondholders recovered 70.32%; Junior Series bondholders recovered 1.69%; Junior Subordinate Series bondholders recovered 1.31%. (Source: Bloomberg)

The Maple Avenue Economic Development Corporation (MAEDC) issued bonds in 2000 to finance the Fair Oaks Apartment Project, an affordable housing project located in Euless, Texas. The bonds were issued through the Tarrant County Housing Finance Corporation. As early as December 2002, the project struggled because of adverse rental market pressures and low rent revenues. Fair Oaks was forced to make deep pricing concessions in an attempt to maintain occupancy as new luxury apartment units that offered amenity packages and move-in specials became available in the Tarrant County submarket. Although the project’s occupancy rate stabilized around 90%, the project’s rental revenue was insufficient to cover both the maintenance and debt service expenses of the property. By January 2004, after multiple taps on debt service reserve funds, no funds were available to pay the full interest due to bondholders. On December 19, 2005, the final distribution was made by the Tarrant County Housing Finance Corporation using proceeds from the foreclosure sale. Bondholders of Senior Series 2000 A and 2000 B recovered 70% on principal, Series 2000 C recovered 2% and Series 2000 D recovered 1%.

31) Mercy Hospital and Medical Center, IL

- CUSIP: 45200
- Default Date: January 2, 2004
- Obligor: Mercy Hospital and Medical Center
- Issuer: Illinois Health Facilities Authority
- Cause of Default: Weak cash management and trustee error.
- Recovery: 100%; default cured in full on Feb 17, 2004 (Source: Trustee notices to bondholders)

The Mercy Hospital and Medical Center default in 2004 was due to weak cash management and a trustee error. Liquidity and operating performance had been declining since 2000, but high management turnover hindered administrative focus and consistency and may have contributed to a default that was otherwise avoidable. At year-end 2003, Mercy Hospital transferred $2.1 million of its $6 million debt service reserve fund to its Bond Fund pay the interest due on January 2, 2004. Mercy expected the bond trustee to tap the rest of the debt service reserve fund to make the $3.5 million principal payment due the same day. But the trustee failed to do so resulting in a payment default.

Moody’s estimates that Mercy had approximately $15 million of unrestricted cash as of January 2, 2004, more than enough to fully pay the principal due and avoid default.

Shortly after the January default, Mercy transferred $5.3 million to the trustee using proceeds from the sale of two properties. The default was cured on February 17, 2004, when the trustee made the full payment of principal ($3.5 million) and accrued interest ($29,989.44) to bondholders. In April 2005, Mercy retired all of its outstanding rated debt with proceeds derived from bank loans and asset sales.

32) National Benevolent Association (NBA), MO

- CUSIP: Multiple
- Default Date: February 16, 2004
- Obligor: National Benevolent Association
- Issuer: Multiple
Defaulted Bonds: Debt of National Benevolent Association and 25 affiliates; approximately $153 million of debt affected.

Cause of Default: Unsuccessful operations and losses in aggressive investment portfolio.

Recovery: 100% recovery of interest and principal paid in April 2005 (Source: Trustee notice to bondholders)

On February 16, 2004, the National Benevolent Association (NBA), a senior living sponsor, along with 25 of its affiliates, voluntarily filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. NBA sought bankruptcy protection due to unprofitable operations and losses incurred due to heavy investment losses. NBA had approximately $153 million of Moody’s-rated debt outstanding that had been issued primarily to finance an expansion of its senior-care facilities. At the time, it was one of the largest not-for-profit enterprises to file for Chapter 11.

NBA sold some of its senior-living facilities and other assets pursuant to the Chapter 11 reorganization plans. The proceeds covered 100% of outstanding principal and 100% of accrued interest through the February 16, 2004 bankruptcy filing. But only covered interest payments at rates ranging from 2.17% to 2.4% for the period from February 16, 2004 to April 18, 2005.

33) Magnolia Park Apartments, GA

CUSIP: 184160H
Default Date: May 2004
Obligor: Magnolia Apartments
Issuer: Clayton County Housing Authority
Cause of Default: Adverse rental market conditions, insufficient proceeds from foreclosure sale to cover outstanding principal and interest.
Recovery: Approximately 67% of principal and interest on senior series 1999A; 0% subordinate 1999 Series C bondholders. (Source: Moody’s issuer report dated May 19, 2004).

Several years of adverse market conditions and low occupancy led to a default on the Clayton County Housing Authority’s Series 1999A bonds. The bonds were secured by the revenue from the Magnolia Park Apartments, a 328-unit project located 12 miles south of Atlanta. The project was built in 1972 for low- to moderate- income tenants and enjoyed a high occupancy rate for most of its history given a stable local rental market and economy.

By December 2002, after an economic downturn, Magnolia Park’s occupancy rate had fallen sharply to 73%. Rent concessions, bad debt expenses and unbudgeted legal fees further reduced the project’s revenue. The trustee utilized the debt service reserve fund to make the required bond payments due in July 2003 and December 2003.

The project was foreclosed upon in May 2004 prior to the scheduled July debt service payment, but sold for less than the outstanding principal and interest due to bondholders. Bondholders ultimately only recovered approximately 67% of outstanding principal and interest from the sale of the Magnolia Park property.

34) Westridge Apartments, TX

CUSIP: 876394P
Default Date: June 1, 2004 (Subordinate Series 2001C); June 1, 2005 (Series 2001A, 2001B)
Obligor: Westridge Apartments
Issuer: Tarrant County Housing Finance Corporation
Defaulted Bonds: Tarrant County Housing Finance Corporation, Texas, Housing Revenue Bonds (Westridge Apartments Project)
Senior Series 2001A and 2001B, Subordinate Series 2001C; $5.6 million of debt affected.

» Cause of Default: Adverse rental market conditions

» Recovery: Approximately 61.5% of principal for Seniors 2001A and 2001B; 4% of principal for Junior 2001C; and 1% for unrated Subordinate 2001D. (Source: Moody's files)

The Westridge Apartments project default on the Series 2001 bonds was due to adverse rental market pressures and low rental revenue.

The project was located in Fort Worth, TX, a difficult market at this time given declining rental demand. To maintain occupancy rates near 90%, Westridge offered deep concessions, including "move-in specials" and other incentives that decreased rental revenue. When the project's utility expenses increased, operating income was reduced to a level insufficient to afford necessary capital repairs. Default finally occurred on June 1, 2004 when the project failed to make interest payments on its Series 2001C junior bonds. The project's senior bonds, Series 2001A and 2001B, defaulted one year later after continued financial difficulties.

The Trustee conducted a foreclosure sale on May 1, 2007 and sold the Westridge Apartments Project for $3.4 million. Recoveries were approximately 61.5% of principal for Seniors 2001A and 2001B, 4% of principal for Junior 2001C, and 1% for unrated Subordinate 2001D.

35) Fort Worth Osteopathic Hospital, TX

» CUSIP: 875906

» Default Date: August, 2004

» Obligor: Fort Worth Osteopathic Hospital

» Issuer: Tarrant County Health Facilities Development Corporation

» Defaulted Bonds: MBIA insured Series 1993, Series 1996 and Series 1997 bonds totaling $79.7 million; $7.1 million of Series 1993 bonds were uninsured.

» Cause of Default: Operating losses.

» Recovery: Uninsured bondholders recovered 21% of principal and interest (Source: Moody's files).

The Fort Worth Osteopathic Hospital default in 2004 was due to operating losses beginning in the late 1990s. The hospital's severe financial difficulties were driven by stiff competition and low healthcare reimbursement rates. The hospital was small compared to nearby competitor systems. Facing insufficient operating funds in the early 2000s, the hospital sought to partner with a larger and more established system. But the potential merger negotiations failed, forcing the hospital to close its doors on October 10, 2004.

The hospital's main campus and ancillary facilities were sold at an auction in February 2005 for $7 million, well under its assessed value of over $38 million. As the result of the proceeds collected from post-default liquidation, holders of the uninsured Series 1993 bonds recovered only about 21% of the principal and interest due.

36) Bay Club at Mesa Cove Project, AZ

» CUSIP: 566823Q

» Default Date: September 1, 2004

» Obligor: Bay Club at Mesa Cove

» Issuer: County of Maricopa Industrial Development Authority
Defaulted Bonds: Maricopa County Industrial Development Authority Multifamily Housing Revenue Bonds (Bay Club at Mesa Project) Subordinate Series 2000B; $2,200,000 of debt affected.

Cause of Default: Adverse rental market conditions, maintenance problems.


Bay Club at Mesa was a 472-unit affordable housing project located in the Maricopa County rental market, which was competitive for this type of housing. Bay Club achieved high occupancy rates, but only through rental discounts and other concessions. As a result, rental revenue was not enough to cover the capital expenditures needed to repair mold, piping leaks and other maintenance problems. Lacking the necessary repairs, many apartments were taken off the rental market, worsening the revenue situation. The lack of income ultimately forced the trustee to make debt service payments from the Series 2000 B Debt Service Reserve Fund, and finally to default on the Series 2000 B bonds on September 1, 2004. On November 25, 2005, the trustee made final distributions to bondholders after the sale of the property. Series 2000B bondholders recovered 35.47% of principal.

The Series 2000 A bonds were insured by MBIA, and had defaulted September 1, 2005; the Series 2000 C bonds were unrated by Moody’s.

37) Riverbend Apartments, FL

CUSIP: 14052TA

Default Date: September 15, 2004

Obligor: Riverbend Apartments

Issuer: Capital Trust Agency


Cause of Default: Adverse rental market conditions and poor management.

Recovery: 99.7% of principal. The Majority Senior Bondholder purchased nearly all of the senior bonds as well as all of the junior bonds and subordinate junior bonds. The Majority Senior bondholder took possession of the project in lieu of payment. The remaining Senior bondholders (approximately 5% of total bondholders) who did not sell their loans to the Majority Senior Bondholder received 94% recovery. (Source: Trustee notice to bondholders).

The Series 2002 A-Capital Trust Agency bonds were issued to finance the acquisition and rehabilitation of the 296-unit Riverbend Apartments affordable housing complex in Tampa, Florida.

Between March and May 2004, the occupancy rate declined from 88% to 81%, primarily due to poor rental market conditions and inadequate management. The project did not generate sufficient revenues to pay for routine maintenance, and many apartments were taken offline due to the need for substantial repairs, the increase in deferred maintenance expenses sharply amplified the financial difficulties caused by the decline in the occupancy rate. By August 2004, Tampa had stopped forwarding project revenues to service its debt, and on September 15 filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.

After the default on the bonds, the majority senior bondholder purchased nearly all of the senior bonds as well as all of the junior bonds and subordinate junior bonds. The majority senior bondholder took possession of the project in lieu of payment, which we classify as a 100% recovery. The remaining senior bondholders (approximately 5% of total bondholders) who did not sell their loans to the majority senior bondholder received 94% recovery. The combined recovery was 99.7%, and the final resolution date was December 21, 2005.

38) Crossroads Apartments, TX

CUSIP: 876394Q
Default Date: December 31, 2004

Obligor: Crossroads Apartments

Issuer: Tarrant County Housing Finance Corporation

Defaulted Bonds: Multifamily Housing Revenue Bonds, Senior Series A $13,300,000 of debt affected; Subordinate Series 2001C, $1,500,000 of debt affected.

Cause of Default: Adverse rental market conditions, unexpected rise in costs.

Recovery: 0% recovery for Subordinate C bondholders (Source: trustee notice to bondholders) Senior bondholders covered in full by insurance, though insurer appears to have recovered less than full interest due

The Series 2001 bonds were issued to finance the acquisition and improvement of Crossroads Apartments, a 292-unit multifamily rental property located in Fort Worth. The Senior Series 2001 A was insured by MBIA.

The project experienced financial difficulties beginning in July 2003. The local affordable housing market had weakened because of competition from luxury housing complexes, as well as low interest rates that encouraged prospective tenants to buy instead of rent. Also the project’s utility costs also rose unexpectedly. Project revenues were insufficient to meet debt service in June 2004 and the trustee tapped and nearly depleted the subordinate debt service reserve fund to make the scheduled payment. But this left the reserve fund insufficient to make the full principal and interest payments due to subordinate bondholders on December 31, 2004, whereupon the Subordinate Series 2001 C bonds defaulted.

On April 6, 2011, the trustee posted Crossroads Apartment for sale by foreclosure. The project was sold and final distributions were made to the holders of the Senior Bonds from the foreclosure sale proceeds and funds drawn from the MBIA bond insurance policy; it appears that the insurer itself recovered 100% of principal but took some loss on past due interest. There was no distribution to Subordinate Series 2001 C bondholders, who experienced 0% recovery.


39) Legacy at Anderson Project, SC

CUSIP: 837036

Default Date: February 1, 2005

Obligor: Legacy at Anderson

Issuer: South Carolina Jobs-Economic Development Authority


Cause of Default: Unanticipated withdrawal of USDA Section 538 loan guaranty and decision by bond trustee not to use the Debt Service Reserve Fund to cover shortfalls.

Recovery: 86%-89% across Series 2002A CUSIPs; 89% for Series 2002B (Source: Trustee notice to bondholders)

The bonds were issued to finance the acquisition and construction of a 102-unit senior housing facility in Anderson County, South Carolina. The security for the bonds was primarily provided by a mortgage loan guaranty from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Rural Development under its Section 538 Program, which provided for both the construction loan and the permanent loan. But the USDA found that the project did not meet the necessary conditions to secure the permanent loan. The USDA’s interpretation of the regulations was that the permanent loan was not in force and could not be drawn upon to cover shortfalls in the project’s mortgage.
While the lender challenged the USDA’s interpretation of Section 538, the trustee decided that all monies, including those in the debt service reserve funds, would be retained to serve what the trustee deemed was the best long-term interest of the bondholders. As a result, the February 1, 2005 debt service was not made. The property was subsequently sold, and on October 6, 2006, the trustee made a distribution of $8,000,000 to bondholders using proceeds from the sale. The distribution provided Series 2002A bondholders with recovery rates ranging from 85.8% to 89.3% of principal and interest outstanding. Series 2002B bondholders recovered 88.8% of principal and interest outstanding.

40) Park at Wells Branch Apartments, TX

» CUSIP: 894386HK0
» Default Date: June 1, 2005
» Obligor: Park at Wells Branch Apartments
» Issuer: Travis County Housing Finance Corporation
» Defaulted Bonds: Multifamily Housing Revenue Bonds Subordinate Series 2002 C; $1.33 million of debt affected.
» Cause of Default: Weakening of rental market.
» Recovery: 100% of par plus accrued interest.

The Park at Wells Branch is a 304-unit apartment complex comprising of 18 separate buildings located in the north Austin metropolitan area in Travis County, Texas. The property had begun experiencing financial difficulties in 2003 with a softening of the local rental market; from 2000 to 2003, Austin experienced an oversupply of new multifamily developments, with completions outpacing net absorption. The Park’s occupancy rates fell during that time to a low of 80%, at which point the property offered substantial concessions to tenants. By the end of 2007 the occupancy levels had returned to 97% but the reduction in rental revenues caused the property’s financial performance to deteriorate. Insufficient revenues forced the project to tap the debt reserve fund to service the Subordinate Series 2002 C debt in 2004, and the project defaulted on the debt service payments due June 1, 2005.

After this initial event of default Subordinate Series, bondholders were paid in August, but the subsequent interest payment due in December 2005 was not made until June of 2007. Debt service payments remained sporadic and either late or missed entirely. Fund balances provided to Moody’s by the Trustee showed that the Series 2002 C Subordinate debt service reserve fund had been depleted. The unrated Series 2002 D Junior Subordinate bonds are presumed to have been in default as well throughout this period. The Series 2002A Senior debt, however, continued to be paid, with a fully funded debt reserve fund; these bonds were insured by National Public Finance Guarantee (formerly MBIA).

CHC, the owner of the property, has contributed substantial amounts to the property to fund working capital and debt service requirements, and has been making such contributions since 2003.

In 2013, the Park at Wells Branch project was refinanced, enabling the defeasance of all three series on August 27, 2013 at 100% of par plus accrued interest, thus curing the outstanding default on rated Subordinate Series 2002 C debt.

41) Ashton Place and Woodstock Apartments, TX

» CUSIP: 88271FA
» Default Date: August 1, 2005
» Obligor: Ashton Place & Woodstock Apartments Project
» Issuer: Texas State Affordable Housing Corp.
» Cause of Default: Low occupancy rates, rehabilitation work, poor financial performance.

» Recovery: Estimated by Moody's at 85.5% of principal for senior bonds, under 2% for subordinate bonds and 0% for junior bonds based the results of foreclosure and final distribution reports. (Source: September 2009 Moody's report).

The bonds are secured by two cross-collateralized projects, Woodstock Apartments and Ashton Place Apartments, located in Fort Worth and Galveston, respectively. The financial performance of both apartment complexes in this transaction had been poor preceding the default, with low occupancy rates in particular at the Woodstock Apartments. The high vacancies pushed management to reduce rental rates in an effort to become more competitive with other projects in the area, but this only strained revenues further ultimately triggering the default in 2004 the reserve accounts were depleted.

The two projects securing the bonds were sold in September 2008 at a foreclosure sale for $2,500,000 and $1,000,000, respectively. The Trustee also received insurance proceeds related to damage at the Ashton Place Apartments of $4,367,325 and $54,143 in refunds of unearned insurance premiums. In the Revised Notice of Final Distributions, the Trustee reported a final distribution of $816,774 attributable to the principal balance for the Series A bonds, and $16,551 attributable to the principal balance for the Series C bonds. In December 2008 and March 2009, the Trustee made two distributions to the Series A bondholders totaling approximately $6,589,318 of outstanding principal.

Moody's estimates the following recovery on the outstanding principal balances: approximately 85.5% for the Series A bondholders, less than two percent recovery for the Series C bondholders, and no recovery for the Series D bondholders.

42) River Falls Project, CO

» CUSIP: 051558A

» Default Date: January 1, 2006

» Obligor: River Falls Project (Senior Series A, Subordinate Series C)

» Issuer: Aurora Housing Authority


» Cause of Default: Slowdown in market for rental properties compounded by trustee decision to retain reserve funds.

» Recovery: All bonds redeemed at 100% plus interest Project in May 2007 following sale of project.

On January 1, 2006, the River Falls Project went into default after a trustee decision to retain reserve funds preventing full debt service payments on the Subordinate Series 1999 C bonds. The project was also performing poorly. The Senior Series 1999 A bonds subsequently went into default as well before the May 2007 redemption after sale of the property.

The River Falls Project was a 511-unit apartment complex east of downtown Denver housing both low income and market rate tenants. The project exhibited weakening debt service coverage from declining total revenues and increased operating expenses between 2005 and 2006. Despite having sufficient coverage in the debt reserve fund to make the January 1, 2006 payment, the trustee elected not to tap the reserve fund for payment to bondholders, instead choosing to preserve these monies to cover costs and expenses associated with an anticipated inevitable default. On April 17, 2006 the trustee made a partial payment to bondholders, utilizing the revenues received from the borrower and investment income received after the January 1 payment was due. On July 1, 2006 the Project again defaulted on the Subordinate Series C bond debt service payments; in addition, it appears that the debt service reserve fund was tapped to pay interest on the Senior Series A bonds, while the mandatory sinking fund payment for the Senior bonds was deferred. No principal was due bondholders for either series before 2009 for the Senior Series A and 2029 for the Subordinate Series C, but both series were subject to semiannual mandatory sinking fund redemptions. By the spring of 2007, before the sale of the Project, the Senior Series A bonds were in default as to interest.

Negotiations commenced for the sale of the project in fall 2006. Upon completion of the sale in May 2007 all Series of outstanding bonds were redeemed at 100% plus accrued interest.
43) Legacy at Lehigh Project, FL

» CUSIP: 52349K

» Default Date: June 1, 2006

» Obligor: Lee County Industrial Development Authority

» Issuer: Lee County Industrial Development Authority


» Cause of Default: Inability to meet occupancy goals, and effective withdrawal of loan guaranty.

» Recovery: 100% recovery of principal and accrued interest.

The Legacy at Lehigh project is another example of a default that was associated with an unfulfilled USDA guarantee.

The Legacy multifamily housing project was financed through a United States Department of Agriculture program that guaranteed both the construction loan and the permanent financing, though the latter would not take effect until the project achieved 90% occupancy for 90 days. Indeed, after successful completion of 24 month construction phase, the Legacy project was able to achieve no better than an 88% occupancy. The project consequently operated at a loss and began tapping the debt reserve fund to make the June 1, 2005 debt service payment, drawing it down to 28% of the required reserve amount. Without the loan guarantee, and after continuing to operate at a loss and with nearly fully depleted debt reserve funds, the project made only a partial interest payment on June 1, 2006.

The project was subsequently sold through foreclosure in Lee County Florida to Canyon Creek. The trustee distributed the proceeds to all of the Senior Bondholders and Series 2003A and 2003B bondholders received 100% of their principal as well as accrued interest.

44) Cameron Crossing Project I and II, SC

» CUSIP: 396081A

» Default Date: June 1, 2006

» Obligor: Greenville Housing Finance LLC

» Issuer: Greenville Housing Finance LLC


» Cause of Default: Inability to meet occupancy goals, and effective withdrawal of loan guaranty.

» Recovery: 85% of principal for senior bondholders, 0% recovery for subordinate bondholders.

The Cameron Crossing Project is a third example of a housing development that defaulted when its USDA loan guarantee went unfulfilled because of an inability to meet occupancy thresholds.

The Series 2003 bonds were issued to finance the acquisition and construction of the Cameron Crossing I and II projects, respectively 134-unit and 64-unit components of a multifamily rental housing community located in Greenville County, South Carolina. The bonds were issued with a Section 538 guarantee by the United States Department of Agriculture in the form of a combined construction and permanent loan guarantee. The permanent guarantee was conditioned upon achieving 90% occupancy for at least 90 consecutive days post-construction, or alternatively if an escrow had been established within specified terms. The project construction phase was completed successfully but Cameron Crossing was unable to reach the 90% occupancy level (24% as of June 2005, 75% as of June 2006) required for the USDA guarantee. The project operated at a loss, and began drawing down on the debt service reserve fund to pay interest and principal payments through 2005. By 2006 only 10% of the required reserve amount remained. Without
the guarantee, no debt service payment was made on June 1, 2006, thereby triggering the default. The project was sold through foreclosure on November 6, 2006 to the lender, Allied Mortgage Capital Corporation. The lender and the trustee transferred title and the remaining trust funds to the Senior bondholders who, in exchange, tendered $12 million in Series 2003A bonds to the trustee for cancellation. This amount represented 85% of outstanding principal on the Senior bonds. No funds were available to pay the Subordinate Bondholders of the Series 2003 B and Series 2003 C.

45) Canterbury/3 Fountains/River Falls/Puckett Place, TX

- CUSIP: 698487A
- Default Date: September 1, 2006
- Obligor: Canterbury/3Fountains/River Falls/Puckett Pl
- Issuer: Panhandle Regional Housing Finance Corporation
- Defaulted Bonds: Multi-Family Housing Revenue Bonds; $24.16 million of debt affected.
- Cause of Default: Softening rental market and increased competition resulting in a decline in occupancy and net income.
- Recovery: Approximately 36% of principal.

The Series 2000 bonds were largely secured by revenue from four multifamily rental properties located in Amarillo Texas: Canterbury, Three Fountains, River Falls, and Puckett Place Apartments. A softening in the rental market combined with increased competition from neighboring developments offering superior amenities caused a decline in occupancy at all four apartment complexes. In order to remain competitive, the project reduced rents and increased concessions, which resulted in net income substantially lower than had been forecast. The March 1, 2006 debt payment could only be made with the help of the debt service reserve fund, which dropped the 2006 debt service coverage ratio down to 0.64x, compared to 1.26x in 2005. The reserve fund balance was insufficient to fully cover the September 1 debt service payments, causing a default.

Since the event of default, the projects have generated sporadic interest payments, but no principal payment since March 1, 2006. In 2007 the trustee halted use of reserves to pay debt service in order to apply funds to conserve and maintain the projects.

The owner, American Housing Foundation, made contributions to the property in 2008 to bring the interest payments current, but after that the payment defaults continued. As of March 2010, the trustee indicated that they were using the remaining debt service reserves to pay the management fees and workout expenses, and make capital improvements. The owner remains in bankruptcy proceedings pending recovery of the local market.

On March 1, 2011, the trustee foreclosed upon all of the property and sold it, from which bondholders received an initial $8 million distribution. A further, final distribution of $679,179 was made on June 28, 2011, producing a total recovery against principal outstanding of about 36%.

46) Forum Health, OH

- CUSIP: 560060
- Default Date: September 2006 (forbearance agreement)
- Obligor: Forum Health
- Issuer: Mahoning County
- Cause of Default: Operating losses from competition and economic weakness.
- Recovery: 100% of principal plus accrued interest upon redemption of debt by new purchaser of obligor (Source: Moody’s reports).
Forum Health triggered a technical default on its revenue bonds when it filed for bankruptcy protection on March 16, 2009, though default can be deemed to have occurred as early as September 2006, when the first of several forbearance agreements with creditors was signed.

The bankruptcy climaxed a multi-year struggle with cost controls, labor negotiations with a heavily (75%) unionized workforce, and declines in admissions and outpatient procedures that reflected competition from non-unionized hospitals as well as declining population and wealth in its Youngstown service area. Although Forum did not miss a debt service payment while in bankruptcy, it had negotiated a series of forbearance agreements with its banks and bond insurer from late 2006. While these agreements likely helped to postpone bankruptcy, they also hindered operating flexibility by requiring the transfer of more cash to reserves. The multiple forbearance agreements eventually coalesced into a single master agreement; in the days preceding the bankruptcy filing, when Forum’s unrestricted liquidity had dwindled to 17 days cash on hand, there was approximately triple this amount in the master forbearance agreement debt reserves.

On June 3, 2011, Moody’s withdrew the Ca bond ratings for Forum Health. The rating withdrawal follows the purchase of Forum Health by Community Health Systems and the redemption of the bonds. The bonds were redeemed at the full principal amount plus accrued interest.

47) Jefferson Commons at the Ballpark, TX

- CUSIP: 882793
- Default Date: January 1, 2007
- Obligor: Jefferson Commons at the Ballpark
- Issuer: Texas Student Housing Authority
- Cause of Default: Decrease in rents due to competition.
- Recovery: Unknown for the senior bonds; less than 1% for the junior debt.

The Series 2001 bonds were secured by and were issued to purchase a newly built 282-unit/768-bed student housing rental property located in Austin, Texas. The senior bonds were insured through a policy provided by National Public Finance Guaranty (formerly MBIA Corp). The property housed mostly freshman and sophomore students who attended the University of Texas at Austin, but it was otherwise legally and financially unaffiliated with the University. The project’s occupancy rate was 97% at the time of purchase, but fell to 79% in 2003 as a result of a softening of the submarket in Austin. This softening led to rent decreases and concessions in order to stay competitive with new student housing offerings and conventional rental properties in the submarket. With revenues and cash levels substantially lower than at the time of underwriting, the junior debt service reserve fund was tapped on July 1, 2005 to make payments for the Junior Series. The project continued to utilize reserve funds to pay Junior Series debt service until the junior reserves were depleted, and on January 1, 2007, the project defaulted on the interest payment due. The project began tapping reserves to pay for the Senior Series debt service on January 1, 2007; the senior reserve was depleted by the time of the January 1, 2009 debt payment, and at this point deficiencies in Senior Series debt service began to be covered by the bond insurance policy.

In December 2012, the Senior bonds were accelerated and fully paid off from proceeds of the National bond insurance policy along with available monies in the bond fund. Subsequent to this acceleration, the insurance policy on the Senior bonds was canceled and National was deemed owner of the bonds. In May 2013, the Senior bonds were sold off by National and new CUSIPs were assigned. National’s recovery on the Senior bonds from the sale is unknown. A final distribution was made to junior bondholders in October 2014 that resulted in recovery of less than 1%.

48) Tampa Home Mortgage Series 1983 A, FL

- CUSIP: 875157BF5
Tampa's Series 1983 Home Mortgage Revenue Bonds were used to purchase single family mortgage loans along with a small percentage of home improvement loans. The bonds, which were secured by the pledged mortgage loan revenues and debt service reserves, primarily comprised serial and term bonds, but about 8% of principal consisted of call-protected multiplier bonds, similar in structure to a zero coupon instrument. But the multiplier bonds had an accretion rate that was 0.40% higher than the mortgage rate, which worsened the program’s financial deterioration on top of the serious mortgage delinquencies that began to occur in the mid 1990s.

The bonds consequently began to undergo a series of sharp rating downgrades beginning in 1995. In 1998, the bonds were downgraded to Caa1 when the program-asset-to-debt ratio (“PADR”) fell below 100%, with a subsequent downgrade to Caa3 in 2005 when the PADR fell to 68%. In 2009, when the bonds were downgraded to C, the PADR had further declined to 47%.

The trustee issued three notices of default starting in 2006 with a technical default and continuing in 2007 with the first monetary default.

In October 2012 and February 2015, there were partial distributions totaling of $905,000 on the outstanding principal of $2,720,000, providing a recovery of approximately 37% when adjusting for time value of money.

49) Sankofa Shule Charter School

Sankofa Shule was a public school academy in Lansing, MI, that operated as a charter school authorized by Central Michigan University Board of Trustees. The school’s certificates of participation were secured by a pledge of 20% of Sankofa’s state aid.

Sankofa began operating in fiscal 1996, offering an African-centered, college preparation curriculum to students in grades kindergarten through four. Shortly after its debt issuance in 2000, Sankofa began to suffer from poor management and weak financial performance. In 2006, the school did not meet its enrollment targets; state aid was subsequently cut, the school’s authorizing charter was not renewed, and the school closed in June 2007. On December 1, 2007, Sankofa Shule failed to make its debt service payment and has been in default ever since.

After the default, the receiver listed the school’s single facility with a real estate agent, but the listing never elicited any buyer interest in the property. In late 2012, the trustee reported that its agent lowered the sale price to $750,000 in an attempt to prompt a sale, which suggested a relatively low potential recovery for bondholders. In October 2013, the trustee announced that less than year’s
reserves were on hand to cover ongoing administration and maintenance of the property, and that the building would be sold to the highest bidder at live auction unless bondholders contributed an additional $100,000 in reserves. This funding was not forthcoming, and the March 19, 2014 auction produced a bid of $134,000. A March 31, 2014 court hearing and judgment will allow the trustee to proceed with the sale of the property and make a final distribution from the trust estate. The February 15 disclosure also revealed that, aside from any proceeds from the auction, only $47,300 remains in the trust estate. Given the bid and depletion of other assets, and the accumulation of $1.178 million in accrued unpaid interest since the 2007 default, the overall anticipated recovery to bondholders will approximately 5% or less depending upon final trustee fees.

50) Nob Hill Apartments, TX

- **CUSIP:** 088379S
- **Default Date:** December 1, 2007
- **Obligor:** Nob Hill Apartments
- **Issuer:** Bexar County Housing Finance Corporation
- **Defaulted Bonds:** Multifamily Housing Revenue Refunding Bonds, Series 2001A; Subordinate Series 2001B; $15.7 million of debt affected over both series.
- **Cause of Default:** Low occupancy, rise in operational costs.
- **Recovery:** 100% of par plus accrued interest.

The Nob Hill Apartments Project, a 368-unit multi-family rental property, is located approximately eight miles north of the San Antonio, Texas central business district. The property began experiencing financial difficulties in 2005 when operating expenses began to outpace revenue growth, causing a decrease in debt service coverage. Both financial performance and occupancy deteriorated significantly over the next few years due to the severing of a relationship with Catholic Charities, an organization that placed families in the facility, as well as an increase in tenants who became delinquent in rent. Maintenance expenses also rose with an increase in turnover, and occupancy hit a low of 72% in May of 2007. The trustee did not tap the debt service reserve fund to cover the December 1, 2007 interest payment, thus triggering the interest payment default.

Since this initial event of default, the trustee has not paid any interest payments on the subordinate series of bonds. The trustee transferred $750,000 from the debt service reserve fund to a repair and replacement fund in order to make substantial repairs to the facility. On June 1, 2011, Nob Hill defaulted on the principal for its senior series bonds.

The project manager for Nob Hill has changed and is now United Apartments Group. On August 5, 2010, the project was foreclosed upon by bondholders and sold to a new owner. The proceeds were sufficient to enable an acceleration of the senior Series A and the subordinate Series B bonds on August 16 at 100% of par and accrued interest, thus curing these defaults. Unrated series C bonds were also accelerated at 100% of par but without payment of defaulted accrued interest.

51) North Oakland Medical Center, MI

- **CUSIP:** 732557A
- **Default Date:** February 1, 2008
- **Obligor:** North Oakland Medical Center
- **Issuer:** Pontiac Hospital Finance Authority
- **Defaulted Bonds:** Series 1993; $38 million of debt affected.
- **Cause of Default:** Operating losses, competition, and a decline in liquidity.
Located in Pontiac, Michigan, North Oakland Medical Center (NOMC) served an economically weak area that was also oversupplied with acute medical care, given two other competing hospitals. NOMC’s patient volumes suffered a multiyear decline, which proved to be a trend that was both unsustainable and irreversible. The hospital’s financial operations expenses were further strained by management turnover, which created unexpected costs both for severance obligations and staff replacement. NOMC experienced several years of operating losses and negative cash flow culminating in a sharp decline in unrestricted cash and investments. A new and experienced senior management team was brought in during the 2007 fiscal year but was unable to improve the financial situation substantially, leading to the February 2008 default on the Series 1993 bonds.

NOMC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on August 26, 2008, and the rating was subsequently withdrawn. NOMC’s assets were sold in November 2008 for approximately $6 million. Although the bonds were not secured by any collateral interest in the assets that were included in the bankruptcy sale, NOMC distributed $3.771 million to bondholders from the proceeds of the sale and other trustee-held funds in November 2008. NOMC continued to liquidate its remaining assets since that time, and a final distribution of $217,774 was made to bondholders in April 2011, for a total distribution of $3,998,742.

**52 & 53) Jefferson (County of), AL**

- **CUSIP:** 472682
- **Default Dates:** Sewer Warrants, April 1, 2008; General Obligations, September 15, 2008;
- **Obligor:** Jefferson (County of) Sewer Enterprise, Jefferson (County of);
- **Issuer:** Jefferson (County of) AL
- **Defaulted Bonds (warrants):** Sewer Revenue and General Obligation; $3.47 billion of debt affected.
- **Cause of Default:** Excessive debt load from court-mandated capital improvements to a regional sewer system, compounded by a large liquidity shortfall linked to variable rate and swap exposure; bankruptcy and GO default preceded by invalidation of key County revenue source.
- **Recovery:** 54% of par and accrued interest for Sewer Warrants .
- **88% of par and accrued interest for General Obligation debt [includes warrants and GO- secured swaps]**

The Jefferson County debacle had a long gestation period and was finally resolved in late 2013 with its emergence from bankruptcy and refinancings of sewer and general obligation debt. At the time of its filing, it was both the largest municipal default and the largest municipal bankruptcy in US history, affecting $3.47 billion of debt.

The problem began with the sewer warrants and was rooted in a longstanding inability to bring portions of an aging and complex regional sewerage system up to environmental standards. By the late 1990s, a lawsuit over the Cahaba River drainage basin resulted in a Federal court mandate for extensive capital improvements. In retrospect, the consent decree allowed Jefferson County officials and their financial advisors—a number of whom subsequently suffered criminal indictment—to lace the sewer capital plan with expansion projects unrelated to the immediate pollution mitigation effort. In the process, the county committed to a debt load that ultimately proved unaffordable; the debt structure in particular included swaps and variable rate instruments that were intended to moderate the high burden of servicing debt but which backfired, and created an enormous liquidity problem as markets and the financial counterparties who held much of the debt were roiled by the 2008 financial crisis. The first sewer default occurred in April 2008, followed by a general obligation default September 2008. The coup de grace, arguably, came with a 2011 court decision stripping the county of a major source of operating revenues that left it on a precarious financial footing. Key milestones are as follows:

- **April 1, 2008:** Initial default when the County fails to make a principal payment on sewer warrants (bank bonds) held by liquidity providers
- **September 15, 2008:** County fails to make principal payment on General Obligation bank bonds (warrants) held by liquidity providers
November 4, 2009: SEC settles fraud charges against lead bank JP Morgan

March 16, 2011: State supreme court finds Jefferson County’s 2009 Occupational Business and License Tax unconstitutional, effectively removing 40% of County General Fund revenues

November 2011: Jefferson County files for Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection

July 2011: First settlement proposal; approximate 60% recovery offer, 70% counteroffer reported

April 1, 2012: County misses payments on non-bank held General Obligation warrants

January 1, 2013: County finalizes forced exchange of Series 2006 Lease Revenue Warrants (see case study number 74)

December 3, 2013: County formally emerges from bankruptcy; by the end of 2013 refinances all outstanding sewer warrants and outstanding variable rate general obligation warrants with new issues of $1.785 billion and $105 million par respectively.

Several of these default milestones bear some discussion. By 2008, Jefferson County’s leverage and debt structure rendered it vulnerable to the turmoil of the ensuing, larger financial crisis, exposing it to what quickly became a cascade of failed remarketings and auctions, penalty rates, swap terminations, collateral calls, and principal accelerations. The sewer debt, over 90% of which was insured by XL Capital and FGIC, was hit first when these insurer were downgraded, causing a failed remarketing of the $567 million variable rate demand sewer debt, all of which was eventually put back to liquidity providers. At the same time, the county’s auction rate securities failed to find new buyers, causing interest payments to spike for these securities. Between the accelerated VRDO principal repayments and the penalty interest rates on variable and auction rate securities, the County’s debt service cash flow requirements increased dramatically.

The downgrade of the county’s sewer debt to below Baa2 then triggered a swap termination event compounding the demands on the sewer system’s cash flows with an estimated $184 million collateral call. The county officially notified swap counterparties on March 4, 2008 that it did not intend to post collateral or provide alternative insurance under the swap agreements, though it did enter into forbearance agreements with its liquidity and swap counterparties, who waived their rights to demand accelerated payments while negotiations continued. The county’s General Obligation variable rate demand warrants were also put back to liquidity providers, triggering the second event of default when the county could not meet accelerated payments on these bonds on September 15, 2008. During that same month, the Trustee and the bond insurers filed suit in federal court requesting that a receiver be appointed to manage the sewer system and raise rates sufficient to meet ongoing obligations; the judge subsequently ruled that the federal government did not have the jurisdiction to influence rate-setting for a local public utility. Negotiations between all parties continued without solution, and eventually, the forbearance agreements lapsed without further extensions.

The county’s fiscal problems worsened significantly in March 2011 when the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that Jefferson County’s occupational and business license tax was unconstitutional. The loss of the 0.45% tax on salaries created a $70 million hole in the County’s $317 million FY 2011 (September 30) budget, equivalent to 40% of General Fund revenues, and it has not been replaced since. In November 2011 the county commission voted to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection, exacerbating the risk to GO warrant holders who suddenly became unsecured obligors given the absence of a statutory lien for GO debt in Alabama. At the time of the filing, both GO variable-rate demand bank bonds and sewer variable-rate demand bank bonds were already in payment default but other county bonds were not. In March 2012, the county filed a resolution directing officials to skip the April 1 principal and interest payment on outstanding GO warrants in order to preserve an already narrow cash position. This constituted an event of default under the trust indenture, and was also the first payment default on county fixed rate GO warrants.

By mid-2013, the County was working out a recovery plan with creditors. The emergence from bankruptcy in December 2013 was facilitated by a very large refinancing of the sewer debt and a more modest one for the Series 2001B variable rate GO warrants producing the 54% sewer and 88% general obligation recoveries cited above. The bankruptcy and the loss of the occupational tax revenues forced the County to make other significant changes besides restructuring of debt. By the time it emerged from bankruptcy, Jefferson County had reduced overall operating expenditures by a third and cut full-time equivalent employment by 46%, a downsizing that was likely helped by the presence of a major city and other underlying local governments whose services and operations were not
affected by the bankruptcy. Jefferson County still faces steep increases in sewer fees, but its recovery should be buoyed by an overall healthy regional economic base with low unemployment.

**A Non-Defaulting Bond Pulled Into a Bankruptcy Proceeding: The Jefferson County School Warrants**

At the time of its bankruptcy, Jefferson County also had $814 million in outstanding limited obligation school warrants across three separate series. This debt suffered no impairment, as the county consistently paid all debt service on time and in full from a pledge of a 1% Education Tax (sales tax) that was not part of Jefferson County's general revenues.

One of the three series, Series 2005-B, had a modification to its terms during the county bankruptcy but one that we do not consider an impairment. This series, with $111 million outstanding, is a variable rate instrument with a standby bond purchase agreement (SBPA) originally provided by Depfa Bank. In June 2008, the Debt Service Reserve Fund (DSRF) surety bond provided by Ambac for the Series 2005-B warrants became ineligible under the terms of the Indenture upon Ambac’s downgrade below Aaa. During this time the county was unable to replenish the DSRF with cash within the required 12-month period because of its own liquidity issues.

As a result, the Trustee issued a Notice of Default dated December 28, 2009 and the Series 2005-B warrants were tendered to Depfa for purchase under the Standby Purchase Agreement (SBPA). The SBPA provided for a Bank Rate for bonds so tendered of prime + 200 bps, which rose to prime + 300 bps upon an Event of Default. The county began paying interest to Depfa at the default rate as due in June 2010. The county completely replenished the DSRF with cash in September 2012, curing one Event of Default, but by this time the county was 10 months into bankruptcy so an Event of Default remained, requiring that the county continue to pay interest at the Default Rate.

If the county and Depfa had not made any changes to the SBPA, the Bank Rate would have reverted back to prime +200 basis points upon the county's exit from bankruptcy. But in exchange for Depfa's support for the county's overall plan to exit bankruptcy, the county and Depfa agreed that effective August 31, 2013, the New Bank Rate would equal prime +225 bps. The county continued to pay the Default Rate up until the Effective Date of the bankruptcy exit (December 3, 2013) in case the bankruptcy exit failed. Once the county completed its exit, it was credited the difference between the Default Rate and the New Bank Rate for the period of August 31 through December 3.

The 2005-B school warrants provide an interesting example of how even an unimpaired debt can be pulled into a bankruptcy proceeding of the issuer.

**54) Fullerton Village at DePaul University, IL (now 1237 West following project name change)**

- **CUSIP:** 45202QA
- **Default Date:** December 1, 2008
- **Obligor:** Fullerton Village at DePaul University
- **Issuer:** Illinois Finance Authority
- **Defaulted Bonds:** Senior Series 2004 A and Subordinate Series 2004B; $72.23 million of debt affected.
- **Cause of Default:** Low occupancy levels led to revenues insufficient for debt service.
- **Recovery:** 100% of principal and accrued and default interest upon the March 15, 2017 sale of the project, after nine years of default.

Fullerton Village at DePaul University initially defaulted on their 2004 A and B bonds when the project failed to make interest payments on December 1, 2008. Since then, net operating income has been sufficient to pay missed interest payments and additional accrued interest at the default rate, but not full debt service.
This student housing development suffered low occupancy levels attributable at least in part to the project architecture. The design—loft-style apartments with concrete floors and high ceilings—was unconventional for student housing, and apparently created very noisy living quarters. The senior property manager was replaced with an affiliate of the project developer (who is the sole bondholder of the unrated Series 2004 C debt) but low occupancy levels persisted. As a result of the drop in occupancy from 87% in Spring 2007 to 52% in Fall 2007, the project tapped debt service reserve funds on both the Senior and Subordinate bonds to make debt service payments on June 1, 2008. On October 24, 2008, the trustee issued a notice to bondholders stating that debt service reserve funds would not be used to make debt service until such time as revenues would be adequate to replenish any draws. This decision was overturned by the majority of bondholders, who were subsequently paid out of the debt service reserve fund, thus drawing it down to below required levels. The debt service reserve funds were subsequently fully depleted such that the project defaulted on December 1, 2008 on both the A and B Series. Project revenues, which include rental income from student residents as well as the retail spaces, were able to cover operating costs as well as interest and accrued interest since the initial default, but remained unable to make full debt service payments or replenish the debt service fund.

As of Fall 2016, project occupancy was reported to be 83%, reflecting ongoing weakening. However, on March 15, 2017, the project was finally sold for $92 million cash and the bonds were redeemed in full. Both senior and subordinate bond holders were repaid in full including unpaid accrued interest and default interest.

55) St. Louis Industrial Development Authority (St. Louis Convention Center Headquarters Hotel Project), MO

» CUSIP: 790906A, 79164T
» Default Date: December 15, 2008
» Obligor: St. Louis Industrial Development Authority
» Issuer: St. Louis Industrial Development Authority
» Defaulted Bonds: Series 2000A; $98 million of debt affected.
» Cause of Default: Oversupply of new or renovated hotels, decline in convention spending by businesses.
» Recovery: 34.10% of principal

Since opening in 2003, the financial and operating performance of the $277 million, 917 room Convention Center Headquarters Hotel had been significantly weaker than originally forecasted. Although the project, also known as the Renaissance St. Louis Grand Hotel, generated enough revenue to cover operating expenses, revenues were not sufficient to cover debt service and to fund fully the furniture and fixtures account. The hotel's financial performance continued to decline due to the broader economic downturn, the consequent slowdown in convention center bookings sales nationally, and the oversupply of new or recently renovated hotels in the project area. The demand for hotel services was further weakened by the demise of the TWA hub at Lambert-St. Louis International Airport and American Airlines’ subsequent, significant reduction in air service to St. Louis.

The Series 2000A bondholders initiated foreclosure proceedings in January 2009 and shortly thereafter, on February 9, 2009 the hotel was auctioned off to the trustee, UMB Bank, for $98 million. Although bondholders took over ownership, the hotel continued to operate under the management of Renaissance Hotel Management Company. There was reportedly some improvement in operations, though it was uneven and not enough to remedy the default.

The hotel was ultimately sold in 2014, following delays due to a slump in the real estate market and the need to secure agreements between the buyers, the hotel operator, the city and the state. Distributions to bondholders, the final of which occurred in November 2014, provided a recovery of 34.10% of principal on the debt.

56) City of Harrisburg, PA

» CUSIP: 41473E; 414738
» Default Date: June 1, 2009 failure to honor city-guaranteed debt service on Harrisburg Authority Resource Recovery bonds and direct GO debt.

» Obligor: Harrisburg (City of)

» Issuer: Harrisburg Authority


» Total parity obligations affected: $352 million. (excludes non-parity $25 million project loan and $5 swap termination, both ultimately within final settlement)

» Cause of Default: Project enterprise risk, poor general governments financial position independent of project, and consequent city failure to honor guarantee.

» Recovery: 75% of principal and past-due interest for aggregate GO and GO-guaranteed bond and loan creditors.

The City of Harrisburg's road to default and receivership would have perhaps been a typical story of enterprise risk had the city not also chosen to guarantee nearly $310 million of incinerator project debt, an amount approximately three times the city's then outstanding debt. Also the focus on its troubled waste-to-energy (WTE) project should not obscure the fact that Harrisburg's own credit situation had deteriorated steadily since about 2007, when its financial reporting began to be seriously delinquent.

From 1998 to 2003, the Harrisburg Authority issued bonds backed by the city's guarantee for an upgrade and retrofit of its WTE facility. By 2007, the project was experiencing significant construction delays and cost overruns, which led to a draw on the city's guarantee beginning in June 2007. The city guarantee was again called tapped in 2008, but that payment was only made using the proceeds of city-guaranteed working capital notes issued in 2007, an indication of the city's long-running financial problems. On June 1, 2009, the city failed to honor its WTE guaranteed obligations altogether and the city subsequently missed more guarantee payments in 2009 and 2010, as well as swap payments on the incinerator debt.

In September 2010, in the most visible sign to date of the city's faltering financial health, the city announced that it would miss an upcoming $3.3 million payment on general obligation bonds, but ultimately covered the payment with an advance of state aid.

Until this point, none of these actions resulted in a missed payment for retail bondholders. GO-guaranteed incinerator project debt service was covered by a combination of reserve funds, Dauphin County guarantee payments, and bond insurance. Similarly, the city's inability to pay its direct general obligation debt was initially covered by the commonwealth's accelerated emergency payment of state aid and thereafter by bond insurance.

The commonwealth became involved in the city's finances beginning in 2010. State assistance first came in the form of various assistance grants and accelerated state aid, and then enrollment into the Act 47 distressed municipalities program, which saw the appointment of a state coordinator to oversee the city's fiscal recovery. In early 2011, the state-appointed coordinator's plan proposed selling off the WTE plant and leasing City parking authority assets, but was rejected by the council.

Absent any plan to address the city's financial troubles, Harrisburg filed for bankruptcy on October 12, 2011, despite newly passed legislation that prohibited distressed Pennsylvania cities from filing. The next month, the bankruptcy court ruled that the city's bankruptcy petition was invalid; the judge also denied the city's appeal.

Ultimately, the commonwealth played a key role in brokering the final settlement package, which involved two relatively complex bond financings in December 2013. The Lancaster County Solid Waste Management Authority sold $129 million of revenue bonds that enabled it to purchase the WTE plant and redeem several series of WTE project bonds. A second $267 million bond issuance by the Pennsylvania Economic Development Financing Authority was used to redeem or defease all outstanding Harrisburg Parking Authority debt and to redeem additional WTE project bonds. Both financings generated additional funds for creditor settlements. The state
helped bolster the value of the assets underlying these transactions with a contractual purchase of co-generated electricity from the WTE plant and with a guaranteed minimum use of parking authority spaces by state employees.

The upfront financial distributions consequently received by the GO and GO guaranteed creditors on December 23, 2013 were in aggregate 75% of the amount owed, including principal and accrued interest. This 75% represents an aggregate of the full recovery for the city’s direct GO bonds and a 66% recovery for the debts of The Harrisburg Authority that were guaranteed with a city GO pledge. Within the aggregate 75% recovery, individual creditors’ recoveries ranged widely:

» Covanta: 39%
» AGM: 60%
» Dauphin County: 75%
» AMBAC: 100%+ (direct GO creditor)

These up-front recoveries do not capture additional considerations in the form of future distributions of parking revenues, fees and various other economic benefits reflecting separate settlement reached with the city and the GO guaranteed creditors at closing.

As a matter of note, the $5 mm swap termination was paid in full as part of the settlement though not eligible for the GO guarantee under state statute. The non-guaranteed $25 mm CIT loan was also repaid as part of the settlement; under the terms of an earlier court settlement, CIT was paid ahead of GO guaranteed creditors but at 39% of par as per the court decision. Both of these settlements affected the amounts available to GO guaranteed creditors.

Most recently, Harrisburg negotiated a forbearance agreement with Assured Guaranty that would enable the city to postpone debt service payments for its Series 1998A GO-guaranteed lease revenue bonds issued to purchase the Strawberry Square office complex. Postponements, which could begin in 2016 and last through 2026, would likely constitute a distressed exchange under Moody’s default definitions. The forbearance leaves aside how the city will fund the large final balloon payment due in 2033.

57) Lower Bucks Hospital

» CUSIP: 515741BW5 and 515741BX3
» Default Date: December 15, 2009
» Obligor: Lower Bucks Hospital
» Issuer: Langhorne Manor Higher Education and Health Authority
» Defaulted Bonds: Series 1992 Bonds; $24.9 million of parity debt affected.
» Cause of Default: Operating losses, cuts in state aid, patient admission declines.
» Recovery: Approximately 33% of par based on available information.

Lower Bucks Hospital struggled with growing operating losses since the late 1990s due to extreme market pressures, including lower reimbursement rates and sharp competition. In 2002, the hospital dissolved its relationship with Temple University, although a tenuous relationship to Temple University Health System remained. The hospital continued to experience several years of significant patient volume declines because of its very competitive market. In recent years, key physician specialists have left the market or aligned with other providers because of high medical liability costs in the Philadelphia area, which caused patients to shift to ambulatory or competing inpatient facilities. The hospital grew increasingly dependent on state funding for profitability, which has steadily dropped from $4.3 million in 2008 to $1 million in 2010, reflecting the state’s own fiscal pressures. In 2009, Lower Bucks applied for “distressed status” designation by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
Lower Bucks Hospital missed a debt service payment on December 15, 2009 and filed for bankruptcy on January 13, 2010, listing assets of $46.1 million and liabilities of $74.4 million. On July 8, 2011, Lower Bucks Hospital, Lower Bucks Health Enterprises, Inc., and Advanced Primary Care Physicians filed a joint Chapter 11 plan of reorganization.

Lower Bucks Hospital emerged from bankruptcy in January 2012, and in early October 2012 was purchased by Prime Healthcare Services, a for-profit hospital company headquartered in California. According to various sources, bondholders agreed to accept $8.15 million—much less than the $24.9 million in parity debt outstanding at the time of bankruptcy -- in exchange for being deemed secured creditors of the restructured enterprise. The bankruptcy court subsequently rejected the portion of the settlement that permitted mutual releases between the hospital and the trustee. No further information on the final settlement amount or the terms of what appears to have been a distressed exchange is available as of the publication date.

US Municipal Defaults 2010-2014 (#58-#80)

58) Nevada Department of Business and Industry-Las Vegas Monorail Project
   » CUSIP: 25457VA
   » Default Date: January 13, 2010
   » Obligor: Las Vegas Monorail Corporation
   » Issuer: Nevada Department of Business and Industry
   » Defaulted Bonds: Series 2000 Revenue bonds; $439 million of bonds affected.
   » Cause of Default: Mechanical problems, shutdown of operations, and below forecasted ridership and revenues.
   » Recovery: 2% of principal recovered

The Series 2000 bonds were issued by the Nevada Department of Business and Industry for the construction of a 4.2 mile monorail corridor on the east side of the Las Vegas Strip connecting hotels, tourist attractions, and the convention center. The bonds were secured by net revenues of the monorail system, and were insured by Ambac. The project faltered from the beginning, with passenger service delayed by over a year and a series of severe mechanical and electrical problems causing periodic shutdowns of the system in 2004 and 2005. As important, ridership and revenues significantly underperformed initial projections. The project was further hurt by reduced advertising revenue and competition from existing transportation alternatives. The monorail continued to deplete its reserves until Ambac, the bond insurance provider, fronted $16 million to the Trustee in late 2009 to be applied towards the January 2010 debt service obligations. The project filed for bankruptcy protection in mid-January 2010. The filing was disputed by Ambac, which has filed a motion to dismiss the Chapter 11 filing in the belief that LVMC is a municipal entity that is not eligible to file for bankruptcy protection. Ambac itself filed for bankruptcy shortly after Las Vegas Monorail Project, bringing the insurance policy under bankruptcy protection as well.

The Las Vegas Monorail Corporation emerged from bankruptcy protection November, 2012, with a reported 2% total recovery for bondholders.

59) The Waters at Northern Hills Apartment, TX
   » CUSIP: 088379
   » Default Date: February 1, 2010.
   » Obligor: Waters at Northern Hills Apartment (The)
   » Issuer: Bexar County Housing Finance Corporation
   » Defaulted Bonds: Multifamily Housing Revenue Bonds Subordinate Series 2001C ($0.21 million); Senior Series 2001A ($11.4 million) have not defaulted so far.
» Cause of Default: Weak occupancy.

» Recovery: 100% of par plus accrued interest the defaulted subordinate bonds.

The bonds were secured by the revenue from the 304-unit Waters at Northern Hills Apartments, a 1982 vintage multi-family rental property located in San Antonio, approximately nine miles north of the central business district with good access to the city’s principal traffic arteries. Despite a satisfactory location, the project suffered poor occupancy levels, as well as operating expenses that were higher than projected in the initial underwriting. Although occupancy rates rose by 4 percentage points to 79% in 2010, in recent years they have remained significantly below the submarket rate of 93.5%.

On February 1, 2010, the Subordinate 2001 C debt service reserve was fully depleted, and no regularly scheduled 2001 Series C debt service payments were made since. There was no default on the Senior Series 2001A, which were insured by National Public Finance Guarantee (formerly MBIA Corp), but the senior debt service reserve fund was almost depleted by 2013. The Waters’ lost its tax exemption status with Bexar County, which involves an accrued tax liability of $1.2 million, with additional amounts likely in the future.

In 2013, the project was sold to a new owner, and the proceeds were sufficient to enable full debt defeasance of senior and subordinate debt. On August 1, 2013, the outstanding subordinate bonds were called in full at 100% of par and accrued interest, thus curing the default.

60) Honey Creek Apartments, TX

» CUSIP: 088379QR6

» Default Date: April 1, 2010.

» Obligor: Honey Creek Apartments

» Issuer: Bexar County Housing Finance Corporation

» Defaulted Bonds: Bexar County Housing Finance Corporation’s (Honey Creek/Austin Point Apartments) Multifamily Housing Revenue Bonds Subordinate Series 2000C; $1.210 million affected. Junior subordinate bonds, not rated, were also in default. Senior Series 2000A ($11.365 million) have not defaulted.

» Cause of Default: Low occupancy.

» Recovery: 100% of par plus accrued interest for the defaulted subordinate Series 2000 C bonds.

Like The Waters at North Hills project, Honey Creek is located approximately 10 miles north of the San Antonio central business district with good vehicular access. Also built in 1982, this garden-style apartment complex was and is composed of 40 two-story buildings. The bonds are limited obligations secured solely by the revenues, receipts and security pledged in the trust indenture.

As of 2010 the occupancy rate was 90-92%, which put the project into financial stress sufficient to affect subordinate bond debt service; Subordinate Series 2000C bond debt service has not been paid since April 1, 2010, although the 2000A senior Series debt service continued to be paid from project revenues, and the senior reserve remained fully funded. The senior bonds were also insured by MBIA Corporation and reinsured by National Public Finance Guarantee Corporation (formerly MBIA Corp).

In 2013, the Honey Creek project was refinanced, enabling the defeasance of all three series on August 27, 2013 at 100% of par plus accrued interest, thus curing the outstanding default on rated Subordinate Series 2000C debt.

61) AOH - Golf Villas, Rivermill, Village Square Apartments, FL

» CUSIP: 14052T

» Default Date: Default June 1, 2010 on Subordinate Series; Monetary default June 1, 2011 on Senior Series after a reserve fund draw on December 1, 2010.

» Obligor: American Opportunity for Housing-Golf Villas, Rivermill, Village Square Apartments
» Issuer: Capital Trust Agency
» Cause of Default: Low occupancy rates, rehabilitation work, poor financial performance.
» Recovery: Approximately 75% of principal for senior debt and 0.4% for subordinate bonds.

The bonds were secured by the revenues and mortgages from three cross-collateralized properties--Golf Villas, Rivermill and Village Square Apartments--as well as funds and investments pledged to the trustee pursuant to the bond indenture. All three housing projects had difficulty maintaining a sustainable occupancy rate; The Golf Villas, Rivermill and Village Square projects reported physical occupancy of 75%, 86% and 91% respectively as of 2010, though these rates appear to have since weakened substantially. Previously, in 2005, revenues at Rivermill had been weak because of rehabilitation work that was performed on the property. With poor occupancy rates across all three projects, net revenues decreased to the point where the American Opportunity for Housing (AOH) failed to make monthly payments for the June 1, 2010 and December 1, 2010 debt service on the Subordinate and Junior Subordinated bonds (not rated), triggering a default on these bonds. AOH provided financial assistance to avert a June 1, 2010 default on the Senior bonds. This financial support then ceased, but the Trustee did have sufficient funds for the December 1, 2010 senior bond debt service payment.

On December 9, 2010, the trustee distributed funds from the debt service reserve fund to partially reimburse the Subordinate and Junior Subordinate bondholders for the June 1 December 1, debt service payments. The project was sold in February 2015, and the proceeds were distributed to bondholders as final payment on the bonds. The recovery was approximately 75% for senior bonds and 0.4% for subordinate bonds.

62) Whispering Palms Apartments, AZ

» CUSIP: 566823M
» Default Date: July 1, 2010.
» Obligor: Whispering Palms Apartments
» Issuer: Maricopa County Industrial Development Authority
» Defaulted Bonds: Multifamily Housing Revenue Bonds (Whispering Palms Apartments Project), Series 1999A; $5 million of debt affected.
» Cause of Default: Weak real estate market and poor operating performance.
» Recovery: 100% plus accrued interest.

Built in 1985, Whispering Palms Apartments is a 200 unit low-income qualified housing complex located approximately four miles west of downtown Phoenix. Serving a predominantly low- to moderate-income clientele, project rents remain below the Phoenix area average and there is fierce competition from nearby properties. The occupancy rate averaged 93% in 2010 but had reached as low as 74% in 2009. Moody’s had highlighted significant weakness at the property back in 2004 when the rating was first moved below investment grade as a result of poor financial performance, weak occupancy and a court-ordered change in management.

Beginning on January 1, 2010, the project began tapping the debt service reserve fund in order to make full debt service payments and the rating was downgraded to Caa1 from B1. The debt service reserve fund was fully depleted by July 1, 2011, when the trustee began making claims under the insurance policy from National Public Finance Guarantee (formerly MBIA Corp.) to make full payment. To date, no monies have been added to replenish the debt service reserve fund and a total of $153,707.61 or 33.87% of 2011 annual debt service has been paid by National Public Finance Guarantee continued to pay debt service through August 17, 2012, when National mandatorily tendered the bonds and paid holders 100% of par plus accrued interest.
63) Knight’s Crossing and The Pointe at Central at University of Central Florida (formerly Pegasus Landing & Pegasus Pointe at University of Central Florida), FL

- CUSIP: 140427A
- Default Date: October 1, 2010.
- Obligor: Knights Crossing and The Pointe at University of Central Florida
- Issuer: Capital Projects Finance Authority
- Defaulted Bonds: Student Housing Revenue Bonds, Senior Series 2000 F-1 and F-2 (Capital Projects Loan Program); $137 million of debt affected.
- Cause of Default: Low occupancy rates resulting from water damage and mold.
- Recovery: Full recovery is likely possible after physical remediation, strong occupancy of the projects, and resumption of debt service payments.

This financing is an interesting example of an otherwise sound project that defaulted because of a construction-related defect, which was then cured with additional investment by the bond insurer. The bonds are limited obligations of Capital Projects Finance Authority, secured solely by rental revenue from two privatized student housing projects—now called Knights Crossing and The Pointe at Central—and various funds pledged under the indenture. The Subordinate Series 2000G were not rated or insured, while the senior bonds are insured by MBIA Corporation and reinsured by National Public Finance Guarantee Corporation (formerly MBIA Corp).

The default was triggered in 2010 when the University of Central Florida began diverting students away from the projects following water damage and the discovery of mold in the buildings. The occupancy rate for the projects dropped to 66% and given reduced rental revenue and tenant relocation, the project began tapping the debt service reserves to help pay debt service for both series beginning in October 2010. Reserves were depleted by October 2011, and a monetary default occurred on the senior bonds, though bond insurance covered the debt service payments. Debt service payments on October 2011, April 2012, and October 2012 were made by the Trustee by drawing on the bond insurance policy.

But unlike other distressed housing projects with weak submarkets, these projects still have a strong occupancy potential given the proximity of the University. Accordingly, MBIA in the Spring of 2011 committed to lend the projects funds, now totaling more than $32 million, to cure the mold and water damage problem and restore the buildings to student tenancy. The projects have also undergone a name change to Knight’s Crossing and The Pointe at Central, as noted above, to facilitate remarketing of the properties. The projects were 99% occupied in Fall 2016. Debt service payments since April 2013 have been made from pledged revenues and not from draws on the insurance policies as in previous periods.

Although recent operating performance has been sufficient to meet current debt service payments, the project incurred approximately $52,800,000 in additional indebtedness between the loan for repair of the project and the bond insurer’s outstanding claim from the remediation period. These obligations are subordinate to the debt service on the senior bonds, but have priority over replenishment of the depleted debt service reserve fund which has not yet been restored. Full recovery would entail repayment of the debt service covered by the insurer.

64) Rutland Place Apartments, TX

- CUSIP: 052425CR4
- Default Date: November 1, 2010
- Obligor: Rutland Place Apartments
- Issuer: Austin Housing Finance Corporation

» Cause of Default: Low occupancy.

» Recovery: Bondholders recovered 73.6% of outstanding principal after sale of the property

The Rutland Place Apartments project is a 294-unit multifamily housing development located in the North Central Austin submarket, and is comprised of 16 garden-style apartment buildings (known as Rutland Place I) and 15 other apartment buildings (known as Rutland Place II). Phase I of the project was built in 1979 and Phase II was built in 1985. The property is subject to income restrictions, which limit the owner’s ability to maximize rental income. The bonds are limited obligations secured solely by the revenues, receipts and security from the project.

The property has struggled with low occupancy, which was most recently at 72%. Occupancy was weakened by a fire in 2008 which affected a significant number of units, and the project is further exposed to competition from a large inventory of housing units in the local market. The property has not been able to fully cover debt service for the past six years and the reserve funds have gradually been depleted, leading to full monetary default in 2010.

Rutland Place Apartments has failed to pay principal on Series 1998A bonds since November 1, 2010, and principal and interest since May 1, 2011.

In early 2012, bondholders directed the trustee to sell the property. A total of $8,224,688 was distributed to bondholders on March 30, 2012, for a total final recovery of 73.6% against principal.

65) Boston Industrial Development Fin. Auth., MA

» CUSIP: 10088MAU9

» Default Date: Forbearance agreement, effective as of May 24, 2011

» Obligor: Boston Industrial Development Finance Authority

» Bonds: Series 2002 Senior Revenue Bonds; $41 million of debt affected.

» Cause of Default: Forbearance Agreement signed to modify the terms from the original promise.

» Recovery: 96% of principal and accrued interest as reported by trustee

The Series 2002 Bonds financed development of the Crosstown Center, a 175-room Hampton Inn and Suites hotel and a 650-space parking garage located adjacent to the Boston Medical Center in downtown Boston. The Project is approximately one mile from the City’s convention center and close to Logan Airport. The bonds are secured by a pledge of net revenues generated primarily from the operation of the hotel and parking garage, as well as debt service and other reserves. Moody’s rated the $35.67 million Senior Revenue Bonds but not the $7.75 million Subordinate bonds.

The project opened for business in July 2004, and despite its promising location room, rentals and revenues have been consistently significantly lower than original forecast. Hotel room demand never reached original expectations due to the continued expansion of the Boston hotel supply and the broader economic slowdown. One particularly problematic aspect of this financing was its ascending debt service structure, which reflected overly optimistic revenue growth projections.

The Crosstown Center Project defaulted effective May 24, 2011, when a forbearance agreement was signed that effectively suspended sinking fund principal payments, aimed at allowing the hotel to build its operations and revenues; regularly scheduled payment of Senior (but not Subordinate) interest continued, in some cases with help from the reserve fund. The original forbearance agreement was to run until January 1, 2013, but was extended several times that year in the absence of sufficient project recovery, and finally to January 31, 2015.
Ultimately, the borrower was able to secure a refinancing of the original project bonds on March 18, 2016, which enabling an acceleration and final payment to bondholders from proceeds on March 21, 2016. As reported by the trustee, the Senior Bonds recovered 96% of principal and accrued interest, reflecting a slight principal haircut taken by institutional holders; no retail Senior Bond holders were impaired. The unrated Subordinate Bonds reportedly recovered 0%.

66) Santa Rosa Bay Bridge Authority, FL

» CUSIP: 802576

» Default Date: July 1, 2011

» Obligor: Santa Rosa Bay Bridge Authority

» Issuer: Santa Rosa Bay Bridge Authority

» Defaulted Bonds: Series 1996 Revenue Bonds; $115.9 million of debt affected.

» Cause of Default: Insufficient toll traffic revenue, well below projections; competition.

» Recovery: Approximately 5% to date but still pending.

The Santa Rosa Bay Bridge Authority default is another example of a transportation infrastructure financing that could not live up to utilization forecasts and revenue projections. The Authority, established in 1984, financed and oversaw construction of the 3.5-mile Garcon Point Bridge, which spans the eastern end of Pensacola Bay, connecting Garcon Point in the north to Redfish Point in the south. The bonds are secured by gross toll revenues, along with a debt service reserve fund.

The Bridge provides access to Gulf Breeze and other areas on the peninsula from areas north and east of Pensacola Bay, though the existing toll-free Pensacola Bay Bridge to the west already linked Pensacola directly with Gulf Breeze. The Bridge opened on May 14, 1999, but from the beginning traffic forecasts proved to be overly optimistic; toll revenues were significantly less than projected, which put a strain on the authority’s finances starting in the first year of operation. In addition to the Pensacola Bay Bridge, the Garcon Point Bridge faces competition from two other toll-free alternatives-SR 8 and I-10. Local population and tourism growth is now expected to be moderate at best given regional economic and housing conditions.

The Bridge’s continued poor performance caused a full depletion of the reserve and interest accounts, which were still insufficient to cover the scheduled debt service payment of $5 million on July 1, 2011. While some of the bonds issued are insured by MBIA Corporation and reinsured by National Public Finance Guarantee Corporation, the July 1 defaulted bond was not insured.

Bridge traffic appears to be improving slightly from year to year; both traffic and revenue peak substantially in the summer months. The revenue yield has enabled the trustee to make periodic small payment on the 1996 bonds. In December 2015, approximately $3 mm was distributed to bondholders, representing about 2% of principal and interest that have accrued. Accruals continue to grow, such that no more aggressive recovery seems imminent.

67) Charitable Leadership Foundation, NY

» CUSIP: 012440FZ1, 012440G85, 012440GB3

» Default Date: July 1, 2011

» Obligor: Charitable Leadership Foundation

» Issuer: Albany Industrial Development Agency

» Defaulted Bonds: 2002A Civic Facility Revenue Bonds (Center for Medical Science Center); $48.2 million of debt outstanding.

» Cause of Default: Bankruptcy of primary tenant.

» Recovery: Highly uncertain, dependent upon sale or re-use of property
Charitable Leadership Foundation ("the Foundation") is a private foundation devoted to various charitable, scientific, religious, or literary purposes including the fields of medicine and education. In 2002, the Foundation issued bonds to finance the creation of a biomedical research facility, called Center for Medical Science, in Albany, NY. The research facility was occupied by three tenants, one of which, Ordway Research Institute (ORI), comprised 43% of the space. Ordway stopped making rental payments in July 2010 and filed for bankruptcy in April 2011.

All three tenants at the time of the default were not-for-profit research or state-related entities. Health Research Inc., a not-for-profit corporation, leased approximately 45% of the space, and the New York State Department of Health Division of Lab Quality and Control leased another 11% of space. These renters reportedly still occupy their share of the building. The bonds are secured by a mortgage lien on the leasehold interest in the research facility, a security interest in the equipment, and a debt service reserve fund via a Citigroup guaranteed investment contract.

After the loss of a large portion of rental income with the ORI bankruptcy, the Foundation tapped the debt reserve fund to make the January 2011 debt service payment but defaulted on July 1, 2011, when it failed to pay the scheduled principal payment due in the amount of $1.875 million. Bondholders foreclosed and formed a new for-profit entity, Albany Medical Science Research Institute LLC. In January 2013, the Albany Industrial Development Agency agreed to payments in lieu of taxes from the new private entity. The property still appears to be listed for sale or lease with Pyramid Brokerage Company-Albany Office. Recovery remains uncertain, and appears to be fully dependent upon the market value of the building. There has been no formal disclosure since 2011.

**68) Southern California Logistics Airport Authority/ Victorville Economic Development Authority- Southern California Logistics Airport Project**

» CUSIP: 842472D, 842472C

» Default Date: Failure to pay $535,000 in subordinate bond principal on December 1, 2011; reserve fund only available for interest payments, which were made ($1.3 million); subsequent defaults occurred in 2012-2015.

» Obligor: Victor Valley Economic Development Authority

» Issuer: Southern California Logistics Airport Authority


» Cause of Default: Loss of pledged tax increment revenues because of collapsing real estate values, despite a very large project area base.

» Recovery: Pending. The December 2011 default of the rated subordinate bonds was cured with tax receipts in March 2012, but reportedly without accrued interest; defaults since then have not been cured. Unrated Taxable Subordinate Series 2006, which effectively occupy a ‘mezzanine’ level pledge ahead of the rated Series 2007 and Series 2008A debt, also defaulted in December 2013 and 2014. The Series 2006 defaults were each cured in the year after the default.

The Southern California Logistics Airport Authority (SCLAA) is a joint powers authority between the City of Victorville and the obligor, the Victor Valley Economic Development Authority (VVEDA). SCLAA is effectively controlled by the City of Victorville. SCLAA was formed in 1997 to pursue redevelopment of the 2,500-acre George Air Force Base, which was deactivated in 1991. To this end it issued approximately $347 million of tax increment debt by 2008, of which $321.54 million was outstanding as of FY 2014. While aspects of the redevelopment effort have proceeded well with diverse warehousing, manufacturing, and aviation tenants, other project components including a BNSF rail spur, a power plant, and a ‘visa investor center’ faltered after considerable expenditure of bond funds.

On December 1, 2011, SCLAA first missed payment on its subordinate non-housing tax allocation bonds. Although the tax base area is very large, comprising some 85,000 acres, 12 sub areas, and several towns and cities, the region was hit hard by losses in housing valuation during the downturn. As a result, tax increment revenues fell sharply, bringing debt service coverage on the rated subordinate non-housing bonds—of which about $51 million remain outstanding—to under 1.0x. The issuer was able to cure the December 2011 default with tax collections received during the next March distribution, however defaults since then have not been cured as no excess funds were available in the subsequent debt service payment cycles.
The State of California dissolved all redevelopment agencies in 2012. The successor agencies to these redevelopment agencies are subject to a semiannual, state approval process to use their tax increment revenues for preexisting obligations. Funds available for SCLAA’s subordinate debt service have actually increased because the distinction between housing and non-housing tax increment was removed with the dissolution. In 2015, available revenues provided 0.86 times coverage of all housing and non-housing debt, up from 0.82 times in 2014.

There is also ongoing uncertainty over whether prior debt service defaults may be cured with subsequent, excess tax increment revenues, when available. A June 2015 continuing disclosure by SCLAA indicated that the state’s Department of Finance (DOF) had disallowed the use of excess tax increment revenues in a subsequent period for the payment of previously defaulted debt service. The DOF’s determination, relating to the July through December 2015 semiannual period, was inconsistent with prior decisions.

In December 2015, SCLAA received notice regarding its January 2016 through June 2016 period, that DOF had reversed its prior decision and would allow the use of excess tax increment revenues in a subsequent period for the payment of previously defaulted debt service. But this reversal was heavily caveated. Previously defaulted debt service obligations could only be paid from former tax increment generated from the George Air Force Base (GAFB) Parcels, which is only a small portion of the total project area securing the bonds.

SCLAA along with their legal counsel worked with DOF to explain that its determination of limiting tax increment to the GAFB parcels was inconsistent with the bond indentures. In February 2016, DOF shifted its position to allow the use of all pledged tax increment for debt service, default payments and reserve replenishment. DOF’s recent decision is not binding and could be altered in future Recognized Obligation Payment Schedule (ROPS) period. Bondholder recovery rates and the rating will both be informed by not only AV growth rates but by DOF’s stance in future ROPS periods on the permitted use of excess tax increment revenues.

69) KidsPeace, Inc., PA

- CUSIP: 524805F37, 524805F45, 524805F52, 524805F60
- Default Date: January 15, 2012
- Obligor: KidsPeace, Inc., PA
- Issuer: Lehigh County General Purpose Authority, PA
- Defaulted Bonds: Series 1998 and 1999 Revenue bonds; $51.3 million of debt outstanding.
- Cause of Default: Weak operating performance.
- Recovery: 9.3% for principal and accrued interest; excludes any value for new bonds.

KidsPeace is a private institution providing youth behavioral and mental health treatment and foster care with facilities in ten states and the District of Columbia. Despite its scale and 130 year history, the debt supported by the institution was never rated above speculative grade by Moody’s since its initial sale in 2000.

Operating and financial performance weakened significantly in subsequent years, reflecting declining or less-than-expected average daily census at residential facilities, cutbacks in governmental funding for programs, and a series of professional liability issues. By fiscal year 2011, KidsPeace’s liabilities exceeded assets by over 50%, and it was cutting salaries across the board and seeking to terminate its pensions. Given the resulting cash pressures, KidsPeace requested a two-year debt service payment suspension from bondholders and pension relief from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). Both petitions are now pending. In March 2012 the PBGC placed an approximate $3 million lien on KidsPeace, becoming a secured creditor. In January 2013, KidsPeace agreed to a forbearance agreement with bondholders through June 1, 2013 that included a $15 million mortgage on property in favor of the trustee; a related step was PBGC’s agreement to subordinate status. KidsPeace missed its May 1, 2013 interest payment and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy shortly thereafter on May 21.

On December 18, 2013, KidsPeace and its affiliates filed a plan of reorganization in federal bankruptcy court. In 2014, bondholders were subject to a distressed exchange, comprising an upfront cash payment equivalent to 9.3% of outstanding par and accrued interest, and
$25.11 million in new 30 year Series A and accreting Series B bonds. (There are no-interest Series C bonds that function only to provide a claim against a second bankruptcy). Bondholders who purchased secondary insurance from ACA are also offered a cash payout of 36% in exchange for release from the insurance claim. There is no available estimate of the value of the replacement bonds.

70) City of Wenatchee, WA

- CUSIP: 950494
- Default Date: June 1, 2012
- Obligor: City of Wenatchee, WA
- Issuer: Greater Wenatchee Regional Events Center Public Facilities District (unrated)
- Defaulted Bonds: Contingent loan agreement on parity with general obligation debt; $9.3 million rated debt outstanding.
- Cause of Default: Unwillingness to pay; failure to understand enterprise risk; poor management.
- Recovery: 100% following long-term take-out of the BANs three months after default.

The City of Wenatchee, located in north central Washington, had pledged its full faith and credit to backstop interest payments on unrated BANs issued by the Greater Wenatchee Regional Events Center Public Facilities District (PFD), a municipal corporation established to build and operate a 4,300-seat sports and entertainment arena. The Town Toyota Center arena enterprise had performed weakly for years and ultimately forced Wenatchee to honor its guarantee, which in turn exposed the City's General Fund and general taxing authority to liabilities far in excess of statutory and constitutional limits. In May 2012, Wenatchee announced it had insufficient funds to advance loans for future interest payments, and did not advance funds for a note interest payment due June 1, 2012. This occurred despite PFD voter approval earlier in April for a 0.1% sales and use tax increase intended to help pay off the arena's $42 million debt.

Wenatchee's missed interest payment constitutes a default because the City made a clear pledge to support the contingent loan agreement, backed by its General Obligation Limited Tax authority.

On September 28, 2012 the PFD refinanced the BANs with $48.2 million long-term debt secured by several sources, including the 0.1% district-wide sales tax, an existing 0.033% district-wide sales tax, and a 0.2% Wenatchee-only sales tax. The City and PFD also settled favorably with most of the city's major potential legal counterparties.

71) City of Stockton, CA

- CUSIP: 861361, 861394
- Default Date: June 28, 2012
- Obligor: City of Stockton, CA
- Issuer: City of Stockton, CA
- Defaulted Bonds:
  - 2007 Taxable Pension Obligation bonds
  - 2004 Public Financing Authority Lease Revenue Bonds (Parking)
  - 2007 A&B Public Financing Authority Variable Rate Demand Lease Revenue Bonds
  - 2009 A Public Financing Authority Lease Revenue Bonds
  - 2004 Redevelopment Agency (Stockton Events Center)
  - 2006 A Public Financing Authority Lease Revenue Bonds
  - 2003 A&B Certificates of Participation (Redevelopment Housing)

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<tr>
<th>Defaulted Bonds</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<td>2007 Taxable Pension Obligation bonds</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004 Public Financing Authority Lease Revenue Bonds (Parking)</td>
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<td>2007 A&amp;B Public Financing Authority Variable Rate Demand Lease Revenue Bonds</td>
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<td>2009 A Public Financing Authority Lease Revenue Bonds</td>
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<td>2004 Redevelopment Agency (Stockton Events Center)</td>
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<td>2006 A Public Financing Authority Lease Revenue Bonds</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003 A&amp;B Certificates of Participation (Redevelopment Housing)</td>
<td>$12.97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Default as defined by Moody’s, reflecting bankruptcy filing; city has suspended support for five of seven above series

» Cause of Default: Substantial losses in housing values and employment; inability to manage costs within confines of statutory property tax revenue limits; lack of sufficient financial controls.

» Recovery: Average recovery of about 50% across all seven outstanding bonds; recovery for Moody’s rated 2007 POBs 41% of principal and accrued interest.

A historic inland port city and the seat of San Joaquin County, Stockton was caught in the boom-bust economic cycle of the 2000s and suffered substantial losses in tax base and employment. The city also had major problems with controlling spending; although a series of earlier self-declared “fiscal emergencies” were seen as aids to renegotiating labor contracts, Stockton also had serious unreported issues with financial management in general. In 2012, when it first proposed a suspension of general fund support for lease obligations, the city simultaneously announced a major, negative restatements of prior years’ audits.

At the time, Stockton’s June 2012 bankruptcy filing was the largest of any city in the US by population. It was also the first California city to use the state’s new AB 506 mediation process. The city’s bankruptcy also set a number of other precedents: it was the first city in which leased assets in a rated transaction were repossessed by the bond trustee (here, the 2004 Parking related transaction), and it was one of the first case in which a court deflated the ability of CalPERS to claim it was an arm of the state.

Although the Stockton bankruptcy has since been eclipsed by Detroit’s filing in scale, the Stockton case will reverberate and redefine how we think about municipal loss given default. Most significantly, it – along with San Bernardino— tested the status of pension obligations in relation to bonded debt.

The court’s February 2015 written opinion confirming Stockton’s plan of adjustment was a mixed bag for bondholders. Favorably, it made clear that pensions are not exempt from impairment under Chapter 9, despite substantial pressure from the state’s pension fund to find otherwise. Negatively for bondholders, the court found that the ability to cut pensions was limited to cases where the court applied a complicated balancing test and ultimately decided cuts to pensioners would be allowed.

Further, the Stockton decision potentially established a roadmap for future bankrupt local governments to impose more severe cuts on bondholders than retirees. It did this by conflating the legally separate claims of pensions and retiree health benefits (also known as Other Post-Employment Benefits, or OPEBs) in determining whether to confirm the city’s plan of adjustment. The judge allowed Stockton retirees to recover all of their future pensions, including the unfunded portion, while reducing OPEB liabilities to almost nothing. In its plan Stockton treated both claims, which are arguably unsecured, as separate classes.

The court made the point that the plan was fair to investors because the outcome for retirees must consider their overall recovery on pensions and OPEBs combined. By combining these two distinct classes of claims to arrive at a calculation of losses for retirees, the court provided a justification for eliminating OPEBs while keeping pensions, possibly opening the door for other bankrupt local governments to consider using the same approach in the future.

For creditors, Stockton’s bankruptcy was complete after Franklin Templeton Investments lost its legal challenge to the bankruptcy exit plan approved in October 2014. Franklin, investor in the 2009 A COPs firm had argued that its recovery on the city’s 2009 A certificates of participation should be far higher in large part because retiree pension benefits were untouched. The 2009 A COPS were significantly more impaired in the bankruptcy than the city’s five other bond transactions outstanding at the time of the bankruptcy (the 2004 Parking lease assets had been repossessed). Franklin had initially been offered about 10%, and its ultimate recovery of about 17.5% was far lower than the other debtors.

72) American Opportunities for Housing—Colinas, LLC, TX

» CUSIP: 088379SD5

» Default Date: July 1, 2012

» Obligor: American Opportunity for Housing - Colinas, LLC, TX
» Issuer: Bexar County Housing Finance Corporation, TX
» Defaulted Bonds: Subordinate Series 2001 C; $27.26 million total debt outstanding.
» Cause of Default: Weak real estate market and poor operating performance.
» Recovery: 100% after sale of property in February 2013 and March 2013 defeasance.

The Colinas Project comprises 776 rental units in three properties—Las Colinas Apartments, Huebner Oaks Apartments, and Perrin Crest Apartments—all built between 1978 and 1984 and located around San Antonio, Texas. The project subsequently experienced weak operating performance and then sustained fire damage, which left 16 units uninhabitable along with water damage. The bonds were first downgraded to below investment-grade in December 2006, in part because occupancy had fallen below 90%. To reduce vacancies, the project began to offer rental concessions that further weakened its financial position. The subordinate bonds first defaulted on July 1, 2012 after tapping both the surplus and debt service reserve funds. The borrower sold the project on February 14, 2013 and generated proceeds sufficient to pay all delinquent and outstanding principal and interest on the defaulted $3,370,000 of subordinate bonds and redeem in full the $23,890,000 of senior bonds.

73) City of Oakdale Sewer Enterprise, CA
» CUSIP: 672010
» Default Date: August 31, 2012
» Obligor: City of Oakdale Sewer Enterprise, CA
» Issuer: City of Oakdale Sewer Enterprise, CA
» Defaulted Bonds: Loan on parity with revenue debt; $1.6 million rated debt outstanding.
» Cause of Default: Weak management practices.
» Recovery: 93.5%, reflecting principal and accrued interest

In August 2009, Oakdale Sewer Enterprise entered into a loan with the California State Water Resource Control Board (CSWRCB), which provided $13 million in capital financing for the rehabilitation and upgrade of the wastewater treatment plant. In August 2012, Oakdale failed to make a payment on this loan which was secured on a parity basis with Oakdale’s rated 2002 revenue bonds. The default was a result of weak management practices, with the city staff reportedly unclear as to when the first payment was due. Apparently, however, miscommunication was not uncommon; the finance department also failed to set aside $844,000 in reserves, as was required by the loan agreement, and had generally failed to track rate increases and projected revenues against expenditures.

Despite a reported doubling of residents’ sewer rates since the borrowing, net revenue had remained insufficient to cover total debt service for the sewer system. Weeks prior to the missed payment, the city council decided to make a partial, interest-only payment on the CSWRCB loan (equivalent to about 39% of debt service due). Debt service on the 2002 parity bonds, however, which was significantly less than that on the loan, remained current at all times.

The city was reluctant to impose further sharp rate increases on residents and began negotiating with the Water Resource Control Board to restructure the entire loan obligation, which occurred in June, 2013. Under the terms of the restructuring, the final maturity date and the total principal for the CSWRCB loan remain unchanged, although the amortization schedule has been modified and backloaded to produce lower annual principal payments (and debt service) over the next seven years. The system made the required interest-only payment of $329,200 on August 31, 2013 and will resume principal payments in August 2014. The loan modification plan also required the system to raise rates sufficient to stabilize the system. In November of 2013, the system adopted a series of rate increases extending out to 2017.

While the new amortization schedule calls for full repayment of the CSWRCB loan principal within the original final maturity date, Moody’s calculates a present value loss of approximately 6.5% for the CSWRCB as creditor.
74) Jefferson County Public Building Authority (Jefferson County Lease)

» CUSIP: 4726PA
» Default Date: January 1, 2013
» Obligor: Jefferson County, AL
» Issuer: Jefferson County Public Building Authority, AL
» Defaulted Bonds: Lease Revenue Warrants Series 2006; $78.4 million outstanding.
» Cause of Default: Distressed exchange and workout related to county bankruptcy.
» Recovery: 100%+, reflecting principal, accrued interest, and additional payments over time

The Jefferson County Public Building Authority was created as a facilities financing vehicle for Jefferson County and its agencies. In 2006, the Authority undertook the construction of a new courthouse and the renovation of the existing jail and courthouse with the sale of $86.7 million of lease revenue warrants. The Bessemer Court House and Jail project warrants were secured by rental payments from Jefferson County, subject to the annual renewal of the lease. After its bankruptcy filing in November 2011, however, Jefferson County skipped its 2012 lease payments to preserve its already-narrow cash position. The County petitioned the court for relief from its automatic bankruptcy stay to allow the trustee to draw on the debt service reserve fund to make the April 2012 payment. The court allowed it, and full payment was made to bondholders. A similar motion was filed and granted for the October 2012 payment. Jefferson County examined a number of options in regards to the lease, including rejecting the lease and relocating the jail and courthouse services elsewhere. Ultimately, however, and in conjunction with its plan of recovery, the County restructured its obligations with the Authority in November 2012 in a workout arrangement that included Ambac, the insurer for the 2006 Warrants. This allowed the county to keep the warrants’ original 20 year maturity schedule by relying in part upon Ambac insurance and with a new lease that eases and extends the county’s repayment obligations over 30 years. The workout, which became effective January 1, 2013, essentially comprises a distressed exchange wherein original warrant holders remain unimpaired; they receive principal and interest as originally scheduled with the help of Ambac, who will cover scheduled debt service payments from 2016-2021 and in 2026. In return for Ambac’s contributions, the county will reimburse Ambac with semi-annual payments of $2.3 million from October 1, 2026 through April 1, 2036, a period that extend well beyond the warrant maturity. The final recovery calculation for the lease revenue debt provides Ambac as ultimate creditor with a recovery of 117% (using a 5% discount rate); the greater than 100% recovery reflects Ambac’s return for covering some of the payments on the warrants.

75) West Penn Allegheny Health System, PA

» CUSIP: 01728AG
» Default Date: April 30, 2013
» Obligor: West Penn Allegheny Health System
» Issuer: Allegheny County Hospital Development Authority
» Defaulted Debt: Health System Revenue Bonds, Series 2007A through distressed exchange; approximately $710 million of debt affected.
» Cause of Default: Declining patient volumes and large operating losses.
» Recovery: About 85% of outstanding bonds were tendered in the distressed exchange and reportedly received 87.5% of par. There was no monetary default on either principal or interest up until the distressed exchange. Status and recovery for the remaining outstanding bonds is pending. (Source: Moody’s files)
West Penn Allegheny Health System (WPAHS) formed at the merger of The Western Pennsylvania Hospital and Allegheny Health and Research Foundation’s (AHERF’s) Pittsburgh operations, after AHERF’s bankruptcy filing and restructuring of its Philadelphia operations in 1998 (See: #16 and #17). In the succession, WPAHS inherited a weakened balance sheet and other credit challenges.

WPAHS’s 2013 restructuring was the result of years of financial troubles for the entity, which included drops in patient volume, management and governance missteps, continuous large operating losses, a concentrated and exclusive insurance market which provided insurance companies unusually high negotiating leverage, and a significant degree of market competition from neighboring University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC). In recent years, UPMC has grown to become the largest health system in the region, and WPAHS’s ability to compete was constrained by a lack of capital resources to invest in facilities and other strategies.

WPAHS underwent a restructuring of its Pittsburgh operations in 2013, which included a distressed exchange with bondholders. As part of the restructuring, Highmark Health Services, a not-for-profit health insurance company in western Pennsylvania, became affiliated with WPAHS, and in doing so took over management of operations and in an associated move attempted to acquire all outstanding debt at a discount. The distressed exchange that resulted affected 85% of outstanding bonds whose holders accepted the tender offer of 87.5% of par. The status and recovery of the remaining outstanding debt is pending. In late 2013, Highmark reportedly acquired another $50 mm, or roughly half of the non-tendered bonds up to that point. At no time did any of bonds suffer monetary default on either principal or interest.

76) Pontiac City School District, MI

» CUSIP: 732538G
» Default Date: May 1, 2013
» Obligor: Pontiac City School District, MI
» Issuer: Pontiac City School District, MI
» Cause of Default: Extreme operating and financial stress stemming from sharp enrollment declines and loss of state aid.
» Recovery: 100% repaid to insurer.

The Pontiac City School District default was the first by any Moody's rated school district, and was followed by the default of a second albeit unrated Michigan school district, Buena Vista, which was then dissolved. A third Michigan district, Inkster, was also dissolved, and two more, Muskegon Heights and Highland Park, were effectively dissolved by their emergency managers and converted to charter academies. These broadly reflect large scale changes in Michigan public education, which promotes school choice and competition through mobility of per student state aid, on top of recent and severe economic and demographic declines in the southeastern part of the state. School districts’ very limited revenue raising flexibility and stagnant state funding have also contributed to financial distress among districts.

The steady erosion of Pontiac School District’s credit quality reflected a variety of problems stemming from a weakened economic base, with school enrollments declining 50% from a decade ago, and rapid turnover of management. The district had been operating with very limited liquidity for several years, with increasing reliance on cash flow borrowing via tax anticipation notes (TANs) and state aid anticipation notes (SANs) to fill shortfalls. Leading up to the default, the district’s General Fund deficit had risen to 50%, and it had a large backlog of unpaid bills. The default was triggered by a series of state actions related to the district’s deficit operations. First, the Michigan Department of Treasury withheld permission for the district to issue TANs for fiscal 2013, citing insufficiency of financial information and its concerns about the district’s ability to ultimately repay the notes. Then, Michigan Department of Education (MDE) separately withheld Pontiac’s aid payments in March and April because the district did not comply with its deficit elimination plan. All this while, the state was considering putting the district under increased financial oversight. The MDE eventually released state aid to Pontiac, but not in time to avert the default.
Defaulted bondholders were paid promptly by the insurer, Syncora Guaranty, once the claim was made, but this was delayed because the paying agent did not notify Syncora of the default until May 21, 2013. While the missed debt service payment was relatively minor in comparison with district operations—approximately 2% of general fund revenues—repayment had to compete against a growing backlog of unpaid bills. The district was then granted permission by the state to issue a TAN, improving cash flow, and also agreed a quarterly repayment schedule with Syncora for principal and accrued interest. The final payment to the insurer was made in June 2014, resulting in recovery of over 100%.

District finances have improved since 2013 given a combination of emergency state loans, expense cuts and stronger management practices. In March 2016, voters renewed the district’s local operating tax, providing predictability for a core operating revenue, and approved a new sinking fund millage that will raise funds for capital expenses and relieve spending pressure on the General Fund.

77) City of Detroit, MI Certificates of Participation

- CUSIP: 251228A; 25113PA
- Default Date: June 14, 2013
- Obligor: City of Detroit, MI
- Issuer: Detroit Retirement Systems Funding Trust
- Defaulted Debt: Series 2005 and 2006 Taxable Certificates of Participation; approximately $1.45 billion of debt affected.
- Cause of Default: Extreme operating and financial distress after years of economic contraction and outmigration.
- Recovery: 12%

The city of Detroit’s decades-long descent into financial distress has been well-documented, and its unraveling, though unique in its severity and duration, may have implications for the treatment of bondholders in other distressed municipalities going forward. Some of its actions have been predictable, but others have been less expected; the treatment of its COPs debt falls into the latter category.

On January 31, 2014, the city filed a motion with the bankruptcy court to invalidate its $1.45 billion of COPs debt. Detroit alleged that its COPs were issued illegally, in that they violated the city’s statutory debt limit. If such a repudiation was successful, holders of the COPs could have received 0% recovery. If the city successfully repudiated the debt, it may have been required to return the proceeds of the sale, which funded the city’s pension systems. Notably, repudiating the COPs could have increased recovery for other creditors, as more of the city’s limited funds would have been available to pay off other liabilities.

Because the COPs were issued as variable rate instruments, the city had entered into a series of swap agreements that later comprised another set of liabilities in the bankruptcy. The city reached a settlement with the counterparties to the swap agreements, whom the city considered to have secured status, resulting in a payment of $85.0 million. The contrast between the proposed treatment of swap counterparties compared to COP holders who faced repudiation highlights the uncertainty of creditor treatment in times of distress.

Ultimately, the city’s filing was rescinded as part of the final settlement with creditors; the bankruptcy settlement provided an approximate cash recovery for COP bondholders of 12%, which is significantly lower than that provided to GOLT and GOULT bondholders (see Case Study 78 and 79).

This up-front recovery does not capture additional considerations in the form of property transfers, lease agreements, or various other economic benefits reflecting separate settlements reached between the city and the bond insurers.

78, 79) City of Detroit, MI Limited Tax and Unlimited Tax General Obligation

- Default Date: July 18, 2013
- Obligor: City of Detroit, MI
» Issuer: City of Detroit, MI


» Cause of Default: Extreme operating and financial distress after years of economic contraction and outmigration.

» Recovery: 73% for GO ULT bonds; 42% for GO LT bonds.

Another surprising turn of events relating to Detroit was its initial treatment of Limited and Unlimited Tax General Obligation bondholders as “unsecured” creditors, which put them on par with other unsecured creditors such as pensioners and vendors. Bondholders contested the treatment of GO debt as “unsecured” in bankruptcy court, claiming that the debt was secured because voters approved a dedicated property tax levy to pay debt service on the GO bonds; under state law, proceeds from this levy were to be put aside and used solely for payment of principal and interest. The city argued that federal bankruptcy protection dissolves any rights the bondholders have to either access those funds or to sue in court to have property taxes increased to pay debt service.

Eventually, the city announced a settlement with most of the insurers of GO ULT debt that reclassified this lien as “secured”. Ultimately, because the city and bondholders settled, there was no court decision as to whether or not the bonds would have been designated secured or unsecured. The final bankruptcy settlement ultimately impaired both types of GO bondholders, with GO ULT and GO LT debt recovering 73% and 42%, respectively.

80) Detroit Academy of Arts & Sciences, MI

» CUSIP: 5955RQ

» Default Date: October 1, 2013

» Obligor: Detroit Academy of Arts & Sciences, MI

» Issuer: Michigan Municipal Bond Authority

» Defaulted Debt: Public Schools Academy Facilities Program Revenue Bonds (Detroit Academy of Arts and Sciences Project), Series 2001; $25.5 million of debt affected

» Recovery: 49% reflecting principal and accrued interest and a distressed exchange into new bonds

The Detroit Academy of Arts and Sciences is a not-for-profit charter school that received its charter in 1997 and began operations in August of that year. It originally served public school children in grades K-5, but eventually expanded to include K-12. The 2001 bonds were secured by monthly installment payments of state aid revenue transferred to the trustee, who is directed to retain no more than 20% for debt service. Pledged revenues in 2011 were a very narrow 1.06 times debt service. The 2011 closure of the Academy’s high school dealt a devastating blow to the already-weak financial position of the Academy, as state aid revenues are distributed on a per-pupil basis. Additionally, the Academy operates in a highly competitive public education market in the state of Michigan, which has resulted in large drops in enrollment for K-8 students (which were down 38% from 2004 to 2013) and may continue to impose volatility on enrollment and revenue trends going forward.

Since February 2102, the Academy had been operating under a forbearance agreement with bondholders; the original agreement had been extended three times, most recently through March 2014.

The Academy defaulted on debt service in October 2013. Relatively quickly thereafter in December 2013 the Academy sold $14.9 million of bonds in a distressed exchange of the remaining $25.5 million principal on the original Series 2001 bonds. In addition to the 42% reduction in principal, the new bonds extend the final maturity from 2013 for the exchanged Series 2001 bonds to 2043 for the new debt. The new 2013 debt is similarly secured by state aid payments to the Academy. The resizing of debt and annual debt service payments is expected to more closely match annual pledged revenues of the Academy following the steady decline in enrollment, but because of the longer amortization, the 58% recovery of principal translates into an all-in recovery rate is 49%.
US Municipal Defaults 2015-2016 (#81-#88)

81) Cook County, IL, Single Family Mortgage Revenue Series '83A – Municipal Multiplier

- CUSIP: 216144CE3
- Default Date: July 1, 2015
- Obligor: Cook Country, IL Single Family Mortgage Revenue
- Issuer: Cook Country, IL
- Defaulted Bonds: Series '83A – Municipal Multiplier; $130K total debt outstanding.
- Cause of Default: Negative Arbitrage.
- Recovery: All in recovery of approximately 15%

The Single Family Mortgage Revenue Bond Series 1983A financed a pool of single family mortgage loans. The bonds defaulted as a result of a weak bond structure. A portion of the bonds were Municipal Multiplier Bonds, a similar payment structure to capital appreciation bonds (CABs), which could not be redeemed until all other bonds were redeemed. Those bonds had an interest rate that was higher than the mortgage and investment rate. Due to the prepayments and defaults on the loans securing the bonds, for much of the life of the bonds, the program experienced negative spread between the interest rates earned on the assets (10.75% on the mortgage loans and 7.75% to 10.125% on the reserves) and rate accruing on the Municipal Multiplier Bonds of 11.25%. This negative spread resulted in insufficient assets to pay off all of the bonds and the default on the bonds.

82) Dowling College, NY

- Default Date: July 20, 2015
- Obligor: Dowling College, NY
- Issuer: Suffolk County Industrial Development Agency, NY and Town of Brookhaven Industrial Development Agency, NY
- Defaulted Bonds: Subordinate Series 1996; $3.5 million outstanding (6/30/2014, rated Ca, issued by Suffolk County Industrial Development Agency), Subordinate Series 2002; $9 million outstanding (6/30/2014, rated Ca, issued by Town of Brookhaven Industrial Development Agency), Series 2006; $34.5 million outstanding (6/30/2014, not rated by Moody's).
- Cause of Default: The deterioration of college's financial condition due to multiyear trend of unsustainable enrollment declines (53% in last four years), weak operating performance (FY 2014 debt service coverage of 0.5 times), and very thin liquidity (12 days cash on hand in FY 2014).
- Recovery: Pending

Dowling College is a small two-campus private educational institution in Long Island NY that has long struggled with costs, competition, and poor financial performance. Unusually tuition dependent, some 40% of Dowling’s enrollment—about 4000 FTE in recent years—has typically been in graduate business, and aviation and other professional programs. Never rated higher than Ba2 since 1997, Dowling fell into the B category in late 2008. By 2009, Dowling was beginning to miss financial covenants, and required non-compliance waivers to continue operations. Dowling began to suffer large enrollment declines and a worsening liquidity position, and in late 2011 was downgraded to the Caa range.

The college entered into a forbearance agreement on 7/20/2015 with respect to the debt service payments on the Series 1996, 2002, and 2006 (not rated) bonds through June 30, 2016, unless terminated earlier pursuant to the agreement terms. Moody's deems the agreement a default as payment will not be made according to originally scheduled terms. The college also entered into a new debt agreement ($6.7 million; not rated by Moody’s) which will be used to provide much needed liquidity and pay down outstanding mortgage notes.
83) Puerto Rico Public Finance Corporation

- CUSIP: 745291VJ0, UY8, UU6, QJ6, PB4
- Default Date: August 3, 2015
- Obligor: Puerto Rico (Commonwealth of)
- Issuer: Puerto Rico Public Finance Corporation
- Cause of Default: Failure to appropriate funds for payment.
- Recovery: Pending, but expected below 35% of principal and accrued interest

Puerto Rico's Public Finance Corporation (PFC; C negative), a conduit agency that issues debt supported by appropriations of Puerto Rico's central government (Caa3 negative), on August 3, 2015, defaulted on four series of bonds for which Puerto Rico's Legislative Assembly had failed to appropriate payments. This was the first payment default of any of the Commonwealth's various debt issuing arms, all of which were rated in the deep speculative ranges at the time of this default. The total payment due was $58 million, and bondholders received only $628,000. Confronted by a growing liquidity and debt crisis, the legislature in June 2015 had approved a budget lacking the required $93.7 million for the PFC bonds' fiscal 2016 debt service, even though the executive branch Office of Management and Budget had included this amount in budget bills it submitted to the legislature. PFC was rated Ca negative when its initial default occurred, and since then it has defaulted each month on bonds with monthly interest payments.

The absence of bondholder objections to PFC’s missed payments underscores the comparative weakness of these subject-to-appropriation bonds with respect to some of the other debt issued by the Commonwealth and its various entities.

84) Cardinal Local School District, OH

- CUSIP: 141519GW2
- Default Date: December 1, 2015
- Obligor: Cardinal Local School District, OH
- Issuer: Cardinal Local School District, OH
- Defaulted Bonds: General Obligation Library Improvement Bonds, Series 2002
- Cause of Default: Strained cash flows coupled with narrow reserves; management’s decision to delay debt payment to make payroll on time
- Recovery: 100% of the amount due

Cardinal Local School District is located about 35 miles outside of Cleveland, OH. In recent years, the district's operations have been pressured by enrollment declines, decreased state aid, rising special education expenditures, and limited voter support for new operating levies. Ongoing structural imbalance led to weakened cash flow and negative fund balance levels. Although Cardinal's debt is secured by a dedicated tax levy, the district intentionally defaulted on its Series 2002 bonds in December 2015, opting to pay salaries instead. Bondholders were ultimately paid by the insurer, Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp, but not until February 2016, as the district did not notify Assured of their inability to pay or their decision to default. Cardinal subsequently repaid Assured the full amount of delinquent principal and interest.

85) Puerto Rico Infrastructure Finance Corporation

- CUSIP: 7452220JQ7, GG2, EY5
- Default Date: January 4, 2016
Obligor: Puerto Rico (Commonwealth of)
Issuer: Puerto Rico Infrastructure Finance Corporation (PRIFA)
Cause of Default: Failure to appropriate funds for payment.
Recovery: Pending, but expected below 35% of principal and accrued interest

The second of the Puerto Rico entities to default, the Public Infrastructure Finance Corporation (PRIFA, C negative) is a conduit agency that had issued debt supported by federal rum excise taxes. Although rum tax revenue continued to flow to PRIFA, the governor invoked the provisions of a November 30, 2015 Executive Order implementing a revenue clawback under the Puerto Rico Constitution, effectively seizing PRIFA’s excise tax revenues for general government operations as of 2016. PRIFA consequently defaulted on January 4, 2016, the first business day of the new year.

86) Puerto Rico Government Development Bank
CUSIP: 745177FH0, FK6, FH3, EX9, EP6, ET8, DZ5, EF8, CJ2, CH6
Default Date: May 3, 2016
Obligor: Puerto Rico (Commonwealth of)
Issuer: Puerto Rico Government Development Bank (GDB)
Cause of Default: Invocation of the commonwealth’s debt moratorium law.
Recovery: Pending, but expected below 35% of principal and accrued interest

Puerto Rico’s Government Development Bank (GDB) defaulted in May 2016 when it was unable to meet a large bullet debt service payment for its Senior Notes. The GDB’s main revenues source comprised repayments of loans made to underlying municipal governments across the Commonwealth; by spring 2016 the GDB’s own liquidity was severely weakened and it had no independent market access.

87) Puerto Rico (General Obligation and GO Guarantee)
CUSIP: 74514LE86, B89, ZX8, WS2, WX1, YW1, ZE0, ZQ3, VM6, HP5, UX3; 7451458Q8, 6G2
Default Date: July 1, 2016
Obligor: Puerto Rico (Commonwealth of)
Issuer: Puerto Rico
Cause of Default: Invocation of the commonwealth’s debt moratorium law.
Recovery: Pending, but expected below 65% to 80% of principal and accrued interest

Puerto Rico’s general obligation pledge ostensibly reflects the highest and broadest form of security for the commonwealth’s non-enterprise debt and it is protected by the commonwealth’s constitution. Puerto Rico’s default on the GO debt before other securities
with weaker legal claims underscores both the comparatively large amount of GO debt and debt service, and also the severity of the government’s current liquidity crisis.

88) Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority

» CUSIP: 745190CQ9
» Default Date: July 1, 2016
» Obligor: Puerto Rico (Commonwealth of)
» Issuer: Puerto Rico
» Defaulted Bonds: Subordinated Transportation Revenue Series 1998; $3.4 billion outstanding
» Cause of Default: Failure to appropriate funds for payment.
» Recovery: Pending, but expected below 35% of principal and accrued interest

The July 2016 default of Puerto Rico’s Highway and Transportation Authority (PRHTA) on its subordinated debt occurred for the same reason as PRIFA’s earlier in the year: the Commonwealth seized the pledged revenues--in this case, highway user taxes--to fund general governments operations under its clawback authority. Throughout 2016, PRHTA’s senior lien highway user tax debt, with $815 mm debt outstanding (Ca negative), was untouched by the clawback and remained current.
Appendix B: Near Misses and Unrated Defaults

Weak operating and financial performance does not always lead to a default. Governments can step-in to support struggling entities or to help provide temporary relief. Mergers and acquisitions in the enterprise sectors can also come at the right time to stave off a default. Because of the high degree of uncertainty and the ability of governments to withdraw their support—even when there is an explicit guarantee as in the case of Wenatchee, WA or an appropriation pledge in the case of Menasha, WI—Moody’s ratings generally don’t consider the possibility of such interventions. In the recent past, there have been several notable examples of ‘near misses’—instances when defaults were averted by fortuitous circumstances.

There have also been several interesting recent default cases which, while not rated, have helped inform our knowledge of the universe of municipal defaults. Below we profile a few notable examples. While these cases are not included in our data statistics, they tend to reflect similar credit trends observed in the rated portfolio—weakening economic profiles, reduced financial flexibility and lacking governance practices.

1) Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation—38 Studios (near miss)

In 2010, Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation (RIEDC) issued bonds on behalf of start-up company 38 Studios, which was a video-gaming venture. The bonds were secured by loan payments made by 38 Studios and featured a moral obligation from the State of Rhode Island to appropriate funds to cover deficiencies in the capital reserve fund and debt service on the bonds. The company struggled financially, failed to make a required annual payment of $1.125 million due in May 2012 and although payment was eventually received within the 30-day cure period specified in the loan contracts, 38 Studios eventually declared bankruptcy. Politically, the once-positive sentiment over job creation in connection with the venture was replaced with frustration over the agreement terms and Rhode Island’s exposure to the outstanding debt. But the state has continued to appropriate funds to meet its moral obligation pledge without interruption. In March 2016, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a complaint against RIEDC and the bond underwriter, Wells Fargo. The complaint alleges, among other things, that the offering documents contained a significant omission because they did not disclose that even with the loan proceeds the project faced a known funding shortfall. This is not expected to affect appropriations going forward.

2) Camden County Pollution Control Finance Authority, NJ (near miss)

Before paying off debt in 2010, the solid waste system in Camden did not generate sufficient revenues to pay its debt service. The Authority had relied on state aid since 1999, receiving more than $150 million. Although the State of New Jersey provided ongoing support, it had no legal or moral obligation to do so. In fact, the State’s assistance did wane in recent years, coming in at $6 million despite increased requests from the Authority. Concerns began to emerge whether Camden County Pollution Control Finance Authority would meet its ballooning principal payment of $24.3 million due December 2010. A last-minute deal with the State Department of Environmental Protection helped the Authority narrowly avoid a default.

3) Westerly Hospital, RI (near miss)

Despite its favorable market position as the dominant player on the southwest coast of Rhode Island, Westerly Hospital has experienced a precipitous decline in financial performance since fiscal year 2000. On December 7, 2011, the hospital filed for receivership to address its operating performance and expense pressures related to salaries and unfunded pensions. Throughout the period of receivership, Westerly Hospital continued to make all debt service payments on time and in full, although it did so by using funds from the debt service reserve fund and skipping the mandatory redemptions. In June 2013, Lawrence and Memorial Hospital based in New London, Connecticut, purchased Westerly Hospital, assuming its debt and ending a 17 month receivership.

4) City of Moberly, Missouri (unrated default)

» Default Date: August 2011 (default on bonds); March 2012 (Moberly’s renege of appropriation pledge) approximately $35 million of debt outstanding.

» Cause of default: Fraud, city’s failure to appropriate.

Located in Randolph County, Missouri, the City of Moberly has a population of 14,000 and an annual budget of about $7 million. In 2010, the City issued $39 million of bonds through its economic development authority on behalf of Mamtek—a corporation building an artificial sweetener facility in the city. Pursuant to the bond issue, Moberly pledged to appropriate funds to the economic
development authority for payment on the bonds. Construction of the facility was never completed and the plant closed due to financial troubles. Mamtek defaulted on $3.2 million in August 2011 and the City reneged on its appropriation pledge when allegations of fraud emerged. Mamtek CEO Bruce Cole pled guilty to two counts of securities fraud and one criminal count of theft under a plea deal for missing bond proceeds for personal gain and is now serving seven years in prison. In October 2012, the manufacturing plant was sold at an auction for $1.8 million. Bondholders filed a federal class action lawsuit against Armstrong Teasdale, general counsel for the issuance, Morgan Keegan, the underwriter for the transaction, and Raymond James, who had since acquired Morgan Keegan, alleging that they were misled about the viability of the plant and the city pledge. A settlement was announced in 2015, in which investors recouped about 86% of their losses.

5) Town of Mammoth Lakes, CA (unrated bankruptcy)

» Default Date: July 2, 2012 (filing for bankruptcy protection).
» Cause of Default: Unfavorable court ruling equaling three times the city’s annual operating budget.

Mammoth Lakes, a ski resort town near Yosemite National Park, filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection after the state appellate court upheld a judgment against the Town. In 1997, Mammoth Lakes entered into an agreement in which developers, Mammoth Lakes Land Acquisition, improved airport operations in exchange for rights to develop retail and housing properties, and an option to buy the land. When the Town announced the project would interfere with Federal Aviation Administration policy governing the use of airport property for aeronautical purposes, developers filed a lawsuit citing breach of contract. The Town appealed the 2008 decision to award $30 million against it. In 2012, the ruling was upheld and the judgment was increased to $43 million, commensurate with interest and legal fees. When mediation between the Town and developers failed, Mammoth Lakes filed for bankruptcy protection. A month after the filing, the Town announced a settlement, and asked the court to dismiss the bankruptcy filing, which was signed by the Judge in November 2012.

6) City of Vadnais Heights, Minnesota (unrated default)

» Default Date: August 27, 2012 (Vadnais Heights decision to renege on appropriation pledge); lease termination December 2012; approximately $1.8 million of lease debt and $10.6 million of general obligation debt outstanding.
» Cause of default: City’s failure to appropriate.

The City of Vadnais Heights’s action to renege on an appropriation pledge is an example of how the failure to support the operations or debt service of struggling enterprises can have serious ramifications for a local government’s general obligation rating. Some will experience severe deterioration in credit quality.

For example, the City of Vadnais Heights, Minnesota made an appropriation pledge to support a lease revenue transaction (unrated) used to finance a sports complex. City management expected net revenues of the facility to fully fund debt service, but when net revenues were insufficient, the city faced an unexpected call on its appropriation pledge. City officials chose to terminate the lease payments, a decision that led to our September 2012 downgrade of the city’s general obligation rating to Ba1 from Aa2. A key factor in our rating action was the city’s unwillingness to honor its pledge on publicly-issued debt. The city’s rating has since been upgraded to Baa2, reflecting the elimination of the contingent liability with the sale of the project assets as well as the moderate risk associated with a pending lawsuit brought by the complex’s operator.

In counterpoint to this is the City of Monticello, Minnesota, which discontinued its support of an underperforming telecommunications enterprise. But when the bonds for this enterprise (unrated) were originally sold, the security was expressly limited to net revenues generated from the utility. The city made no pledge to support the debt from any other source and did not provide funding to avert a default on the bonds. The city did, however, provide some General Fund support for the utility’s operations, which weakened the city’s the financial position, triggering our September 2012 downgrade of the city’s general obligation rating to A2 from Aa3. Despite the downgrade, we viewed the city’s general obligation credit profile as remaining solidly in the investment-grade range. Unlike the Vadnais Heights transaction, Monticello made no assurances to consider appropriating for debt service; the risks on the utility revenue bonds were transparent to investors.
7) Harrisburg University of Science and Technology, Pennsylvania (unrated default)

- Default Date: March 1, 2014
- Cause of Default: Higher than projected expenses and low enrollment

Harrisburg University of Science and Technology was created in 2001 and opened its doors in 2005 as a private not-for-profit university in the capital city. The University was partially supported by public funds, including a $1.5 million a year pledge from Dauphin County to support debt service through 2019. Located downtown and meant to spur development, the University issued approximately $88 million in bonds in 2007 to support a science and technology project.

The University, which aimed to provide science, mathematics and technology education through undergraduate, graduate and professional programs, was never able to meet its enrollment projections. Enrollment for Fall 2013 semester stood at about 420 students, with the University needing between 520 and 550 to break even.

The University experienced both payment and non-payment defaults, the latter in the form of failing to submit funds to the trustee in advance of the bond payment date as required. The trustee has been able to draw on Dauphin County’s guaranty to provide payment to bondholders, but it is insufficient to cover total annual debt service.

Dauphin County has signaled its intent to continue to provide $1.5 million each year towards debt service. The city of Harrisburg itself exited state receivership in February 2014. School officials report that, despite being put on a federal watchlist by the U.S. Department of Education requiring increased financial oversight, the school has been improving, with April 2015 headcount standing at around 1,500.

8) Munster School District (IN) (unrated default)

The school district, which defaulted in January 2015, serves a wealthy population about 30 miles outside Chicago. It faced severe cash flow constraints following major cuts to state funding coupled with lower-than-expected tax collections in December 2014. The district was a participant in a post-default state intercept program, but the district cured the deficiency with an emergency loan and did not trigger Indiana’s (Aaa stable) post-default intercept program. The district is planning cuts in spending, including significant layoffs, to allow it to make its next debt service payment.

9) Penn Hills School District, PA (near miss)

Penn Hills School District, PA’s (B3 negative) serves approximately 3,900 students in western Pennsylvania near the City of Pittsburgh (A1 positive). The district is challenged by very limited finances, a heavy debt and pension burden, steady enrollment declines, and stiff competition from 31 nearby charter and cyber schools. In fiscal 2014, the district experienced a $9 million operating deficit due to negative variance in revenues and expenses, primarily from under budgeting for debt service, transportation, charter school and pension costs. The deficit reduced the General Fund balance to -$8.9 million, or -11.6% of revenues. Given its narrow position, the district found itself unable to meet its April 1, 2015 debt service payment.

In contrast to Munster School District referenced above, which did not utilize its post-default enhancement program to cure its default, Penn Hills tapped Pennsylvania’s Act 150 post-default program with sufficient advance warning to the state so that the program was able to make debt service payments before there was a default. The payment was made by the state with the district’s intercepted state aid.

The district’s finances continue to be significantly pressured. Its weak liquidity position was exacerbated by the state’s budget impasse, which prevented regular disbursements of state aid from flowing to school districts. As a result, the district again relied on the Act 150 program to meet its April 1, 2016 payment given its narrow liquidity.

10) San Bernardino, CA (unrated bankruptcy)

- Default Date: August 1, 2012 (filing for bankruptcy protection).
- Cause of Default: A $46 million projected budget deficit and large unfunded pension liabilities.
San Bernardino is the county seat of San Bernardino County located in southeast California’s Inland Empire. On August 1, 2012, the city filed for bankruptcy protection and stopped making payments on its pension obligation bonds (POBs). The filing came after the city announced it faced a sizeable $46 million projected budget deficit, nearly 40% of operating revenues. San Bernardino suspended its employer contributions to the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS, Aa2 stable) for one year after it filed for bankruptcy, but, in a 2014 deal, eventually agreed to a schedule to repay its foregone contributions and to contribute according to the actuarial requirements annually determined by CalPERS going forward.

The city filed its plan of adjustment on May 23, 2015 after nearly three years of disputes with its unions, creditors, and CalPERS. The proposed plan of adjustment called for full payment on pension obligations to CalPERS and no impairment to the small amount of lease debt outstanding. In exchange for preserving pensions, retirees agreed to cuts in other post-employment benefits, or OPEB, primarily retiree health insurance. The city eliminated its monthly subsidies and retirees were placed in a retiree-only benefit program, instead of a blended program with active city employees, resulting in increased premiums. These changes resulted in a 86% cut to the city’s OPEB liabilities.

The city also proposed a significant 99% loss for POB holders. The strategy of cutting OPEB and debt obligations, while leaving pensions untouched, is consistent with the earlier Stockton and Detroit bankruptcies. In mid-September 2015, Ambac and the Luxembourg bank Erste Europäische Pfandbrief-Und Kommunalkreditabnk AG (EePK) filed objections to the proposed plan.

On March 28, 2016, the city reached a settlement agreement with EePK and Ambac. The new payment schedule is stretched out by 10 years and is significantly backloaded. We estimate the recovery to be about 30%, which is more than the initial 1% proposal and somewhat less than the stated recovery of 40%. Overall, the loss is sizeable when compared to the historic recovery rates for the sector.

Although the POBs were “unconditional legal obligations” of the city, they were unsecured obligations, and the agreement is another example of how such debt fares against secured debt and pension obligations.

11) Griggs County, ND (near miss)

Griggs County, ND (B3 developing) is an example of how a lack of public support for a lease project can significantly increase bondholder risks, even if the security pledge is nominally strong. The county’s Series 2013 Lease Revenue Bonds were used to finance a new county courthouse in conjunction with a new emergency operations center that was concurrently financed by federal grants. The Griggs County Building Authority (GCBA) was created for the sole purpose of issuing the 2013 bonds and governed by the same Board of County Commissioners (Board) who authorized the project. The pledge securing the bonds is strong as it is unconditional and not subject to annual appropriation. Because the project had a public safety component, under state statute the county dedicated an irrevocable 10-mill lease levy for repayment that is backed by an unlimited property tax if the lease levy is insufficient.

But community opposition to the project, undisclosed at the time of issuance, was very high and voters had previously defeated the project three times. All five of the County Commissioners who authorized the original bond issuance in March 2013 were replaced through a recall election in October in direct response to the county’s proceeding with the courthouse project the public had voted against. The newly elected County Commissioners refused to sit on the GCBA board, leading to an unusual separation of the governance of Griggs County and the GCBA and laying the foundation for the new Board to distance itself from the unpopular courthouse project. The GCBA board is still composed of the now recalled former Commissioners.

Since the recall election, the Board has engaged in standoff with the GCBA. It has blocked completion of the courthouse project, threatened to not make its lease payments, and has generally attempted to terminate its obligation to pay. Most recently, in August 2015, the county filed suit against the GCBA to break the lease agreement. On December 30, 2015 a judge of the Southeast Judicial District court in North Dakota denied the County’s motion for a summary judgment terminating its lease and later scheduled a date for a jury trial to resolve the case. The trial is to be held December 12, 2016 through December 21, 2016. The judge also ordered a mediation be between the two parties prior to the trial that has now been scheduled for May 3.

Despite the ongoing litigation the county has continued to make all of its required lease payments and has been paying in advance at least five days prior to the debt service payment date.
Appendix C: Individual Short-Term Municipal Default Events

Although the focus of this study is on long-term defaults, short-term risks are inevitably incorporated in the performance data. Liquidity, market access and solvency are key considerations for both short-term and long-term ratings. Furthermore, short-term pressures reflect an issuer’s credit profile, and Moody’s adjusts its long- and short-term ratings accordingly when such information is discovered. There were four notable short-term defaults during the study period; these exclude the slight interest payment delays on Orange County notes which resulted from procedural issues, as noted in the Orange County default case study (14) in Appendix A above.

1) New York State Urban Development Corporation

UDC was the first major municipal issuer to default on its obligations since the Great Depression. Established in 1968, the Urban Development Corporation (UDC) was created to provide low- and moderate-income housing around the New York State. The Corporation relied heavily on moral obligations from New York State to help fund its construction projects, having issued $1.1 billion in long-term debt by 1974. But at the time UDC’s programs had not yet developed sufficient cash flow to cover debt service, and the concept of what debt service it should be covering was itself hazy since borrowings were frequent, new programs continuously starting, and accounting techniques for capitalized interest still evolving.

By the end of 1974, UDC had substantial future borrowing requirements to complete projects under construction and to repay $100 million in maturing BANs and $30 million in a private bridge loan, both due February 1975. Security for the BANs included UDC’s full faith and credit and commitment to issue bonds in order to pay them off. In January and February, UDC tried to issue new debt to continue its operations but was unable to do so. Governor Carey stepped in and asked banks to lend to the Corporation, but an agreement could not be reached. On February 25, UDC missed a $104.5 million payment due on its BANs, $100 million principal and $4.5 million interest; the default was cured within eight days.

After the default New York State Legislature and Governor Carey created New York State Project Finance Agency (PFA) to provide long-term financing not otherwise available to UDC. The Agency received $190 million state appropriations and $280 million credit line from commercial banks and state agencies. PFA purchased mortgages from UDC, thus, enabling UDC to pay principal and interest on defaulted notes, to make contributions for completing projects under construction and to provide one year’s debt service on existing bonds. UDC’s financing needs continued to be met through bond issuances by PFA until the 1980s, and the Corporation remained reliant on state support for years afterwards given high mortgage delinquencies in its housing program.

Leading up to the default, Moody’s had a MIG 2 rating on the notes and a long-term rating of Baa, which was based in part on the evolving support from the State. Moody’s suspended its rating on the BANs on January 29, 1975.

2) New York City

New York City’s three year moratorium on note repayment occurred in the context of an epic fiscal crisis that came to a head in 1975, nearly resulted in a monetary default, caused the city to flirt with bankruptcy, and was ultimately resolved only with the assistance of the federal and state governments. The problem lay in chronic overspending and budget deficits that reached back as far as 1961, an accumulation of short-term cash of borrowing to meet operating needs, and opaque and improper accounting and budgeting practices that camouflaged the imbalances. By early 1975 the market was beginning to reject New York City paper; a February TAN sale had to be canceled, and subsequent proposed issues could not get clean legal opinions. The Urban Development Corporation then defaulted on a BAN issue, which was unrelated to the City but which heightening the overall market concern. By April, the city was resorting to bank and pension fund loans for short-term operating funds.

In November 1975, New York State enacted the Moratorium Act, which suspended for three years the right to sue the city of New York to force payment of its short-term obligations. Using the terms of this law, New York City deferred payment and thus defaulted on its notes as they came due. The financial emergency that existed in New York City in the early to mid-1970s was a result of spending that exceeded operating revenue for several years. The overspending created accumulated fund deficits and cash flow problems that could be resolved only by short-term borrowing to meet expenditures.

When banks refused to roll over its short-term debt, the city did not have the funds necessary to pay its obligations. To provide cash to the city while implementing a plan to return it to balanced budgets under the supervision of a state control board, the state advanced the city money, the Municipal Assistance Corporation for the City of New York (MAC) was established to issue debt on behalf of the
city, the city’s pension funds provided loans, and the federal government provided loans and guaranteed the city’s other loans. The majority of the short-term debt was converted to long-term debt through the MAC. This allowed the city to eliminate its fund deficits by reducing debt service payments by lengthening the repayment time. These actions allowed the city to emerge from its fiscal crisis. In the mid-1970s, the MAC scaled back the interest rate payable and extended the maturity of its debt through bondholder approved amendments. This restructuring was part of a series of actions taken to secure fiscal support from the US Government. At the time, Moody’s did not classify this restructuring as a bond distressed exchange default by MAC because:

» The restructuring was not undertaken to avoid default on the MAC bonds since the MAC bonds were legally separate and distinct from the City of New York and therefore not at risk to a potential bankruptcy;

» The restructuring was approved by MAC bondholders as part of a larger agreement designed to bolster and secure the finances of New York City; and

» Financial and political issues broader than payment on the MAC bonds motivated approval by the bondholders.

Under our current definition of a distressed exchange, however, the restructuring of some investors’ bonds as a pre-condition for federal support would support the conclusion that the debt exchange was “distressed.” We have not incorporated this default into our default statistics, however, since the definition of default, to which the ratings were then calibrated, was different at the time.

3) Cleveland, Ohio
The City of Cleveland (OH) defaulted in December 1978 on $14 million short-term notes held by six local banks. The default was not cured until November 1980, after a voter-approved tax levy in 1979 and the January 1980 passage of a ‘Local Fiscal Emergencies’ statute that enabled state intervention including loans and financial oversight. Broadly similar to New York City’s fiscal emergency, the source of the Cleveland default lay in its chronic inability to balance its operations and resulting questionable financial practices. Throughout the mid-1970s, Cleveland’s general fund expenses greatly exceeded its revenues which ultimately led the city to adopt a practice of ‘borrowing’ restricted bond fund monies from the Water Department to meet ongoing general operating costs. While the incoming Kucinich administration (1977-79) inherited this problem, it also did not act quickly to remedy the situation. Concerns over this practice and the structural budget imbalances brought the Moody’s rating from A to Baa and then Ba by mid-1978; Cleveland was unable to issue bonds nor refinance or renew outstanding notes. The rating had fallen to B by November, shortly before the default itself.

While the Cleveland default was rooted in its very poor financial management, the triggering event was bound up in a curious political flight over the fate of the city’s electric system, Municipal Light, which had been in a long-running feud with its wholesale supplier, Cleveland Electric Illuminating (CEI) that ultimately resulted in antitrust allegations against the latter. The former administration had planned to sell Municipal Light to CEI to resolve the suit and generate cash for Cleveland, but the Kucinich administration opposed the sale. In the context of the city’s worsening financial situation and absence of market access, the banks holding the city’s notes, headed by Cleveland Trust, refused to renew the notes unless the utility sale went ahead. It was subsequently reported that Cleveland Trust and CEI had interlocking directors and, with another bank, had ownership interests in CEI.

In a February 1979 special election, Cleveland voters approved a new half-cent income tax that began to produce new revenues, and further rejected the plan to sell Municipal Light, which it still operates. The Voinovich administration came into office in November 1979 and developed a three-year refinancing plan that included $15 million in state loans under the Fiscal Emergencies statute. Cleveland was upgraded to Ba1 in August 1981, and reached Baa in early 1985.

4) City of Menasha, Wisconsin
The City of Menasha (WI) defaulted on its appropriation-backed Steam Utility Revenue BANs with the failure of a steam enterprise project that seriously compromised the city’s overall debt capacity and creditworthiness. The Steam Utility had begun as a local economic development effort when Menasha Utilities’ gas-fired electric generating units were idled by the dispatching utility in 2004. The plan was to divert the redundant units to industrial steam production for four surrounding paper mills; by converting the units to coal—at the time cheaper than gas—the hope was that cheaper energy would help revive the mills’ fortunes and sustain their employment. The project rapidly suffered cost overruns more than triple the initial $12.6 million BANs (2005, due 9/1/2009), along with a variety of technical and environmental problems and shortfalls in actual steam sales. To keep up with project costs, Menasha
issued another $11.5 million in Steam BANs, $2.675 Steam Note Anticipation Notes (NANs), and $13 million privately placed Steam BANs in 2006, and $13.93 million GO Promissory Notes in 2007. By 2007, the reserve funds were tapped to make BAN interest payments. By April, the city’s advisors recommended closure of the plant to avoid further financial damage to the city, but by this time the Steam notes were rated speculative-grade, and the city’s GO and GO-note ratings had also suffered. In April 2011, Menasha sold the assets to WPPI Energy (formerly known as Wisconsin Public Power Inc.) with the proceeds used to partially repay noteholders of the defaulted securities, representing a recovery rate of approximately 75%.
Appendix D: Methodology

This study covers public underlying ratings for all public finance issuers, including US state and local governments, municipal utilities, not-for-profit hospitals, housing agencies, colleges and universities, as well as other municipal issuers with long-term debt ratings. It also includes certain infrastructure and project finance credits that are tracked in parallel in our infrastructure default study. Insured, enhanced, and structured finance (e.g., letter of credit-backed) ratings are excluded. Refunded ratings are also excluded.

Our unit of analysis throughout this study is a "credit". It refers to a rating for a distinct obligor, purpose, security, and seniority designations. As such, multiple rating histories may exist for a given obligor. The municipal sector is highly disaggregated. Municipal issuers may issue separately secured debt with differing seniority for multiple financing purposes, and each may have a distinct default probability and expected recovery rate in the event of default. In these cases, each security may have a distinct rating. For example, the Dormitory Authority of New York sells bonds for both hospitals and universities, purposes that have different default probabilities. As these projects may have a different financial performance, the bonds backed by that performance may have different degrees of credit risk and hence receive different ratings.

In instances where more than one debt with the same financing purpose and security class exist at a given point-in-time for a given obligor, we choose the median rating to represent that obligor’s rating for the specific financing purpose and security class. In case the median rating lies in between two assigned ratings but is itself not an assigned rating, we choose the worse of the two assigned ratings to represent the rating of the obligor.

This study captures the recalibration of municipal ratings to the global rating scale, which took place between April and May 2010. Moody's recalibrated its long-term US municipal ratings to its global rating scale. The recalibration was intended to achieve such comparability, so that now a given rating symbol for different sectors and regions should have similar average credit risk relative to global peers measured over long periods of time. Prior to the recalibration, Moody’s municipal ratings emphasized the ordinal ranking of credit risk within the municipal sector only and were not intended to be comparable to global corporate ratings, for example.

When calibrated to the global rating scale, most state and local government long-term municipal ratings were increased by up to three notches. These new rating assignments did not reflect an improvement in credit risk, but simply a rescaling of that risk, analogous to changing a temperature report from Fahrenheit to Celsius. Consequently, for the purposes of this study the recalibration is not reflected as an "upgrade" in any of the credit metrics presented. Instead, historical ratings were adjusted to the new scale to "smooth over" the recalibration (the next appendix provides additional details on the recalibration process).

We have also smoothed the rating refinements of the late 1990s in our rating volatility and drift exhibits to more accurately reflect credit-based changes. Beginning in 1997, Moody’s introduced 2s and 3s to our municipal alpha-numeric ratings (until this point, for example, municipal ratings in the A range were either “A1” or “A”). The addition of 2s and 3s were previously reflected as upgrades and downgrades, and appeared as increased rating volatility. Since these changes reflect a change in Moody's published scale and not a change in underlying credit quality, they have been smoothed for the purpose of measuring rating volatility. This was achieved by taking the rating back to date of the rating assignment immediately prior to the refinement date.
Appendix E: Recalibration to the Global Rating Scale

The table below provides examples of how the rating histories were adjusted to reflect the recalibration of municipal ratings to the global rating scale that occurred in 2010. The table shows both the rating before and after the recalibration process for a couple of municipal issuers, San Diego County and the City of New York. The columns to the far right illustrate that in any instance the calibration process resulted in an upgrade or downgrade of the issuer: the ratings before and after the calibration resulted in the same notch differential between two given rating actions.

<table>
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<th>Obligor</th>
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<th>Rating before re-calibration</th>
<th>Rating after re-calibration</th>
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<td>A1</td>
<td>Aa3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3/23/1982</td>
<td>A2</td>
<td>A1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7/19/1982</td>
<td>A1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>A2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10/24/1996</td>
<td>Baa1</td>
<td>A3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9/8/1999</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>Aa3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4/16/2010</td>
<td>Aa3</td>
<td>Aa3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| New York (City of) NY    | 4/11/1968   | Baa1                         | A3                          |
|                         | 12/18/1972  | A2                           | A1                          |
|                         | 10/2/1975   | Ba2                          | Ba1                         |
|                         | 10/29/1975  | Caa2                         | Caa1                        |
|                         | 5/24/1977   | B2                           | B1                          |
|                         | 11/19/1981  | Ba1                          | Baa3                        |
|                         | 11/10/1983  | Baa2                         | Baa1                        |
|                         | 12/17/1985  | Baa1                         | A3                          |
|                         | 5/31/1988   | A2                           | A1                          |
|                         | 2/11/1991   | Baa1                         | A3                          |
|                         | 5/1/1999    | A3                           | A2                          |
|                         | 4/4/2005    | A2                           | A1                          |
|                         | 7/18/2007   | Aa3                          | Aa2                         |
|                         | 10/23/2008  | Aa3                          | Aa2                         |

*Source: Moody’s*
Appendix F: Moody’s Definition of Default

Moody’s definition of default includes the following events:

» A missed or delayed disbursement of a contractually-obligated interest or principal payment (excluding missed payments cured within a contractually allowed grace period), as defined in credit agreements and indentures;

» A bankruptcy filing or legal receivership by the debt issuer or obligor that will likely cause a miss or delay in future contractually-obligated debt service payments;

» A distressed exchange whereby: (i) the issuer offers creditors a new or restructured debt, or a new package of securities, cash or assets, that amount to a diminished financial obligation relative to the original obligation; and (ii) the exchange has the effect of allowing the issuer to avoid a bankruptcy or payment default; or

» A change in the payment terms of a credit agreement or indenture imposed by the sovereign that results in a diminished financial obligation, such as a forced currency re-denomination (imposed by the debtor, himself, or his sovereign) or a forced change in some other aspect of the original promise.

Moody’s definition of default does not include so-called “technical defaults,” such as maximum leverage or minimum debt coverage violations, unless the obligor fails to cure the violation and fails to honor the resulting debt acceleration which may be required. For structured finance securities, technical defaults (such as breach of an overcollateralization test or certain other events of default as per the legal documentation of the issuer), or a temporary missed interest payment on a security whose terms allow for the deferral of such payments together with corresponding interest (such as PIKable securities) prior to its legal final maturity date do not constitute defaults. Also excluded are payments owed on long-term debt obligations which are missed due to purely technical or administrative errors which are 1) not related to the ability or willingness to make the payments and 2) are cured in very short order (typically, 1-2 business days). Finally, in select instances based on the facts and circumstances, missed payments on financial contracts or claims may be excluded if they are the result of legal disputes regarding the validity of those claim such as indexation or maturity.
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» US Public Finance: 2016 Outlooks

Rating Implementation Guidance
» Recalibration of Moody's US Municipal Ratings to its Global Rating Scale and Assigning Global Scale, March 2010

Rating Methodology
» U.S. Public Finance: Rating Methodologies
» US Local Government General Obligation Debt, January 2014

Research Guide
» Moody's Rating Symbols and Definitions, January 2016

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Endnotes

1 See US Municipal Bond Default Study 1970-2012 for a larger discussion on this topic.

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